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KLANICZAY TIBOR 
(1923-1992) 
In memoriam 
My first meeting with KJaniczay Tibor lives very vividly in my mind. I am seated in his office 
at the Institute of Literary Studies on a morning in early November 1959, his rapid-fire Hungarian 
buffeting, sometimes befuddling my inexperienced ear as he, flanked by the staff, welcomes me as 
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the first American academic to appear at the Institute since the end of the war and, after 
painstakingly exploring my project and needs, assures me of complete cooperation during the three 
weeks I shall devote to reviewing sources in the Institute's library for inclusion in my introductory 
bibliography to the study of Hungarian literature, time taken from a Fulbright year in Vienna. 
Four years later, in September 1963,1 returned to Ménesi út to launch research on my annotated 
bibliography of Hungarian authors, also to be published by Harvard University Press, and once 
again received his cooperation and benefited from his guidance, this time for a period of nine 
months. It was during these months that I came to know Klaniczay as a colleague and friend and 
saw that he would play a historical role in restoring relations between the intellectual world of 
Hungary and that of other countries, a scholar who would forge the links required to advance 
knowledge of the Hungarian language and literature beyond his country's borders at a troubled 
time, when political factors and economic considerations originating in the Cold War and the 
aftermath of the '56 uprising cast dark clouds over the prospects for the undertaking. 
But as bleak as the outlook was that fall for initiating steps in that direction, some signs of 
western interest in Hungarian culture and of cooperation on the part of Hungarian agencies were 
beginning to appear. Personages, some under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of State and 
the assistance of the Institute of Cultural Relations were seen in the Gellért lobby: Edward Albee 
came to address a group of Hungarian writers, John Steinbeck to discover authors for possible 
publication in America, Edmund Wilson to scrutinize Hungarian translations of Pushkin's Eugene 
Onegin for his review of Nabakov's own recently published version, and C. P. Snow and Walter 
Lippmann together to observe the political scene. As a less glamorous portent of the changing 
climate but one more pertinent to future exchanges of scholars, two other academics were at work 
for the year at institutes in Budapest - Thomas Mark on his translation of Katona's Bánk bán, 
Richard Allen on his doctoral dissertation - both, like myself, under the joint auspices of the 
Inter-University Committee of Travel Grants and the Institute of Cultural Relations, the first 
Americans given this opportunity since the end of the war. And a representative of the Ford 
Foundation, Shepard Stone, came in November to prepare the way for a committee of distinguished 
scholars, headed by John Lotz, who were scheduled to arrive in February to refine the details of the 
Foundation's fellowship program for Hungarian scholars seeking to conduct research in the United 
States, and to interview prospective applicants. All these stirrings represented a striking change in 
the climate I found in November 1959, when the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party was holding its 
first session since 1956, and a reporter from Magyar Nemzet was interviewing guests breakfasting at 
the Gellért so he could inform readers that foreigners were again coming to Hungary. 
The need to expand relations between academics of East and West entered our conversations 
independently of these harbingers of improved circumstances very early that fall. By December we 
were discussing the major barriers hampering the growth of the knowledge of the Hungarian 
language and literature in the United States, barriers encountered to varying degrees in other 
nations of the world: the lack of supportive curricula at universities, the inadequacy of Hungarian 
holdings in libraries, even at such prime institutions as Columbia and Harvard and the New York 
Public Library, and the shortage of funds supporting research in Hungarian studies. These realities 
did not dampen Klaniczay's determination to act. He found hope in the fact that, despite these 
formidable obstacles, serious activity in Hungarian studies was stirring among determined, 
dedicated scholars outside Hungary, and that the Hungarian language and literature and subjects 
related to their study were beginning to attract increasing numbers of academics as fields to which 
they were ready to commit their energies even though they had only a limited opportunity, if 
fortunate to have any at all, to teach the subject of their research. 
Determined to break ground, Klaniczay, sifting through the options at hand for viable action, 
went to the heart of the matter: The implementation of the efforts of this growing band of 
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academics trying to expand knowledge of Hungarian culture abroad. Hungary, he concluded, was 
unable, in its current circumstances, to contribute to the development of university programs (an 
initiative to come much later with the establishment of the Hungarian chair at Indiana University 
by the Academy, in which he played a major role), or to build Hungarian holdings in libraries, or 
to fund research, but, he believed, steps, however gradual they had to be, could and must be taken 
to create a formal community of academics engaged in the study of Hungarian language, 
literature, and ethnography abroad and in Hungary as a forum in which to exchange ideas and 
share work in progress. His prodigious energy, perseverance, and administrative skill buttressed 
by the great esteem in which he was held by scholars at home and abroad, he soon began to lay 
the foundation for the International Association of Hungarian Studies: recruiting like-minded 
supporters, securing financial backing from the Academy, setting up a competent staff, compiling 
lists of potential members in various countries, organizing an international working committee to 
draft a constitution - all this while tending to his many other responsibilites and scholarly pursuits. 
The achievement of his aim required many years, but his energy, persistence, and persuasiveness 
produced results. It was, indeed, a moment of celebration experienced by all who had shared this 
genesis with him when the draft constitution, proposals for two journals, and other matters 
essential to activating the Association were presented for action at the first session of the Executive 
Committee, representing seventeen countries, September 18-19, 1977, and again when the 
Association held its first congress August 10-14, 1981, at the Academy with members from 
twenty-five countries present. 
In the time since those formative years, members of the Association have reaped the benefits 
of his vision. Once scattered over the world, accustomed to working in isolation, in silence, we 
have witnessed the development of Hungarian holdings, the growth in financial support, and the 
increase in the number of those seriously engaged in Hungarian studies abroad, including students. 
We now know what is transpiring in the areas of our professional interests. And Klaniczay's 
ultimate aim has been achieved: we are now no longer strangers, names and works now have faces 
and voices, for we have met, talked, argued, and broken bread together. To him we owe this 
enrichment of our personal and professional lives, and to him we pledge the perpetuation of his 
vision. 
My last visit with Klaniczay also lives vividly in my memory. I was in Budapest to conclude 
a project and begin another and to mark the thirtieth anniversary of my first days at the Institute. 
Since that visit so long ago, the bell had tolled for many of my colleagues at the Institute who had 
helped me, born of immigrant Hungarian peasants from the Bánát, to find my legs in Hungarian 
literature. As I summoned them up in the stillness of the night, the litany of their names so 
tightened my throat that I could not continue them: Gerézdi Rábán, Kemény G. Gábor, Sőtér 
István, Vargha Kálmán, V. Kovács Sándor... I made my pilgrimage to. Ménesi út, to the library 
where I had spent so may days, months on end digging, exploring, discovering, to be surrounded 
once again by the works of authors who had become such an intimate part of my existence and 
to sit at that large table I kept piled high with books for annotation. But I went there above all 
to express my deepest gratitude to Klaniczay for having opened the way for me three decades ago 
by putting on his desk a copy of every work I had published since then. I did that, but I bade him 
farewell with an apprehensive heart, fearful that his presence would never grace my life again. 
University of Minnesota, Duluth 
Duluth, Minnesota Albert Tezla 

LOST OPPORTUNITIES: LAJOS KOSSUTH, 
THE BALKAN NATIONALITIES, 
AND THE DANUBIAN CONFEDERATION 
SAMUEL J. WILSON 
University of Rio Grande, Ohio 
USA 
In 1923, while an émigré in Vienna, Oszkár Jászi wrote the following 
dedication to Lajos Kossuth in his book Revolution and Counter-Revolution in 
Hungary: 
To the Manes of Louis Kossuth the most farseeing of Hungarians who predicted his 
country's disaster and clearly discerned the path to her recovery.1 
Jászi was also describing himself in this dedication. He wrote it in retro-
spect, after the failure of the Károlyi Revolution in January 1919. Like 
Kossuth, Jászi became an exile following the failure of a revolution in which 
he had played a significant role. Also like Kossuth, with the passing of time, 
Jászi became more mature and objective in his perspective of Hungarian 
affairs, especially on Hungary's role in the Danubian basin and its relationship 
to the various nationalities that lived within and outside its borders. 
The first ten years following the Hungarian War of Independence were the 
most significant ones for Kossuth. During this brief and chaotic decade he was 
at the pinnacle of his influence in European affairs. It was during the latter 
half of the 1850's that his movements were scrutinized by the English 
Parliament for fear he might be able to formulate an alliance with Hungary's 
Danubian and Balkan neighbors, under the auspices of Napoleon Ill's France, 
and later, Cavour's Italy, against Austria, which would upset the delicate 
balance of power on the continent.2 From 1849, when he became the focus of 
an eastern crisis as a prisoner of Turkey, until 10 November 1859, when 
France and Austria signed the Treaty of Zurich, ending the War of Austria 
with France and Piedmont, Kossuth remained the leader of the Hungarian 
nation even as an exile. The Hungarians waited for the opportunity to regain 
the constitutional rights and privileges they had won during the April days of 
1848 and subsequently lost with their surrender at Világos in August 1849. 
After 1859, Kossuth's influence in European affairs rapidly diminished. 
More important, in the spring of 1862, he publicly announced his ideas 
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concerning Hungary's future within a Danubian confederation that included 
Romania and Serbia.3 This plan lost him what was left of his support among 
the landowning classes in Hungary. Moreover, it diminished his importance 
among those individuals who mattered politically, and assisted them, under the 
guidance of Ferenc Deák, to come to an agreement with the Habsburgs,4 using 
the legality of the Pragmatic Sanction and the April Laws of 1848 as a basis 
for their negotiations. Kossuth's rejection of a compromise with the Habs-
burgs was of valuable assistance to both parties-to Francis Joseph and the 
Hungarian Diet-in reaching a final settlement.5 
The basis for Kossuth's confederation was first established in his letter of 
15 June 1850 to László Teleki and in the Kiutahia Constitution of 1851. These 
sources, particularly the constitution, created an internal federation, not a 
confederated system. The democratic ideas Kossuth used in creating this 
constitution formed the basis of his plans for the Danubian Basin during the 
remainder of his life. Naturally his ideas would change throughout the years, 
the result of the realities of great power politics and the need to compromise 
with the other national groups. To succeed, Kossuth needed to be flexible in 
his negotiations with the leaders of the Danubian Principalities and Serbia, on 
whose cooperation his eventual success would depend. 
The Constitution of Kiutahia was one of the most farsighted plans ever 
devised to develop democracy in Hungary. District borders were to be changed 
according to the national composition of the districts. A two-chamber parlia-
ment would be created with its participants chosen through democratic 
elections. The upper house, or Senate, would be composed of members from 
each county. Each district would elect its own senator; therefore, a Slovak 
county would naturally send a Slovak representative to parliament. Since 
almost one-half of Hungary's population was composed of minorities, the 
district elections would send the equivalent number of minority senators to 
parliament. Each county would decide its own language; Magyar however, 
would be the language of the parliament because of the need for all the 
members to use a common language.6 
Kossuth's ideas went further in attempting to accommodate the different 
nations within the region than anything developed during this period, includ-
ing the works of Deák and József Eötvös.7 Kossuth's ideas show a general 
development that started just before his resignation in August 1849. He 
continued to work with the idea of granting autonomous and democratic 
rights and failed to realize that more was needed to create an independent 
Hungary. Time was a major problem with the realization of Kossuth's ideas. 
The opportunity to reach a possible accommodation with the nationalities was 
during the revolution, which disillusioned and forced them to side with the 
LOST OPPORTUNITIES 173 
monarchy.8 As the Romanians talked about joint cooperation through a 
Danubian Confederation, Kossuth continued to develop democracy for Hun-
gary with the purpose of keeping the historic kingdom intact. 
Regardless of Kossuth's democratic plans for Hungary, it was difficult for 
him to abandon his nationalist outlook. His confederation would be 
dominated by the Hungarians, the crown lands would remain intact, and the 
monarchy would experience the modernization processes of bourgeois democ-
ratization.5 The semifeudal structure of Hungary would be abandoned. Even 
as early as September 1848, Kossuth offered to resign as long as the April 
Laws and national self government were guaranteed.10 These were his real 
objectives, and his confederation was one of the ways of achieving them. Early 
in his emigration Kossuth reached the conclusion that the monarchy was 
obsolete, and that change was necessary if it was to survive. The emergence of 
a democratic Hungary required a give and take, but as long as Kossuth had 
power within the emigration, compromise with the Habsburgs was out of the 
question. Kossuth was left with two other alternatives. The first was to seek 
assistance from the West to keeping Russia from intervening in Hungary's 
future struggle for independence. This was a solution that would exclude the 
Danubian Principalities and Serbia from participation in the struggle, although 
their assistance would be considered quite valuable to the Hungarian cause. 
The support of the national minorities within Hungary would be awarded with 
the creation of a federated democratic state that would welcome their partici-
pation in its processes. The Croats, because of their historic constitution and 
tradition of statehood, would be given the opportunity for independence if 
they so desired. But Fiume with a corridor to the sea had to be given to 
Hungary as a price for this independence. Kossuth's second alternative was to 
reach an accommodation with the other nations in the Danubian basin for 
joint cooperation in creating a confederation for the mutual protection and 
benefit of each national group. It took Kossuth time to realize that he had to 
look beyond the Hungarian problem and include the other nations in a 
solution that could guarantee an independent and democratic Hungary. He 
needed to broaden his horizon and realize that the issues involved the whole 
basin and not just Hungary. More important, both of these solutions could 
only be successful if they were supported by England and France. 
In retrospect Kossuth made two major mistakes as governor of Hungary. 
The first and most catastrophic miscue was not granting democratic and 
autonomous concessions to the minorities once he assumed power. Ironically, 
in the years before the war, Kossuth advocated independence for Croatia.11 
Had he followed the example of another Hungarian revolutionary, Ferenc 
Rákóczi II (1676-1735), and granted the minorities an equal place within the 
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kingdom they would have been useful allies against the Habsburgs during the 
war. Kossuth's second mistake was the dethronement of the Habsburgs on 14 
April 1849. Although this act was constitutionally legal, it turned the conser-
vatives in Hungary against his cause.12 His actions lost him the support of the 
most important and influential group that respected and supported this 
monarchiái system. It changed the struggle from a revolution to a war of 
independence. Also, it made the conservatives seek a re-alignment with the 
monarchy. This is clearly explained by György Szabad: 
Two main factors enabled the aristocracy to regain their position - shaken during the 
1840's - as leaders of Hungary's public life: the immense income they continued to 
derive from their estates; and their close ties with the Imperial aristocracy through 
whom, by the early 1860's, they were again drawn to the court.13 
Some historians14 maintain that Kossuth's influence in Hungarian affairs 
lasted until Austria's defeat in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. His long 
exile, however, left him out of touch with the moderate trends, championed by 
Deák, Eötvös, and the recently returned Count Gyula Andrássy,15 that were 
beginning to grow in influence within Hungary. Hungarians were neither 
prepared nor able to fulfill the Danubian designs that Kossuth had set for 
them. This realization caused Kossuth to change his views concerning the role 
of an independent Hungary. If Hungary was not powerful enough to secure 
her own independence without foreign assistance, then she would not be 
powerful enough to withstand the pressures of great power politics; therefore, 
she needed to be a member of a confederated system of Danubian states, which 
Hungary would naturally dominate, thus fulfilling her great power aspirations. 
Since the inclusion of Austria in any association with Hungary was anathema 
to Kossuth, he had to find a way for Hungary to replace Austria so the other 
powers, particularly Britain, would find it acceptable. More important, such a 
confederation would cause a drastic change between the Magyars and the 
nationalities living within and outside the lands of historic Hungary that the 
Hungarian landowning classes would never accept. 
It is imperative to point out that political leaders, regardless of nationality 
or time period, in advocating a confederated or federated system as a possible 
solution to the nationality problem within the Danubian Basin, have always 
advocated this solution from a position of political weakness. This was the case 
with the Polish émigré, Adam Czartoryski, the Serbian minister of the Interior, 
Ilija Garasanin,16 the Czech leader Palacky,17 the Romanian leader Nicolae 
Bälcescu, Kossuth, Jászi, and even the Belvedere policy of Archduke Francis 
Ferdinand. They all advocated federation at times when they were not in a 
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position to implement such a policy. The proponents of federation schemes are 
not in the position to realize them. More often than not, then, they advocate 
such solutions when they are not faced with the political responsibilities for 
their projects. 
Even if the Hungarians had been willing to accept Kossuth's advice, Great 
Britain opposed the idea of a Danubian confederation. The British, particu-
larly Palmerston and Russell, were opposed to both Kossuth and his liberation 
movements because they feared that if successful they "would endanger the 
existence of Austria, considered indispensable in the given system of the 
balance of power."18 British policy regarding the Eastern Question and the 
issue of the Straits revolved around the continued existence of the Ottoman 
Empire and the use of Austria as a bulwark against Russian expansion into 
the Balkans.19 Without Hungary, Austria would lose its great power status, 
thereby creating an imbalance in the Balkans that could lead to the dissolution 
of Turkey, and would entail Russian control of the Straits. The Balkans, and 
possibly Central Europe, would become another appendage of the Russian 
Empire. Palmerston and Russell were both successful in undermining Kos-
suth's position while maintaining the status quo with little change in the 
balance of power. 
After the revolution Britain continued to pressure Vienna to find a work-
able solution to its Hungarian problem. This policy will be discussed later in 
this work. Suffice it to say that Austria's defeat in the Austro-Prussian War 
of 1866 created the need to save the House of Habsburg's place in the 
European balance of power. Britain needed Austria to find some workable 
solution to the nationality problem that would allow the Habsburgs to 
concentrate on their role in the Eastern Question."20 The Austrian solution 
was in the Compromise in 1867, which joined the once rebellious Hungarians 
in a partnership with the House of Habsburg. The Compromise was abhorrent 
to Kossuth,21 and yet, ironically, the publication of his ideas concerning a 
Danubian confederation was a seminal event in the background of the 
agreement. 
It was those years immediately before and after the war of 1859 when 
Kossuth began the process of becoming the "most farseeing Hungarian" that 
Jászi referred to in his introduction. Following the First World War and the 
dismemberment of Hungary at Trianon, Jászi wrote about Kossuth's predic-
tions concerning the nationalities' problems and the need for a Danubian 
Confederation as their solution. Jászi maintained that if Kossuth's warning 
had been heeded to during the lean years of his exile, especially those years he 
was advocating the confederation, the dismemberment of Hungary could have 
been avoided, and more importantly, the First World War could have been 
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prevented. It is a quite remarkable concept that the historian István Deák has 
also shared. For Jászi, the war was the result of the failure of the monarchy 
to solve its nationality problems. Had the monarchy implemented a federated 
or confederated solution,22 similar to what Kossuth advocated, the monarchy 
could possibly have survived up to now. It is then possible to believe that the 
monarchy's nationality problems were the major force in perpetrating the war. 
It was these problems that threatened to change the balance of power in the 
Balkans. 
Interestingly enough, Kossuth's predictions had their roots in the first 
decade of his years in exile. One might argue that they go back even further. 
Possibly the Revolution of 1848 had the greatest impact upon him? It cannot 
be denied that the revolution helped to influence and mold Kossuth as a 
statesman; however, it was his first ten years in exile that educated him. These 
years gave him the experience, knowledge, and understanding of European 
political affairs. It was during these years that he became familiar with the 
problems of the balance of power and the importance of Great Britain's role 
it. Thus, at this point, it becomes essential to trace Kossuth's trail in 1849 
Turkey, where his real education begins. 
Kossuth in Turkey 
On 11 August 1849, in the city of Arad, located east of Szeged on the Maros 
River in south-central Hungary, Kossuth, after having granted concessions to 
the Hungarian nationalities just days before, informed both the nation,23 and 
General Artúr Görgey, that he was resigning and handing over both civil and 
military control to Görgey, for the benefit and well being of the nation.24 He 
then left Hungary for self-imposed exile in Turkey. 
As mentioned above, the presence of Kossuth and the other émigrés in 
Turkey caused an immediate problem for the great powers once Austria 
secured its control over Hungary. Both Russia and Austria regarded demo-
cratic principles as revolutionary and detrimented to their respective states. 
More than once, with the consent of Nicholas I, Metternich had suppressed 
liberal movements in Italy. Both had problems with the Polish émigrés of 
Paris, led by Czartoryski, and within their Polish possessions. In 1846, the 
Galician Poles had attempted to overthrow Austrian rule. Also, many Poles, 
including Joseph Bern, had given the Hungarians valuable assistance in their 
recent revolution. Both Russia and Austria knew that the émigrés could cause 
considerable problems among their fellow nationals at home. The Polish 
experience had taught them that émigrés would be willing to join in any 
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revolutionary movement if it could in some way benefit their cause. Kossuth's 
popularity in the West was viewed with much apprehension in Vienna. There 
was the possibility that the Poles and Magyars could join together to form a 
common front against both their oppressors. With this understanding in mind, 
Austria and Russia put as much pressure as possible upon the Turkish Sultan 
Abdul Mejid to return Kossuth and the Hungarians to Austria, and the Poles 
to Russia,25 so they could stand trial.20 
Although the defeat of the Hungarians was more likely to help the 
established British policy in East Central Europe, Great Britain and France 
could not sit by idly while Russia and Austria forced the sultan to hand 
Kossuth over to "hangman Haynau."27 Furthermore, they were putting a 
great deal of pressure upon Vienna because the former Hungarian leaders, who 
had been captured or elected to stay in Hungary, were being imprisoned or 
executed. During the revolution France and England virtually ignored Kos-
suth's appeals for recognition and aid and only voiced minimum opposition 
when Russian troops entered Hungary.28 Furthermore, Russian assistance to 
Austria was watched with great concern by the British. Always fearful of 
Russian encroachment into the Balkans, Britain kept a watchful eye on the 
camaraderie between Vienna and St. Petersburg. Therefore, along with the 
French, Britain put diplomatic pressure on the sultan not to hand the émigrés 
over to the Russians and Austrians. Also, a joint Anglo-French fleet was sent 
to the Straits as a show of strength against the absolutist powers.29 
Early on, Kossuth was faced with the prospect of extradition or the 
adoption of Islam,30 as some Hungarians actually did convert. Instead, thanks 
to the persistence of Britain's ambassador to the Porte, Stratford Canning, 
Kossuth was relegated to the position of a prisoner of the Turkish sultan.31 
On 20 September 1849, Kossuth sent a letter to Palmerston that prompted 
Canning and Palmerston to intercede on behalf of the émigrés. In the letter he 
asked the following question: 
are 5000 Christians set in the dreadful alternative to be sent to the scaffold, or to buy 
their life by abandoning their religion.32 
With British and French support for the émigrés, the absolutist powers 
found it necessary to withdraw their demands for extradition.33 
Meanwhile, Kossuth had not abandoned the revolution or doubted its 
eventual success. On 12 September, from Vidin, he sent a letter to the 
Hungarian envoys and agents in England and France.34 In it he analyzed the 
revolution, paying particular attention to Görgey's role in the latter days of 
the rebellion.34 Görgey may have surrendered, he may have taken his thirty 
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pieces of silver, but Kossuth emphasized the fact that he himself was continu-
ing the struggle. 
Kossuth would languish in Turkey for over two years. Although interna-
tional pressure had cooled somewhat regarding his presence within Turkey, the 
problem remained for all the powers involved. The Porte, regardless of its 
promises, wanted Kossuth out and the situation resolved. The Russian 
chancellor, Nesselrode, had already reached an agreement with Fuad Effendi, 
the Sultan's Representative in St. Petersburg, regarding the Polish émigrés. 
Under the agreement all the Poles were expelled from Ottoman territory, 
except for the leaders, whose positions were negotiated separately.36 
Palmerston had hoped that the Austrian prime minister, Prince Felix Schwar-
zenberg, would have negotiated a similar agreement with the Porte.37 How-
ever, Austria still wanted the return of the émigrés, particularly the leaders, 
both political and military.38 Negotiations with the Porte had broken down, 
but Schwarzenberg reached an understanding with Constantinople that the 
refugees had to be detained until internal order was restored to Hungary.39 
Kossuth's internment was worked out separately. It was eventually agreed to 
detain him for only one year, but under further Austrian pressure, he was 
confined for over a year and a half after arriving at Kiutahia on 12 April 
1850.*° 
Kossuth's activities had not helped the international situation. Tireless 
worker that he was, he continued to carry on discussions with the West and 
Danubian peoples through the emigration in Paris and through officials in 
Constantinople. These activities, aimed to secure Hungarian independence, led 
to extending Kossuth's internment longer than would have been necessary. 
Much to the displeasure of László Teleki, Kossuth's agent in Paris, Kossuth 
attempted to control the émigré movement himself.41 Strong leadership was a 
prerequisite for keeping the émigré community together because if needed to 
be under a unified political leadership if it was going to be successful. There 
are many examples in which emigrations have fallen apart when strong 
leadership was lacking; schisms develop within emigrations that lack such 
leadership, and more time is spent on useless internal squabbles than attempt-
ing to achieve their objectives. This was evident with the Polish emigration led 
by Czartoryski's Hôtel Lambert group and the Democratic Society of Joachim 
Lelewel.42 Immediately after Világos, Kossuth began to analyze the failure of 
the rebellion. He believed defeat was the result of a failure in leadership. 
Görgey had not followed orders and undermined his authority.43 In order for 
the next revolution to be successful both military and political control needed 
to be under one leader, namely himself.44 For this view the other émigrés, 
particularly Teleki, Andrássy, and later Bertalan Szemere, criticized Kossuth. 
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Some of Kossuth's most important contacts inside Turkey included an 
English officer, Charles Frederic Henningson, whom Palmerston had sent to 
the Balkans; 45 the Polish émigré Count Wladislaw Zamoyski, who had come 
to Hungary from the Polish émigré capital of Paris and had fled to Turkey 
along with the Hungarians;46 and the Romanian émigrés: the Golescu 
brothers (Nicolae and Alexander) and particularly Ion Ghica, who had 
recently escaped from the failed Bucharest revolt of 1848-49.47 This is not 
taking into consideration Kossuth's association with the Hungarian émigrés, 
particularly Teleki, Andrássy, Ferenc Pulszky, Hungary's agent in London, 
and General György Klapka. It was during this period, from Vidin to 
Kiutahia, that Kossuth, with the help of those nationals mentioned above, but 
particularly Teleki and the Romanian Nicolae Bälcescu in London, began 
working on the confederation. 
In actuality, the initiative of the first confederation rested more with the 
Romanian than the Magyar emigres. Even before Világos, the idea of such a 
system circulated among the exiled leaders.48 The Romanians took the most 
serious approach to the idea. As early as May 1848 Dumitru Brätianu went to 
Pest to discuss with Lajos Batthyány the construction of a confederation of 
Danubian states.49 Later in 1849, Bälcescu had conversations with Kossuth in 
Debrecen. They discussed the possibility of joint cooperation between the 
Hungarian and Romanian revolutionary movements.50 In the spring of 1850, 
Bälcescu played a vital role in convincing the Hungarians, particularly Teleki 
and Klapka, to support the confederation idea.51 More importantly, his 
influence on Klapka would continue long after Kossuth abandoned the idea 
of a confederation. 
Suffice it to say that the idea of a confederation received enough support 
to warrant further development and discussion. Bälcescu had already made 
converts of Klapka and Teleki. Lajos Lukács examined the correspondence 
between Bälcescu and Ghica and showed that there was a gradual development 
of ideas supporting the establishment of the confederation. In January 1850, 
Bälcescu drew up a constitution for the Romanians, Magyars, and South 
Slavs in which a plebiscite would decide the borders of each state. Bälcescu's 
ideas eliminated old historic borders and boundaries. Blocks of nationalities 
were to be given to the appropriate nations to which they belonged: the 
nation of the same culture and language. Naturally he was addressing 
the question of Romanians in Transylvania. He maintained that the Tran-
sylvanian question could be discussed during the final rounds of talks, 
after all the other details had been concluded. Also, a central parliament 
composed of fifty members from each nation, one hundred-fifty members 
in all, would meet annually to decide common affairs: defense, foreign 
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affairs, commerce, and communication. Each year a different nation would 
host the parliament, whose language would be either French or German.52 But 
when Ghica approached Kossuth with the Romanians' proposal, even though 
it had been endorsed by the Hungarian émigrés in London, he rejected them. 
Upon hearing of Kossuth's rejection, Bälcescu remarked to Teleki that 
Kossuth was a "dead person... a representative of Hungary of the past, the 
past that is buried forever."53 Nevertheless, Bälcescu and the other émigrés 
knew that without Kossuth's approval nothing could be accomplished. 
Kossuth's counter-proposal to the Romanians was his letter to Teleki of 15 
June 1850, which gave his reason why he was against autonomous territorial 
concessions to the nationalitites. He believed that the integrity of historic 
Hungary would be ruined by joining all the Romanians of Transylvania to 
Romania. Also, it would only be a short while before the other nationalities, 
i.e., the Slovaks, Carpatho-Ukrainians and Germans, would want the same 
rights as the Romanians.5* The principle of majority was not a viable process 
to determine the structure of the state. Many areas of Transylvania had a 
mixed population and could not be determined ethnically as a majority for any 
nation. Hungary would create a dangerous precedent if it granted territorial 
concessions to the nationalities. But democratic rights, which would include 
individual language and cultural development, religious freedom, and local 
autonomy was another matter. Kossuth supported the idea of a federated 
Hungarian state with confederated ties to the other Danubian nations. 
This letter to Teleki, Kossuth wrote about the organizational basis for such a 
system. Like Bälcescu, Kossuth wanted the confederation to have a common 
foreign, military, and economic policy and a common market with joint 
decisions on important economic questions. Also, Kossuth supported the 
creation of a council for deciding joint cooperation, which would have equal 
membership from all the nations. It would meet in Hungary at a place 
determined at a later date and be ruled by a president elected for one year. Every 
twenty-five years the alliance would go through a revision that would determine 
the constitutional status for each member of the alliance. Also, they could 
determine whether or not to remain in the confederation. Kossuth went on to 
state that the language of the parliament would be Hungarian, with the usage of 
local languages in the autonomous areas, in judicature and other local matters.55 
Previously, Bälcescu had questioned Klapka, whom he regarded as a man 
having a wide perspective as to the language of the future diet. 
Klapka suggested a common diet with German and French the official language while 
others suggested they should have Latin familiar to both Hungarians and Poles and 
related to the Romanian language as well.36 
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While Kossuth, in his nationalistic way, recommended Hungarian, Klapka, 
being more pragmatic, suggested German or French. It is interesting that of 
all the emigres, Klapka and Teleki were to stand behind the confederation idea 
the longest, keeping it "from sinking into oblivion."57 Also, they were more 
willing to come to an amicable solution of the differences that existed between 
the nationalities, including concessions on the important territorial and lan-
guage issues. 
Kossuth's ideas had a democratic basis and, except for the language decree 
and the territorial concessions, were an excellent basis for negotiations with 
the other nations. Granted, Kossuth planned to keep Hungary in a position of 
primary importance within the basin, but he was willing to give more rights 
than ever before to the nationalities. He was willing to share power in a 
confederation if the basis for such cooperation could be worked out. Kossuth 
believed in the viability and necessity of the existence of historic Hungary, not 
only for Hungary's future but for the basin's as well. A large and powerful 
Hungary in the midst of such a confederation would be a force in world affairs. 
Hungary would then be in a position to defend itself from external enemies. 
But the émigré communities were disappointed with Kossuth's reply because 
they put so much emphasis on the territorial solution as the basis of 
cooperation. Unfortunately for Kossuth, nationalism played a greater role in 
these negotiations than democracy, but he cannot be criticized for his willing-
ness to bring bourgeois democracy to the region. 
In May 1851, Kossuth wrote his Kutahiai alkotmányterv (The Constitution 
Plan of Kiutahia). He was against the nationalities forming independent 
territorial entities within Hungary, but he supported the development of an 
autonomous infrastructure that allowed the nationalities to control their own 
democratic development within the communities, counties, and state. Kossuth 
used the term "Universal Suffrage" in describing the democratic processes that 
would determine individual participation within the country. According to 
historian Domokos Kosáry, Kossuth's constitution relied upon the declaration 
of civic equality in 1848, the Nationalities Law of 1849, and "harmonized the 
structure of the state with the principle and practice of the democratic 
self-determination of the nationalities."58 
Kossuth addressed the language issue by using the United States as an 
example for overcoming this problem. He cited the varieties of languages used 
by the population and that language was not an issue amongst them. Also, he 
alluded to Switzerland with German, French, and Italian in use among its 
population.59 Kossuth still supported the use of Hungarian as the language of 
state but only for practical reasons of joint communication and administra-
tion. He supported the nationalities' rights to use their own language in its 
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communities, counties, churches, and schools. Also, in counties of mixed 
nationalities, the schools must offer the languages that are used by its peoples. 
In addition, the county assembly must offer its citizens the right to use their 
languages. Also, their elected representatives needed to have a minimum 
knowledge of the languages of their constituents.60 
The national parliament would be elected from the different counties by 
universal suffrage. Minorities would naturally be allowed to send their own 
representatives to the two-house parliament. Since almost one-half of Hun-
gary's population was non-Magyar, the parliament would reflect the popula-
tion. Hungarian would be the language of the councils, but all legislation and 
transcripts would be available in every language of the state.61 Kossuth made 
provisions for the different branches of government and the right of succession 
of the monarch.62 Parliament was to have a president that could rule in case 
the monarch became ill. Kossuth even gave the age requirements of recruits 
who would constitute Hungary's citizen army. 
Kossuth believed the idea of a Danubian confederation could actually be 
realized. Once again, he used the United States as an example to be emulated. 
Although Kossuth still adhered to the idea of Hungary's territorial integrity, 
he saw the confederation developing into a federated system structured like the 
state system in America. Domestic affairs would be the concern of each 
individual national territory within the confederation. He again reiterated his 
willingness to give Croatia the option of leaving the kingdom. Fiume would 
have to remain under the joint protection of Hungary and Croatia, and 
Hungary's access to the port must be a prerequisite for any settlement. 
Kossuth was emphatic in stating that Transylvania could not be compared 
with Croatia, and solutions applied to the latter did not apply to Transylvania. 
Transylvania would decide whether to join with Hungary's parliament or have 
its own, but Transylvania would remain with Hungary, since the Transyl-
vanian population was thoroughly mixed. Historically Transylvania was 
Hungarian and it would remain under the Holy Crown. However, Kossuth 
mentioned that the individual democratic rights concerning the nationalities in 
his constitution applied to all nations of Transylvania.63 
The Kiutahia Constitution granted democratic rights to all the nations of 
Hungary. Except for the issue of territorial concessions and the use of 
Hungarian as the state language, Kossuth had granted almost every possible 
right that could be accorded in structuring a democratic state. He had devised 
a way to accommodate nationalism within a multi-national state. But accord-
ing to Lajos Lukács, none of the émigrés approved of Kossuth's plan. Teleki 
criticized his ideas as out of harmony with the ideas of democratic co-
existence.64 Denis Jánossy saw Kossuth as a staunch defender of historic rights 
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over the principle of nationality.65 But it is difficult to examine Kossuth's 
constitution and understand how any of the other émigrés could have gone 
further in granting concessions to the diverse nations of the Danubian basin if 
they were in Kossuth's place. Kossuth's main shortcoming at the time was that 
he was not willing to grant territorial concessions. However, the other nations 
were not required to give territorial concessions for their participation in the 
confederation. Naturally, heavy concentrations of Hungarian were absent 
from Serbia or the Danubian Principalities; this is one reason that Garasanin 
and Bälcescu were not afraid to stress territorial concessions over the concept 
of historic right. Also, it was a reason why they demanded Hungarian territory 
for their participation in the confederation. 
Negotiations with the Serbs were conducted with Ilija Garasanin, the most 
important Serbian statesman in the nineteenth century. In 1844, he developed 
his Nacertanije (Outline), a plan that became the basis of Serbia's foreign and 
national policies until its eventual success in 1919. The Nacertanije was a 
three-stage program that outlined the liberation of South Slavs from Turkish 
and Austrian rule and their unification in a state under the Serbian mon-
archy.66 In this program Garasanin stated: 
[Serbia] must realize that she is still small, that she cannot remain so, and that she can 
achieve her future only in alliance with other surrounding peoples.07 
Garasanin's ultimate objective was the recreation of the Great Serbian 
Empire of the Middle Ages. 
Garasanin had an excellent relationship with the Polish émigrés under 
Czartoryski and the French government, both of which pursued a policy of 
undermining Russian influence in Europe and the Near East. Before the Polish 
Revolution of 1830, Czartoryski, the former foreign minister to Russian Tsar 
Alexander I, advised the South Slavs to unite under Russian leadership. 
However, after the revolution, Czartoryski, aided with French financial and 
diplomatic support, pursued a policy that sought to reestablish an independent 
Poland.68 Since 1804, Serbia, although still under Ottoman suzerainty, enjoyed 
domestic autonomy generally recognized by other states. Also, the Serbs were 
the only Slavs, besides the Russians, to have a degree of political independence 
in Europe. This, along with its important geographic location in the Balkans, 
made Serbia the focus of numerous schemes by different powers to achieve 
political advantage over each other. Both the Poles and Magyars hoped to use 
the Serbs for their own purposes. Thus Garasanin approached each group 
cautiously and always negotiated in a manner to get the most for Serbia's 
interests. 
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Another important émigré for the Serbs was the Czech Frantisek Zach, 
who became Hôtel Lambert's envoy in Belgrade in 1843. Zach, along with 
Czartoryski, supported the plans for the creation of a large South Slav state 
under Serbia's aegis. In a memorandum to Czartoryski, Zach "stressed the 
Austrian threat to Serbia and urged the Serbs to cultivate the Austrian Slavs 
and cooperate with the Porte against Russia."69 Serbia would form the 
nucleus of the future South Slav state once the Ottoman Empire disinte­
grated and would be a bulwark against Russian and Austrian expansion into 
the Balkans,70 Both Zach and Czartoryski's ideas played a role in helping 
Garasanin formulate the Nacertanije. The one major difference between their 
ideas was that Garasanin believed that his goal was more attainable with 
Russian support. He cautiously rejected the negative view of Russia held by 
Czartoryski and Zach. 
The idea of an independent South Slav state under Serbian leadership was 
discussed during the early stages of the revolution in 1848. From March to 
May, Garasanin began discussions with the Croatian leader Josip Jelaôic 
concerning joint cooperation against the Hungarians.71 And in July, immedi­
ately following his correspondence with Garasanin, Jelacic and Batthyány met 
in Vienna to negotiate Croatia's relationship to Hungary. But Jelaéic, who 
could have acquired Croatian independence from Hungary, refused to negoti­
ate with the Hungarian president. On 29 July, Batthyány said: 
We shall negotiate, if need be, with hell itself; we shall negotiate, if negotiate we must, 
on purely Croatian grounds, perhaps even with Jelaőic; but we shall never negotiate 
with reactionaries who would curb Hungary's independence.72 
By refusing to negotiate with the Hungarians, Jelacic missed an opportunity 
to achieve Croatian independence. Also, the promotion of Serbo-Croat coop­
eration, supported by Garasanin, Bishop Juraj Strossmayer,73 and Ljudevit 
Gaj74 among others, might have had a chance to develop on the path to a 
South Slav or Illyrian state. 
Following the revolution, negotiations continued with the Serbs through 
Garasanin, Henningsen, and Zamoyski. Of all the participants, Garasanin and 
the Serbs were the least supportive of the confederation. As previously 
mentioned, Garasanin's Nacertanije entailed incorporating all territories in­
habited by Serbs and Croats into a South Slav state. After supporting the fight 
against the Hungarians in 1848-49, Garasanin, like almost all the national 
leaders, tried to gain the most he could out of the situation. He had no faith 
in the confederation and hoped, like every other participant, to use it as a 
means to achieve his national end: Greater Serbia. This was apparent in his 
LOST OPPORTUNITIES 185 
negotiations with the Hungarians, and he was supported by the Poles who 
could not understand Hungary's refusal to grant territorial concessions for 
the good of the confederation.75 It was apparent that Kossuth was adamant 
in not surrendering any of Hungary's territory with the possible exception of 
Croatia. Needless to say, he would not even begin to consider giving Serbia 
the Bánát and Bácska for their support or for participation in the confeder-
ation.76 Although Kossuth received much of the criticism for the stall in 
negotiations, it was the Serbs who adopted a wait and see attitude towards 
the idea and who expected the Hungarians to make the territorial sacrifices 
for their support. 
As early as 2 November 1849, Henningsen wrote a letter addressed to 
Zamoyski that discussed such a confederation. Henningsen credited Kossuth 
and the Hungarians for the basis of the plan, but for some reason Henningsen 
never forwarded the letter. Its contents favor the creation of a large Serbian 
state within the confederation. Greater Serbia was an idea that the Serbs had 
been pursuing for quite some time. In the letter Henningsen confessed that 
Kossuth's ideas "startled [him] at first by [their] boldness."77 In the letter the 
following proposals were given: 
1. ...to gain the co-operation of Serbia by giving up to them Slavonia, (and leaving them 
the option of uniting or not with Croatia as they might agree,) but the whole to be 
as Serbia now under the protectorate of the Porte. 
2. The price (for Serbia) would be offensive and defensive alliance, abolition of 
quarantine duties and a common system of lines of communication - in fact a free 
trade Zollverein. 
3. ...the protectorate of the Porte for Hungary itself. Hungary would in fact accept its 
suzerainty on terms somewhat analogous to those, determining the actual inter-
relations of Serbia and the Porte and Serbia, according as it could agree with the 
Croatians, might enter into fusion with them. 
4. The Hungarians only stipulation was for a sea port and uninterrupted right of way 
to that point (Fiume). 
5. Poland, Dalmatia, Wallachia, Moldavia etc. might not be indisposed to enter with 
this confederation under Turkish protectorate.78 
Henningsen was to act as intermediary with the Serbs, was naturally 
favorable towards the idea.79 The plan held distinct advantages, Henningsen 
believed, for the British position in the Balkans. The proposal could actually 
extend the Ottoman Empire to the Baltic and erect a permanent "barrier 
against Russia,"80 that would help to consolidate the empire.81 Through such 
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consolidation, it was believed, that the empire's centralizing forces would 
become stronger, strengthening Turkey against the external and internal 
threats of invasion and dissolution.82 But it is difficult to imagine how Turkey, 
facing so many problems on so many fronts could possibly be consolidated 
and centralized with the addition of further multinational populations of such 
revolutionary, nationalistic character as the Poles and Magyars, who had just 
recently fought for their own independence. Of course, Henningsen was 
examining the idea from the standpoint of Britain's role in the balance of 
power. Naturally, a strengthened Ottoman Empire of such magnitude could 
replace Austria's role in Britain's scheme. Also, Hungarians and Poles believed 
that the achievement of independence for their countries would be easier with 
the weak Ottoman Empire as an adversary than it could ever be against the 
combined absolutist powers. Why would they consider subjecting themselves 
to a power they regarded as inferior to their own unless they just hoped to win 
British approval and eventual independence? 
It needs to be mentioned that the Poles, particularly Zamoyski, strongly 
supported the confederation. Since 1831, they had been playing the game of 
émigré politics.83 By the time the Hungarians became émigrés in 1849, the 
Polish emigration was well established in its role and knew how to function in 
Europe's diplomatic community. It had established itself throughout Europe 
and the Near East with a network of agents willing to support any movement 
that might aid its cause. The number of Poles who supported Hungary in 1848 
indicate their willingness to aid Europe's revolutionary movements. Also, 
Austria, Hungary's adversary in that struggle, was one of the powers which 
participated in the partitions of Poland in the eighteenth century. In other 
words, the Poles had been émigrés much longer than any other group and they 
hoped to use the experience along with their political connections, to lead 
Europe's revolutionary community in its struggle for freedom. Early on, they 
hoped to join with the Hungarians and Italians in an alliance of democratic 
revolutionaries that would aid in the liberation of nations oppressed by the 
absolutist powers.84 
One of the problems the Poles faced in negotiations with the Hungarians 
was their failure to comprehend Kossuth's ardent refusal to grant territorial 
and other concessions for the overall good of the confederation.85 In this, 
Kossuth was just as obstinate as the Polish émigrés who envisioned a 
re-creation of the Poland of the pre-partition period. The Poles would never 
have considered relinquishing their dreams of Poland at its apex in territory, 
power, and glory for the purpose of joining a confederation. There was never 
any discussions concerning what territorial sacrifices the Poles would give up 
for the good of the confederation. Indeed one of the objectives of the 
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confederation was the liberation and restoration of Poland. The confederation 
then, was merely a vehicle for the Poles to reclaim their state; it was just 
another of many ideas that circulated throughout Europe that they hoped to 
use to their advantage. Thus, although the Poles had certain advantages in 
their established emigration and their French connections, the other émigré 
communities were understandably unwilling to hand over the leadership of 
their specific groups to the Poles. 
In 1848, Hôtel Lambert discussed the idea of a confederation with Teleki in 
Paris. However, by January 1850, Czartoryski put a halt to the confederation 
idea among his people in Turkey. Although this might create a new Poland, it 
was not the promised land. Also, the Poles could not come to grips with the 
Hungarian nationality question, or the Hungarian attitude towards that issue. 
Since many of the Polish leaders had been in exile since the Revolution of 1830, 
they were unaware of the effects nationalism was having on all the emerging 
nations in East-Central Europe. They believed that if the confederation wanted 
the Poles, Poland should come above all the other nations within the alliance. 
The problem was that Kossuth felt the same about Hungary's participation. 
Where Kossuth was willing to grant certain rights to the nationalities, 
Czartoryski was not even aware of their existence in historic Poland. Not only, 
thought Czartoryski, could this confederation be a vehicle for the re-creation of 
the Polish state, but it could also help perpetuate Panslavism of a Polish 
variety.86 Such ideas were anathema to the Hungarians, not to mention to the 
other nationalities, or to the more recent Polish émigrés who were slowly 
developing a schism with Hôtel Lambert's less than democratic leadership.87 
Czartoryski, like Kossuth, hoped, or rather expected to dominate and use 
the confederation for his own purposes. After all, the Hungarians and Poles 
viewed themselves as having the more advanced cultures. Both nations had 
recently experienced independent statehood, and more important, they had 
great historic pasts and a strongly felt sense of national identity. Also, they 
were, in the majority, Roman Catholic. Hungary had strong Calvinist and 
Lutheran traditions,88 but these looked westward. This orientation helped to 
re-enforce their attitudes of superiority when they compared themselves with 
their Balkan neighbors, who followed Eastern Orthodoxy or Islam. How could 
the Poles and Magyars be expected to share power with such eastern peoples? 
The confederation was just another scheme in which they hoped to regain their 
political independence, by supplanting Austria, or by rejoining the political 
arena as one of the great powers. 
The confederation plan had no viable means of success. Everyone realized 
that France and England were not going to change the European equilibrium 
to benefit Hungary and Poland or to construct a Danubian confederation. It 
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would have to be a great catastrophe similar to the First World War, to 
accomplish such objectives, an event all the émigrés waited anxiously to 
happen. However, until such a war actually happened, the only way to achieve 
a degree of independence or autonomy laid through domestic compromises 
with the monarch or sultan and not foreign negotiations. 
It is understandable how these nascent plans for a confederation would 
end in failure. In reality, there was always a plethora of ideas circulating in 
the émigré communities, and the Poles were extremely active in the ideologi-
cal field. For instance, on 27 August 1849, Czartoryski and Zamoyski 
discussed a Turkish-Hungarian-Polish alliance against Russia and Austria.88 
However, the different attitudes and objectives among the émigrés created a 
further widening of the gap which made any type of cooperation virtually 
impossible. These problems were also evident amongst each individual 
emigre community. The Hungarians, like the Poles before them, were 
beginning to develop a schism that would cause the emigre leaders to 
question Kossuth's leadership and policies. Eventually this would lead to 
breaks within the Hungarian émigré community. Nevertheless, Kossuth's 
power was so intact and strong that it was impossible to accomplish 
anything concerning Hungarian affairs unless he approved. After he dis-
missed the joint confederation plan of Bálcescu there was no need to discuss 
the matter any further. At that time he rejected the concept as impractical 
for the creation of an independent Hungary. When he received his invitation 
to come to America in 1851, he left his confederation ideas behind buried in 
Turkey. The Hungary of 1849 was still his immediate objective, and no one 
could convince him that it was unattainable. The knowledge and experience 
he acquired during his negotiations in Turkey would prove invaluable in the 
future. When Kossuth left for America he felt Hungary could achieve 
independence if Russia was prevented from intervening a second time against 
the Hungarians. Thus, while in Great Britain and America, he hoped to 
create an alliance of democratic states that could act as a deterrent to 
Russian interference. But during the next few years, until he fully came to 
understand the importance of the balance of power, Kossuth put the idea of 
the Danubian Confederation on hold. 
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LES IDEALS FRANÇAIS DE ZOLTÁN AMBRUS 
ET LE JOURNALISME DE LA FIN DE SIÈCLE 
ZOLTÁN AMBRUS: LES JOURNALISTES ET LE PUBLIC 
JÓZSEF ÁGOSTON BOGOLY 
Bibliothèque Nationale Széchényi, Budapest 
Hongrie 
Lors des années quatre-vingt et quatre-vingt-dix du siècle passé Zoltán 
Ambrus était une vraie incarnation des types d'orientation française les plus 
intellectuels et les plus modernes de la fin de siècle hongroise. Aussi ses 
collègues l'appelaient-ils entre eux «l'écrivain des écrivains». 
Il n'a pas encore vingt ans quand nous le voyons déjà aux tables des 
habitués littéraires dans les cafés de Budapest, tout en feuilletant le Journal des 
Débats et Le Temps, et Gyula Reviczky, Elek Gozsdu, Gyula Rudnyánszky, 
Béla Tóth, écrivains bien connus, écoutent le jeune homme élégant. A la fin 
des années quatre-vingt il jouit d'un grand respect aussi aux yeux des écrivains 
plus jeunes, comme Sándor Bródy et Ignotus. «Nous l'avons suivi d'un café à 
l'autre, d'un salon à l'autre pour écouter ses paroles laconiques et en ap-
prendre.» - écrivait Bródy dans Magyar Hírlap (Courir Hongrois) en 1891. 
Les idéals d'Ambrus sortaient principalement de la littérature française. 
Anatole France, Flaubert, Maupassant, Zola, Daudet et le suisse Cherbuliez 
l'ont influencé au plus. Parmi les critiques contemporains, il attribuait une 
attention distinguée aux critiques théâtrales de Lemaître sur les pages des 
revues françaises et à celles de Sarcey dans les quotidiens. 
La formation des points de vue pendant les années quatre-vingt du siècle passé, 
les signes caractéristiques du changement de la structure des valeurs -diffusées par 
les journaux et les hebdomadaires et jouant un rôle toujours plus important aussi 
bien dans la publicité et dans le monde des relations sociales que dans la culture -
se manifestaient déjà d'une façon accentuée dans les publications des écrivains, des 
poètes, des journalistes et des essayistes nés dans les années cinquante et au début 
des années soixante. Avec l'arrivée de la nouvelle génération, la littérature arrive, 
elle aussi, à un changement d'époque. Les débuts d'Ambrus et de la jeune 
génération littéraire se voient développer pendant cette période de la fin de siècle, 
et leurs oeuvres commencent à s'achever au début du siècle. Ils sont les précurseurs 
de la revue Nyugat (Ouest), dépositaires du renouvellement littéraire et culturel, 
puisque, en ce domaine-là, ils avaient préparé une réformation fortement 
considérable des points de vue non moins qu'un changement des goûts littéraires. 
Hungarian Studies 8j2 (1993) 
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Dans l'année 1932 de Nyugat, Aladár Schöpflin caractérisait Zoltán Amb-
rus par ces mots: «Sa culture, son goût, son attitude d'écrivain étaient 
beaucoup plus éminents que ceux d'un écrivain hongrois auraient pu l'être à 
la fin du XIXe siècle. Dans une époque d'air optimiste il est arrivé pessimiste, 
en la Hongrie retentissante de la musique tzigane et des toasts, autour de la 
fête millénaire il parlait à la voix de la melancholic» 
Regardant les structures informatiques culturelles dans les cadres de la publicité 
sociale des régions centrales et occidentales d'Europe, le milieu et la fin du siècle 
peuvent être considérés comme la grande époque des relations mutuelles entre 
littérature et journalisme. Quant à Ambrus, la matière culturelle de son choix de 
valeurs de goût, de son orientation intellectuelle et de sa réception des effets 
s'enracinant dans sa mentalité, peut être cherchée dans les sources de la presse 
française de l'époque, dans les revues littéraires et culturelles, qui nous montrent 
bien les procédures des changements structuraux des valeurs, des styles et des 
goûts. Dans la vie littéraire autour des revues et des quotidiens français diffusant 
les notions de valeur de la bourgeoisie, on voyait, depuis le milieu du siècle, des 
rédacteurs et critiques, personnages déterminants et respectés, mais qui sont 
devenus conservatifs et souhaitaient empêcher le modernisme de l'époque: 
Gustave Planche, Buloz, Charles Rémusat, Emile Montégut, Arnaud de 
Pontmartin. Tandis que Saint-Beuve âgé, renouvelé d'un tournant, s'est retourné 
au cercle d'idées du libéralisme conservatif, aux idéals des valeurs du classicisme 
national français. A l'époque, la mentalité considérable comme au plus moderne 
en les sciences, l'estéthique et la littérature était déjà représentée par Renan, 
Berthelot, Taine et Flaubert. Dans le cas d'Ambrus, du point de vue de la 
réception mentionnée des influences françaises, c'est la fin des années soixante-
dix et les années quatre-vingt qui sont les plus remarquables. 
Chez les Français une manifestation grandiose de la rédaction de revue, qui 
déterminait le visage des périodiques contemporaines européennes était La 
Revue des Deux Mondes. A l'époque du deuxième Empire la revue s'était 
caractérisée par un conservatisme libéral. Entre autres, on retrouve parmi ses 
collaborateurs Octave Feuillet, Murger, Leconte de Lisle, Fromentin, Renan 
et Baudelaire. Toutefois, le goût de Zoltán Ambrus était influencé par une 
Revue des Deux Mondes qui n'était plus rédigé par Buloz, mais, dès 1877, par 
Brunetière. A cette époque-là apparaissent, comme nouveaux auteurs, France, 
Loti, Coppée, Maupassant et Taine. 
La Revue des Deux Mondes avait un rôle eminent parmi les revues qui 
exerçaient de l'action sur le goût et les idéals culturels de Zoltán Ambrus, 
devenant un personnage très compétent des tendences modernes dans la vie 
littéraire budapestoise dès la deuxième moitié des années quatre-vingt. Il était 
un des lecteurs hongrois les plus fidèles de ce journal pendant des décennies. 
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Plus tard, à 1908, La Nouvelle Revue Française, la fameuse NRF a commencé 
ses années, et cette périodique appuyée par Gide et son cercle portait encore 
une grande importance pour Ambrus au début de ce siècle. 
Les idéals de style et le comportement de Zoltán Ambrus ont été formés par 
les valeurs culturelles de la direction analytique de la pensée française agissant 
au milieu et à la fin du siècle passé. La formation de sa mentalité et son idéal 
culturel étaient influencés surtout par les directions marquées de la pensée 
comtienne, principalement par Taine et Renan, et par les notions de valeur 
positivistes de la bourgeoisie contemporaine. Zoltán Ambrus défendait pen-
dant toute sa vie les valeurs du libéralisme conservateur de la fin de siècle 
française. Au début de sa jeunesse, sa considération avait été caractérisée par 
la confiance réceptive en les valeurs culturelles, mais qui n'est pas restée stable: 
après quelques décennies son attitude d'écrivain et artistique serait déjà 
changée. Plus tard, la doute devient un élément principal de sa vision du 
monde, il se considère, tout comme la société, avec ironie et satire. Le ton 
mondain du traitement subjectif du sujet et l'approche sentimental étaient les 
caractéristiques de l'époque dans le genre du récit de journal. Zoltán Ambrus 
s'est montré excellent causeur, toutefois lui, au temps «du culte de la frivolité», 
il était caractérisé par l'objectivité d'un homme vivant dans une autoréflexion 
perpétuelle. On peut dire qu'il écrivait selon le principe que Descartes avait 
utilisé et exigé: claire et distincte, avec une clarté analytique et avec une 
maîtrise de soi. A cause de son caractère, de sa considération et de son goût, 
il était privé de «la négligeance naturelle des inspirés». 
Le jeune Zoltán Ambrus écrivait d'une façon captivante pour le public en ce 
style préféré des lecteurs de la fin de siècle, celui du récit de journal, formé sous 
l'influence créateur de genres du journalisme littéraire. A la fin des années 
soixante-dix et pendant des années quatre-vingt son nom est devenu célèbre dans 
les rubriques littéraires des journaux budapestois comme publiciste, critique, 
novelliste. Ses premiers articles sont apparus dans Fővárosi Lapok (Feuilles de la 
Capital), puis il écrivait continuellement dans Függetlenség (Independence), et 
Jenő Péterfy ayant quitté Egyetértés (Entente), il l'y a remplacé comme critique de 
théâtre. Plus tard Budapesti Hírlap (Courir de Budapest), Nemzet (Nation), 
Budapesti Szemle (Revue de Budapest), Ország-Világ (Pays et Monde), puis Pesti 
Napló (Journal de Pest) publient aussi ses articles. Il travaillait aussi pour Koszorú 
(Couronne) de Szana, et quelques-unes de ses articles sont apparus dans 
Vasárnapi Újság (Journal de Dimanche) et dans Magyar Salon (Salon Hongrois). 
Il était collaborateur principal du nouveau A Hét (Semaine), ses oeuvres 
littéraires ont vu le jour surtout ici et sur les pages des Új Idők (Temps Nouveaux). 
Pour rendre sensible la façon de penser de Zoltán Ambrus écrivain des récits 
de journal, nous présentons aux lecteurs un récit typique de son époque, 
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retrouvé pendant nos recherches de sources dans la domaine de la presse 
littéraire de la fin de siècle. Ce récit oublié d'Ambrus est apparu originellement 
dans la revue Magyar Salon (Salon Hongrois) en 1888. 
On y voit une contribution digne d'attention pour l'histoire de littérature 
étudiant la mentalité littéraire de la fin du siècle. Dans les cadres de la publicité 
de la fin de siècle, Zoltán Ambrus y donne l'image authentique de l'aggran-
dissement du rôle de la presse, du journalisme conquérant, des relations entre 
journaliste et public. 
Selon nos recherches il est devenu certain que dans l'oeuvre de Zoltán 
Ambrus le récit au titre «Les journalistes et le public»* est l'antécédent de 
son essai «Littérature et journalisme» qui a une valeur de source excellente 
du point de vue de la sociologie littéraire et de l'histoire de la mentalité de 
l'époque. 
*L'article Littérature et journalisme est paru originellement dans la périodique Szerda (Mer-
credi) estimée comme antécédent de Nyugat. (Le texte a été publié de nouveau pour la postérité 
en 1978, dans le recueil Esszépanoráma [Panorama d'essais], par Zoltán Kenyeres.) 
Zoltán Ambrus: 
Les journalistes et le public 
Monsieur De Bissy - raconte Saint-Beuve quelque part - était un beau vieil 
homme aux cheveux blancs, qui, quand il entendait parler sans cesse de la 
révolution et de Bonaparte, devenait impatient, et s'exclamait avec un geste 
usuel pour chasser des mouches: «Ce n'est pas vrai! La révolution, ce n'est pas 
vrai! Bonaparte, ce n'est pas vrai!» La princesse Fitz-James lui expliquait en 
vain que la révolution et Napoléon étaient malheureusement des réalités, le 
brave vieux insistait: «Pas vrai! Pas vrai!» 
Même à nos temps on peut rencontrer quelques types d'espèce De Bissy, qui 
ne veulent rien croire ni savoir de tout ce qui se passe dans le monde; qui, dès 
le moment qu'ils ne peuvent plus se délecter dans l'ordre des choses, se 
moquent bien des hommes, s'en foutent profondément du vent qui souffle, du 
temps qu'il fait au dehors de leur grotte. 
Il y a quelque peu de niaiserie dans cette sorte d'obstination qui fait penser 
aux autruches, mais aussi un trait de dignité. L'homme qui tient tête au monde 
entier, même s'il est ridicule, peut compter sur quelque respect. 
Ce trait de dignité caractérisait auparavant le Hongrois aussi, lui étant, 
comme on sait, beaucoup incliné vers le comportement distingué. Les vieux 
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Garamvölgyi, qui, un peu exaspérés, ne voulaient réfléchir même plus, se 
trouvaient chez nous de tout temps en grand nombre. Ces gens, qui se 
contentaient de leurs propres problèmes et qui ne voulaient même pas savoir 
qu'on canonnait dans le voisinage - dont toute la sagesse politique s'était 
épuisée au fait que «le portugais désire de la laine fine», qui étaient 
sérieusement convaincu que Sébastopol n'existasse même jamais - ils n'étaient 
pas de rarités. 
Bien sur, dans nos jours, quand on ne peut plus se douter du chemin de fer 
«fameux», quand l'Electrom parcourt les rues et danse à l'Opéra, quand les 
gens sont en train de se niveller si considérablement, et même son majesté le 
peuple marchant nu-pieds commence à se livrer aux opinions démocratiques: 
ces originalités sont en voie de disparition. 
Aujourd'hui tout le monde veut savoir ce qui fume chez le voisin. Nos 
intérêts ne sont plus tellement attachés à la glèbe que nous puissions nous 
cacher la tête dans le sable, mais si capricieusement ramifiés en général que le 
porc américain nous intéresse beaucoup plus que le sors de notre demi-frère. 
Depuis lors la lecture des journaux fait partie de notre vie, devenue un tel 
besoin que le chauffage ou l'éclairage. Et il n'y a pas un coin dans ce pays ou 
la cigarette, le couplet d'opérette et le journal ne soient pas nichés. 
Beaucoup de sorte d'intérêts nous rendent retirés du monde. La lutte pour 
le pain est toujours plus forte, et autant qu'elle devient plus forte, nous 
devenons nous-mêmes toujours plus isolés. Nous n'avons contacts à peine 
qu'avec nos associés, je pourrais dire, avec nos connaissances d'affaires: nous 
n'avons pas le temps pour voir la société. La plupart des gens, nous sommes 
en relations avec des firmes, nous avons à peine la possibilité de rencontrer les 
autres. Pourtant, comme disait Aristote, l'homme est un animal social, un 
animal de société, zoon politikon. En tout temps, tous les hommes avaient des 
affaires qu'ils voulaient discuter avec les autres. Jadis ils se réunissaient aux 
foires, aux fêtes - plus tard dans la «société» ou près du moulin. Le citoyen 
romain allait au forum, le citoyen de Debrecen allait devant l'hôtel de ville. 
Aujourd'hui les gens ne s'écrivent plus des lettres comme au XVIIP siècle, la 
«société» n'est qu'une ombre de celle qui existait jadis, dans un monde beau, 
les fêtes ne sont que des spectacles et des entreprises de spéculation, les foires 
ne sont que des bourses; et si le citoyen de Debrecen veut s'occuper de 
politique, il reste à la maison et lit l'Entente. Notre besoin de société est aussi 
Supplemente par un surrogatum: c'est le journal. 
Pour accomplir ce devoir double, les journaux ont deux fonctions: ils 
informent et ils discutent les événements. 
Bien entendu les journaux n'attachent pas toujours la même importance à 
toutes les deux vocations. L'Anglais, qui est un homme d'affaire avant tout, 
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prend son journal dans sa main principalement par intérêt, et il y cherche 
des informations rapides, ponctuelles et détaillées. Le journal lui remplace 
moins la compagnie: de ce point de vue il se contente de ce qu'il trouve dans 
sa famille et dans son club. Dans les journaux anglais donc l'information est 
le plus important: l'avertissement aussi rapide et bon que possible, le 
télégramme abondant, la correspondance régulière, la chronique détaillée du 
parlement. Le journal discute consciencieusement les choses politiques, avec 
quoi il sert toujours surtout les intérêts, mais il ne fouille pas trop les 
événements du point de vue social en général, évite la philosophie de cuisine, 
ne se complaît pas dans les velléités littéraires, mais il se permet d'être 
majestueusement ennuyeux. 
La plupart des journaux français veut jouer le rôle de l'amusant invité 
quotidien. Ses informations se limitent aux plus importantes, ses télégrammes 
sont pauvres, sa correspondance est presque ridicule. Il est caractéristique, que 
le Figaro, qui publie chaque mercredi les lettres arrivées de l'étranger, soit 
vendu en le moins d'exemplaires justement à ce jour-là, quand il apparaît muni 
d'un supplément abondant. Mais le parisien s'intéresse très peu à la politique 
mondiale, et ces lettres ne sont publiées que pour faire plaisir surtout aux 
étrangers. La plupart des journaux français ne donne presque exclusivement 
que des commentaires, et joue le rôle de Démocrite, le philosophe rigolant, 
avec le plus d'originalité, d'esprit, dans la forme la plus polie, la plus gentille 
que possible, sur le fond de la moindre information. 
Evidemment, à la plupart des endroits la conception est devenue dominante 
selon laquelle le journal est d'autant meilleur tant il est capable de convenir à 
tous ses deux devoirs. Cette conception a vaincu chez nous aussi; qui n'est pas 
un miracle, puisque on rencontre de braves lecteurs hongrois qui n'exigent pas 
seulement d'avoir les meilleures informations et les commentaires les plus sages 
possibles, mais qui voudraient qu'on leur donne une pendule et un manteau 
d'hiver en supplément avec le journal. Nos quotidiens, s'ils veulent complète-
ment satisfaire à toutes les exigeances de leurs lecteurs, sont contraints d'avoir 
un médecin, un avocat et un commissionnaire à part, pour l'utilisation 
personnelle des lecteurs. Et, il est arrivé une fois en effet qu'un cher abonné a 
demandé son rédacteur: ne serait-il pas possible qu'il le présente à une de ses 
belles connaissances? Notre journalisme étant immaculé, le rédacteur a donné 
une réponse négative. 
Depuis que tout le monde en a besoin, le journal est devenu une machine 
gigantesque. Il doit mettre à disposition énormément d'informations et 
énormément de commentaires. Tous les deux devoirs ne peuvent pas être 
accomplis par des mêmes gens. L'un fabrique la porte et un autre fabrique le 
loquet. 
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Où le journaliste commence-t-il? Certes pas à la première lettre imprimée. 
Alors nous devrions appeler journaliste un homme sur deux homme; puisque 
une partie considérable des nouvelles est servie par les lecteurs mêmes. Le 
monde entier apporte son concours à la publication des informations. Mais le 
reportage professionnel n'est peut-être pas journalisme non plus. Non que ça 
soit un métier facile. Il y faut beaucoup d'habileté et du talent spécial. Mais 
finalement, à chaque journal, ce sont les commentateurs, les publicistes, les 
chroniqueurs qui ont le rôle le plus important. Car tandis que le premier ne 
contribue à la rédaction du journal qu'avec son nez, ses mains et ses pieds, le 
commentateur, le vrai journaliste accomplit en même temps le devoir du 
rhéteur, de tribun du peuple et de l'écrivain. Et son influence peut être encore 
plus illimitée, plus universelle que celle de ceux-ci tous ensemble. Il est vrai que 
son pouvoir ressemble un peu à celui des grands vizirs turcs qui, faisant leur 
travail qui a ébranlé le monde, ne savaient jamais, en quel moment auraient-ils 
reçu le lacet. Car il n'existe pas un tyranne plus capricieux que Démos; et le 
dompteur de lions, aussi adroit soit-il, n'est jamais sûr que la bête royale ne le 
dévore un beau jour, peau et os. 
Le journaliste le plus puissant parmi ceux qui sont restés journalistes 
(puisque ce métier était toujours un marchepied commode pour aller plus haut, 
et de temps à autre il y avait même des têtes couronnées parmi les journalistes), 
donc le journaliste le plus puissant qui ne voulait être que journaliste, c'était 
Timothée Trimm. Timothée Trimm, Léo Lespès de son vrai nom, a fondé, 
s'alliant avec l'éditeur Cochinat, le Petit Journal, qui apparaît dans nos jours 
en près d'un million d'exemplaires. La fortune du quotidien a été fondé par les 
chroniques de Timothée Trimm, où le monde des lecteurs friands du bon 
journal trouvait une voix jusque'alors complètement inhabituelle, une vivacité 
stupéfiante et un esprit vraiment brillant. Leo Lespès a eu une position sans 
exemple dans l'histoire du journalisme. Tous ses mots étaient payés 
littéralement de pièces d'or, son salaire est monté aux cent milles, à titre 
d'avance il lui a réussi à recevoir un million et demi. Une fois, Timothée 
Trimm s'est offusqué de son éditeur lésinant sur quelques cinq mille francs 
vilains, et, pour l'effrayer, il s'est donné ses huit jours. Un autre éditeur a 
donné volontiers, bien sûr, la somme bagatelle à Léo Lespès. Chez le Petit 
Journal on était mort de frayeur. Ils n'ont fait ni une ni deux, mais ils ont 
ramassé une douzaine d'écrivains qui remplaçaient Léo Lespès sous le nom 
collectif Thomas Grimm; le journal continuait à monter rapidement, le public 
a oublié son chouchou en quelques semaines. Lespès et son nouveau journal 
ont échoué. 
Alphonse Daudet raconte de Villemessant, fondateur du Figaro, qu'il 
laissait tomber régulièrement ses collègues sur lesquels il avait entendu au café 
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de remarques dépréciatives. Celui qu'il avait porté aux nues la veille, pouvait 
être prêt d'écrire son dernier article le lendemain. 
Chaque journal est en même temps une entreprise commerciale; toute sa vie 
dépend de son public. Un mot déplacé provoquant un ressentiment général, et 
le journal est voilà perdu. Une de nos meilleures entreprises illustrée a fait 
faillite à cause d'un portrait publié intempestivement. Or, l'intérêt de 
l'existence est plus fort que toute philosophie. Donc, d'une façon explicite ou 
implicite, le public exerce aussi une influence sur le journaliste. Le commen-
taire ne peut être écrit non plus librement, indépendemment; le monde entier 
participent non seulement à l'information mais aussi bien à la discussion. 
Plus le journaliste possède des valeurs personnelles, plus il aspire à 
l'indépendence la plus totale possible, mais aussi ce but est idéal, on peut s'en 
approcher mais on ne l'atteind jamais parfaitement. D'ailleurs, généralement 
le journaliste ne devient pas plus fort dans cette lutte, même, le plus souvent, 
plus qu'il reste à sa place plus sa position affaiblit. Après tout, l'occupation 
continuelle rend tout le monde artisan. L'acteur qui récite chaque jour, le 
rhéteur qui harangue chaque jour tombent vite dans un maniérisme auquel le 
public ne s'accoutume pas facilement, par contre il s'en dégoûte très facile-
ment. 
Un soir Planche, le critique excellent qui était un journaliste d'assez grand 
respect, a envoyé son article très tard à son journal. Le compositeur en chef 
de l'imprimerie protestait, disant qu'il était déjà impossible de composer 
l'article, mais ayant entendu que l'article était celui de Planche, il a accepté de 
le faire composer quand-même. On lui a demandé pourqoui avait-il changé son 
opinion. Parce que je n'ai pas encore fait démonté son article apparu ce matin 
répondit-il. Et puisque monsieur Planche se répète tout le temps, dans son 
article nouveau il y a forcément un tas de phrase, déjà composées. En voilà: 
«puisque il nous est impossible de ne pas en être convaincu - nous sommes obligés 
de déclarer sans aucune réserve - il serait absurde de ne pas reconnaître, etc.» 
La maladie de Planche, ou bien quelque chose de pareille attaque la plupart 
des journalistes tôt ou tard. Et pour qu'il puisse faire oublier cette faiblesse, il 
a besoin ou bien de mille petites manoeuvres (genre, style, changement de 
place) ou bien d'une génialité exceptionnelle. Bien sûr, il y a quelquefois un 
journaliste qui est audacieux et prudemment sage, spirituel et sans manières en 
même temps, brillant donc comme Rafaël Garucci dans la pièce de Musset. 
Celui-là peut alors se procurer d'une grande indépendance. Mais les Rafaël 
Garucci sont rares. 
(Trad.: Noémi Saly) 
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PSYCHOLOGY, FANTASTICALITY 
AND THE TRUTH OF THE NOVEL 
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Institute of Literary Studies, 
Hungarian Academy of Letters and Sciences, Budapest 
Hungary 
The truth of psychology, fantasticality and aesthetics is one and the same 
in the novel but the common path leading to it has to be found by the writer 
himself, wherever he or she starts from. A valid, trustworthy picture of this 
seeking ways and means can best be given with the help of the history of the 
novel-that is, the testimony of the different endeavours. 
Our starting point is the history of ideas. At the beginning of the Hungarian 
modernity the new psychological conceptions of the early 20th century were 
among the most influential ideas. Due to Mihály Babits, Bergson became 
popular among Hungarian modernists already in the first decade of our 
century while Freudism provoked general as well as profound thinking in 
"Nyugat" as witnessed by studies of reception and novels describing the 
period. In the history of Hungarian literary modernity, however, Bergsonism 
played a different role than Freudism. In 1910 Babits introduced the great 
French thinker as "a deliverer who brings back dreams we thought to have 
lost long ago and leads us to regions we did not even dare to look towards". 
This deliverer, in Babits's interpretation, makes us revolt against preconcep­
tions as well as "the despairs of Spencerian agnosticism and the slavery of 
automatism". The aim of his conception, that is, his theories of intuition and 
time, is to eliminate the duality of experience and subsequent systematization. 
It is for this purpose that Bergson qualifies the examination of individual states 
of consciousness as a construction of a metaphysical order and thus makes 
psychology part of the philosophical train of thought. It becomes understand­
able that the modern writers felt that Bergson got very close to the problems 
of the artist. Thus his influence was absorbed in the general renewal of the view 
of the world and it did not affect directly the birth of the inner monologue in 
poetics. Meanwhile it calls attention to the fact that there are questions of life 
and death in the new psychological conception. In this respect Bergsonism has 
a common point with Freudism that had direct thematic influence. In Sándor 
Ferenczi's obituary Dezső Kosztolányi refers with sympathy to Freud's great 
follower who "regarded man... as a mystery that cannot be expressed with any 
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psychological formula. He did not like the writers who popularize or apply 
psychoanalysis but those who associate with their instincts, with nature. He 
admired Gyula Krúdy." Following Ferenczi, Kosztolányi saw psychoanalysis 
as an intellectual revolution that caused disappointment to self-conceited man. 
He expected more of it than digging up motives or exploring the unknown 
layers of the soul. Following the new psychology, many discovered the depth 
of the human soul with romantic ardour. They enriched their motives by 
describing suppressions. Several of them rejected biologism for naturalism. 
Kosztolányid character Esti Kornél says: "I want to be a writer who thunders 
at the doors of being and attempts the impossible." Kosztolányi's great epic 
works, however, would break the borders of the "psychoanalytic" novels. He 
was still looking for the new role of psychology within the art of narrative 
when he constructed his own model of the psychological novel. "Today's 
literature is again violently haunted by ghosts," he wrote in Éjfél (Midnight) 
(1917). "What used to be outside, is now inside us. We have the ghosts within 
ourselves. The crucial discovery of the new psychology, namely that we do not 
know a large part of our soul, took place in this age. This enormous region... 
is just being discovered by the fearless conquistadors of the soul... The knots 
of the beginning and the end have never been unbound, people have always 
had hallucinations and visions... There were ages though that only realized the 
phenomena between the two points, ages that in the harmony of earthly life 
were oblivious of themselves... The 20th century is very mystical. Why? 
Because it is unhappy. Mysticism... is an activity deriving from the despair of 
the human mind... What should be believe in? What should we confess? Where 
should we run? Frightened from the alien world that we cannot understand 
we run back into ourselves, escaping from mystery to mystery... there are no 
mystics in happy ages." {Éjfél. Edited by Aladár Bálint, Gyoma, 1917, p. 5.) 
Kosztolányi makes his characters say that understanding is already half way 
to victory and the beginning of love. In the attraction of the new psychology 
he recognized both the escape of man who has lost his values and the 
self-expression of the age. It is this understanding that gave birth to the new 
psychological aspect and, at the same time, the fullness of his novels. 
The eras after the Enlightenment mainly examined the temporal evolution 
of man: his role in society and in nature, the effects of the changes happening 
there and his struggle to improve his circumstances. The examining method of 
modern psychology has reversed the traditional view completely. Let this point 
of view be called anthropological. The timeliness of the new endeavour is 
demonstrated by the fact that the conception of the novel of the 1920-30s 
reached the same conclusion from a different starting point. By studying the 
changes in form Gábor Halász recognized that the modern novel originated in 
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the technique of the early English novels-in other words the Bildungsroman 
(formation novel, education novel) gave place to the action novel. 
The changes in poetics launched by new psychology first of all modified the 
claims and characteristics of psychological description. In the nineteenth-cen-
tury novel the description of the soul, similarly to that of the age or the 
landscape, served to describe character development. It was a means of 
expressing temporal changes and effects, and it only showed as much from its 
subject matter as was visible from the overall point of view. The novelty that 
the modern psychoanalytic novel brought was not primarily the idea of 
describing the incidents of spiritual life even if it was a problem freshly 
discovered by the new trends. The most important thing here was the change 
in the point of view as a consequence of which the psychological theme, too, 
came to fulfil a structural function. Whoever undertook such a theme had to 
give up the principle of rational causality. 
It was still a long way to the clear formula of Kosztolányi's great novels 
and this way demanded a struggle with genre conventions even by writers who 
followed the new psychology. The orientations before new psychology, on the 
other hand, also contributed to the destruction of the inherited rules of poetics. 
When the generation of the Nyugat appeared, the best of psychological 
description was still represented by Zsigmond Kemény's novels. His Pál Gyulai 
differs from the heroes of the contemporary novels: exaggerated virtue drives 
him toward sin and destroying; he is miserable before he would be tragic. It 
is not because of the circumstances of his life that he becomes unhappy; his 
temper causes his fall. In Özvegy és leánya (The Widow and Her Daughter), 
Mrs. Tarnóczy rushes at her enemies with a passion that cannot be explained 
simply by her circumstances. Her hatred is mythic and her way in the novel is 
something like running amok. Similar characters include Senno Barnabás, 
Sribe Gergely and Simon Pécsi. As we can see, Kemény raised psychological 
description to an unusually high rank and expected a lot from the exploration 
of spiritual causes. We know from his biography (Papp, Ferenc: Báró Kemény 
Zsigmond. Bp., 1922.) that he studied clinical neurology and psychology at the 
University of Vienna. Furthermore, as an undergraduate at the Academy of 
Nagyenyed, he became familiar with Troxler who examined the bases of 
human nature and who thought that obscure emotions lay behind human 
deeds and character. (Troxler: Naturlehre des menschlichen Erkennens oder 
Methaphysik. 1828.) But his own confession proves, too that his interest in 
psychology was due to reflection. He writes in his Pál Gyulai : "I firmly believe 
that all the moods of our soul derive from our ideas but from such pairs of 
ideas that are too small and too fast to find shape in words and so to become 
perceptible. So our mood, the seed-bed of our deeds, takes shape among effects 
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independent from us and at the same time originating in us." (Quoted by Papp, 
Ferenc, op. cit. p. 360.) If we read his works after having read the psychologi­
cal novels of our century we feel a sense of destiny rather than the atmosphere 
of the depths of the soul. Pál Gyulai, Mrs. Tarnóczy and the other characters 
are the vehicles of their creator's fatalism while their description refines the 
classical realistic analysis of the soul into a model. (Rónay, György: A regény 
és az élet (The Novel and Life), Bp., 1947. p. 61.) 
From the viewpoint of modern psychological epic, another figure outstand­
ing from the nineteenth-century history of the novel is István Petelei. He wants 
to recreate the ballad in prose. We can find evidence of this in the structure 
and psychology of his best writings which is a recurring theme of the Petelei 
studies. The description of the process of psychological constraint in Őszi 
éjszaka (Autumn Night) for example, reminds one of the world of János 
Arany's ballad. Many of Petelei's other short stories have the same elliptical, 
disconnected structure with the representation of the psychical processes being 
delayed. We are imprecise if we call the author's message psychological, as it 
is not the contents of the inner world that Petelei's balladistic short stories 
represent by means of language but rather a display of the psychical processes 
taking shape in behaviour and action. Petelei did not fully understand the 
modern psychological trends penetrating into the depths of the inner world. In 
fact, his balladistic picture of the world is based on an inheritance from János 
Arany namely the combat of moral forces. As András Diószegi observed, the 
"ideal" is missing from this world and man appears to be subject to the 
irresistible power of fate. To discuss which psychological approach is more 
authentic would be going to false extremes. Obviously that the representation 
of spiritual contents have lead to formerly unknown territories of portrayal of 
man but, at the same time, just like the naturalistic description of human life, 
it was tightly connected to the momentary symptoms of everyday life. The 
moral approach of the ballad's psychology had not yet integrated the deter­
mining factors of the unconscious. It presented a hero emerging from the 
incidental that modern Hungarian literature after naturalism wants to refor­
mulate. 
The pressure of poetic conventions was first felt by those writers who 
preceded the lyrical revolution of the Nyugat or even experimented with new 
types of narrative technique. They examined the coexistence of poetic conven­
tions and new formations. We have to examine the presence of the principle 
of rational causality to find the turning point of modern narrative. This study 
first of all wants to throw light upon the experiments of Viktor Cholnoky. 
Looking back at Cholnoky from the viewpoint of modernity he appears to be 
a typically transitional writer bounded by many inherited literary conventions 
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who also made several attempts to complete and to requalify the inherited 
picture of man. His contemporaries and successors, who could make headway 
towards the aims of modern narrative on the way already started, found the 
new medium defined both by the new messages and the new conceptions of 
genre either in the new description of the soul or in abstract objectivity 
expressing human existence. Viktor Cholnoky tried to orientate himself in both 
directions but he still justified his new psychology with the rational epic 
probability and did not create the homogenous medium necessary to his 
abstract objectivity either. He searches for the inner world and secrets of man 
but he finds peculiarity, remoteness and weirdness. This strange thrilling world 
observes Hungarian anecdotal rules which incline the writer to unfold the 
secret of his mysticism and fantasticality with the help of a rational motive. 
Examples include Szürke ember (The Grey Person), Bertalan Lajos lelke (The 
Soul of Lajos Bertalan) and Trivulzio szeme (Trivulzio's Eye). But the 
constraint of epic probability is only a symptom in Viktor Cholnoky's 
narrative art. In his Kövér ember (Fat Man), for example, he does not force 
the rational explanation. He creates a situation similar to those of Franz 
Kafka-but without Kafka's truth. 
The constraint of rational epic probability can be felt in the works of 
authors who created modernism. In Géza Csáth's early works, for example, 
the principle of rational causality is conveyed in the main story while in the 
inner story chronology and memory merge into one another. After 1907 a 
world of visions, memories and elementary moods flourishes unrepressed 
alongside these "true" stories. This is Géza Csáth's way to the often quoted 
Anyagyilkosság (Matricide), that is the self-definition of the modern psycho-
logical short story. There is hardly any story here and the faint convention of 
epic probability has apparently become subject to reflection. The whole novel 
describes the accumulation of motives for the matricide. Psychology is not 
contained in the representation of the inner world but in the characters' deeds. 
They appear cold and dispassionate. The murder is a senseless act, too, with 
its senselessness representing the vanity of existence and indifference to the 
laws, morals and ideals of life. The standard of this new psychology in 
Hungarian narrative literature is Kosztolányi's Anna Édes but his short stories 
preceding the novels are already regarded as evidences pointing to it. The 
private tutor of Sakk-matt (Checkmate) rebels against his sick pupil because 
of being humiliated by him. The story is the summary of a psychological 
process beginning with the revolt of self-respect and reaching its climax in the 
irrational want to win. It is quite striking that although the author speaks in 
first person singular, he does not submerge in the flow of consciousness but 
leaves the psychological motives to narration. A Kövér Biró (The Fat Judge) is 
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the representation of the same type of irrational force. The heroes of this short 
story are children who hate the judge simply because he is fat. Their passion 
does not break out in cruelty but is dissolved in sympathy aroused by the 
judge's mother when she recalls his son's childhood with painful nostalgia. The 
reverse psychology of the cruel joke is represented in Április bolondja (April 
Fool): the lodger of an Üllői road student room wants to pry into the 
loneliness of his room-mate and becomes the victim of loneliness. In these early 
experiments Kosztolányi is attracted by the findings of modern psychology, 
regions of human life which had not yet been conquered by 19th-century 
literature. The excitement of discovery is undoubtedly a new source of energy. 
But the inner force of the short story nourished by it is only potential, and the 
more familiar the new environment-the subconscious layers of the soul-is, the 
weaker this inner force becomes. A consistent writer must realize that the new 
territories of the soul can only be a starting point. It is not by accident that 
young Kosztolányi feels at home in the world of the children, in a world which 
is the borderland of transition and universality in natural life, too. But later 
he is unsatisfied with the inner reserves of his raw material and tries to express 
universality in the incidental details of the whole structure of his short stories. 
The turning point of Kosztolányi's narrative is probably Lidérc (Nightmare) 
written in 1911. The narrator/hero meets drunk workers on a dim road, 
anguish overcomes him and he escapes into a restaurant of bad reputation 
where he is soon followed by his supposed persecutors. He is identical with his 
psychological state, his anguish, further increased by the provocation of his 
persecutors. This provocation imperceptibly raises the novel from reality to 
irreality. His persecutors think he is an old friend who does not remember 
them. If the short story ended here, it would be the expression of the decadent 
way of looking at life in which memories are more real than things. But the 
hero continues his escape and runs home where he is seen as a stranger. When 
he faces himself in a mirror in the street the face that glances back frightens 
him. Is it the story of schizophrenia? Or is it the representation of feeling lost? 
Both can be the préfiguration of Babits's A gólyakalifa (The Nightmare) and 
of Epepe by Ferenc Karinthy as well. At the same time its abstract objectivity 
resembles the world of Franz Kafka because the hero's nightmarish visions 
take the form of things and actions. Only at the end of the short story can we 
read the deliberately enigmatic sentence: "The face... was motionless... (in the 
mirror) like a dead man in a glass coffin and the dream did not want to come 
to an end." Is this said by the narrator qualifying the foregoing as a dream? 
A stylistic knack showing simultaneously the reflection of the dead man and 
the man in the dream? In my opinion, this enigmatic ending of the short story 
is the amplification of the essence of the author's message. The final sentence 
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does not want to give a rational explanation of the anguish but it does want 
to raise it from the medium of psychological naturalism. In this way does 
Lidérc (Nightmare) become an authentic psychological record and an insight 
into the existential problem experienced by a person falling into loneliness and 
despair. This is why Kosztolányi will be able to represent the three-dimen-
sional man in his great narratives, an individual who is part of history, society 
and of universal existence. 
It is probably not by accident that the greatest test of the narrative 
influenced by the new psychology, the representation of the fantastic, soon 
lead to new experiments. Two from the early Hungarian psychological novels 
are based on fantasticality and, by expressing the role of fantisticality they try 
to express psychological problems. 
Babits published his A gólyakalifa (The Nightmare) in the Nyugat in 1913. 
Three years passed before his first novel was published in book form, eight 
more years for a review in his own literary periodical. His critic was Frigyes 
Karinthy, a congenial colleague who justified his deepest motives. According 
to Frigyes Karinthy A gólyakalifa represents the most painful and the most 
noble driving force of Babits's psychology, philosophy and poetry: the 
problem of dualism. Philosophy calls it conflict, but the living person, the most 
vivid being, the poet sees it as the condition of life. "One will never become 
two: the lonely womb is sterile" as Babits writes in Kabala (Cabbala). But the 
twin poles of being create such a tension the discharge of which can only be 
death. The human mind can only comprehend one life and if he is confronted 
with its duality then he meets the gap of madness and voluntary death is 
preferable. He must be content with the credo of the "I do not know it for 
sure" and the brave hesitators suffer the martyrdom of uncertainty for us all: 
they live instead of the dead and die for those who live. As we can see Frigyes 
Karinthy finds the indivisible common ground of rational and irrational 
endlessness in A gólyakalifa and identifies the credo of this world with 
enlightened doubt. But about the shape, the form of the whole novel he only 
writes one declarative sentence: "This time he has created something bordering 
upon a narrative masterpiece." 
Nyugat attempted a new interpretation of the novel in 1932 the pretext 
being its third edition. The critic was Endre Illés who examined how Babits's 
material related to the concepts of Freudian psychoanalysis. This question first 
necessarily leads him to the separation of the novel's psychological, naturalistic 
and fantastic elements and after that he recognized that in themselves. Endre 
Illés reaches the conclusion that creation makes process from the sequence of 
the elements and at the same time is the form of the writer's inner world. The 
critic recognizes the medium of the work of art and he names it timidly and 
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uncertainly. "Is it fantasticality? Yes, it is! But fantasticality of noble material 
is a more real representation of man, human soul and life than unstructured 
reality."- Illés writes in his summary. 
What is the distinctive features of the novel's cohesive force? Illés raises the 
question whether the fantastic novel has a special mode of existence, whether 
it has any uniqueness in the theory of the novel; whether formerly, naturalism 
or new psychology has created such new value, new pattern, or to use a very 
popular term, new paradigm. 
When critics attempt to define what type of novel A gólyakalifa is, they use 
the adjectives "psychological" and "fantastic". They do not openly accept the 
presence of a naturalistic motive, although we can discover the presence of the 
formerly revolutionary trend's conception of reality not only in the description 
of the joiner's shop, the suburb and the brothel but also in the presentation of 
passion. When the tormented apprentice starts to beat his master's son left to 
his care, he vaguely feels that what he does is villainous cruelty but his anger 
causes him pleasure. Later on the prostitute's patchouli frees him from his 
inhibitions and transforms his disgust into wild passion. And finally he feels 
the same pleasure of "evil" when throttles his victim. Of course, the contem-
porary critics are right if they say that these motifs cannot define the medium 
of the novel even if they are stressed. The question remains whether fantas-
ticality or the new psychological theme itself are already preformed materials 
of the novel, whether they automatically contain a new form of novel. The 
reader of our day has probably got over the sensation of science-fiction. And 
if we consistently consider the "lesson" of this genre we must admit that the 
effectiveness of scientific or pseudo-scientific theses can only be realized in 
fiction. Science-fiction has to transcend itself just like social or historical 
novels. Naturalism has not even gone by the easier way of applied literature 
and it thought to be useful to exclude fiction from the demanded truths in the 
hope of conquering a higher realm. So its followers became the victims of an 
illusion of the theory of the novel. But from a historical viewpoint it is clear 
that philosophical novelties or those of life could temporarily appear as new 
values of the genre. And this illusion defined the first experiences of modern 
psychological novel. 
The coexistence of naturalism and new psychology at the time of the birth 
of the modern novel is a natural phenomenon, so to say. The success of their 
coexistence depends on whether they can create a new generic formation. And 
if they can, even their interbreeding with fantasticality is possible making 
irreality an autochthonous and universal reality. 
The intention of the author of A gólyakalifa is to create such an autoch-
thonous and self-asserting world. Its hero is the victim of schizophrenia who 
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can look upon himself consciously. His prognostic symptom differs from the 
examples of psychology in such an extent that in him both personalities know 
the other and this knowledge finally destroys the walls between them and real 
life and the life of dreams merge together. So A gólyakalifa is science fiction 
because it extends and represents a psychological thesis. But is it a novel in the 
sense of having a valid fantastic world? We can answer yes if we think of 
Babits's concept of the world in which there is no sharp distinction between 
rational and irrational, good and bad, and man's life is an on-going struggle 
against his own extremes and conflicts. But is the hero's autobiography enough 
to make an epic serving as the frame of the novel? It probably expresses the 
psychological problems if it is combined with inner monologue. 
But inner monologue in itself cannot verify fantasticality. The writer 
describes one of his smaller characters, the very learned teacher: "This strange 
reader was mainly interested in curiosities... The facts of the psychology of the 
abnormal, that are so important in the philosophy of our day, were only 
interesting curiosities for him, nothing else." At another place he makes his 
hero think of the essence of poetry: "Things that were only data and curiosity 
to him, gained emotional and aesthetic value in my soul." This emotion and 
aesthetics, i.e. the created world of universal validity is missing from the 
fantastic world of A gólyakalifa. Thus the epoch-making experience of modern 
Hungarian psychological novel remained unaccomplished. 
A gólyakalifa is present in Hungarian literary life from its birth. A similar 
experiment, Kálmán Harsányi's first novel, A kristálynézők (The Crystal-
Watchers) is hardly more than a work interesting only for a literary historian. 
It belongs to the circle of ideas of such literary challenges such as A gólyakalifa 
and Elsodort falu (The Village Swept Away) by Dezső Szabó. Its fantasticality 
associates it with the former novel while its point of connection with the 
latter's conception of Hungarian tragedy. "The most vivid problems of Az 
elsodort falu are all lurking in this novel" László Németh writes." You can feel 
that you only had to be clean and educated and you could understand if you 
wanted how the remnant Hungarians should think in this colonial town and 
country sinking as low as becoming an unloading ground of cosmopolitan 
products." And we have to bear in mind that this warning was written five 
years before Dezső Szabó's cry and Gyula Szekfű's analysis. We may add that 
A kristálynézők is a milestone for descriptions of the 1910s among Állomások 
(Stations) by Margit Kaffka, Szegény magyarok (Poor Hungarians) by Gábor 
Oláh, Fáklya (Torch) by Zsigmond Móricz and Vulkán (Volcano) by Marcell 
Benedek. To find the roots of modern Hungarian psychological novel we again 
face the work of Kálmán Harsányi somewhere between the naturalistic spiritual 
diagnosis and the mystic short stories. 
214 GYÖRGY BODNÁR 
Fantasticality, psychology and description: it is not the first time that these 
coexist in the world of a novel just at the revolution of the genre showing the 
effects of new-romantic attractions and the recognitions of basic poetic concepts. 
The fantasticality of A kristálynézők, just like that of A gólyakalifa, is given by an 
interesting psychological problem. The hero of Kálmán Harsányi's novel 
identifies himself with a hypothesis of occult psychology. According to this "the 
capricious visions of autohypnosis can be governed and forced to view reality." 
His Indian predecessors still contented themselves with being hypnotised while 
staring at a crystal and they dreamed their capricious and perplexed dreams 
about anything the illusion projected onto their mind. Kálmán Harsányi's 
crystal-watcher reversed the process and became the master of his dreams, 
dictates them and sees not a tale but reality. In addition, he is able to make this 
reality vivid and if he looks back at a historical figure he sees his features gained 
by learning in the medium of his personal ones given by nature. And as he regards 
this autohypnotic vision of reality as the hidden gift of the human mind, his 
fantastic experiments broaden and deepen the picture of man, complete the 
rational dimensions of life with spiritual and ontological dimensions. Thus the 
experiment in A kristálynézők always changes its ways: now it approaches the 
novel towards the contents of universal human spirit, then it is supposed to raise 
the state of consciousness that is evoked by scientific fiction. It is perhaps 
unnecessary to prove that the two ways should meet in order to help the novel get 
to that fantasticality which could make a homogenous medium for motives of 
different origin. The world of the novel should be self-justifying and its inner 
logic should be defined by the laws of fantasticality. But the psychological 
experiment of crystal-watching is a motif of a realistic story in Kálmán 
Harsányi's work. Its main character, Fábián Balogh escapes into the mysticism 
of crystal-watching because his wife killed their child and destroyed his 
autograph. She was perhaps driven by vengeance or by hysteria. When she 
appears in her divorced husband's life after seven years she harbours thoughts of 
revenge again. Her new lover, Tamás, is Fabian's young friend and the 
embodiment of his patriotic ideals. Of course, her ex-husband hinders her from 
making Tamás her victim, too. The reaction of the woman could be a deep 
spiritual drama as she herself is a victim, too, in whom the want for salvation is 
awakened by human and heavenly law. But Kálmán Harsányi shows this heroine 
only from the outside and puts her into the one-sided role of relentless vengeance. 
The ex-wife, Júlia, knows her husband's sticking to the resort found in the light of 
the crystal. She gets her friend, an actress, to deceive Fábián by justifying the 
reality of the world suggested by crystal-watching and then to reveal her betrayal. 
The woman's vengeance is successful, at the end of the novel Fábián, locked up in 
an irreal world, meditates on his loved and despised Budapest. 
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This real Budapest medium has an important role in A kristálynézők 
because in his normal, worldly status Fábián is a man with national, moralistic 
and artificial ideals who passionately struggles against his modernized world 
in the hope of an ideal Hungary that bridges the past and the future. He thinks 
that Budapest is the prey of conceited cynics who work with trickery, the 
victim of fashions in art and politics and of a stolen cosmopolitan culture. In 
contrast to these, the genteel poverty, the unpractical but more valuable 
element, the community of inefficient and deadly wounded people. This love 
and hatred shows Budapest as the "girlfriend of anyone" whose "every drop 
of blood is deadly poison but her face is beautiful". 
This conception is part of the criticism of culture at the beginning of our 
century but it refers to the conservative past and the alarming modernization 
at the same time. We may call this attitude conservative radicalism provided 
that we accept the truth of paradoxes. And we can probably accept them 
because from the studies that examine Kálmán Harsányi's entire career we 
may know that he really tried to reach a historical synthesis and while he 
was wrestling with the modernists, he also had to struggle with orthodox 
conservativism. But, of course, we can only consider properly his ideas of 
nation, society and philosophy of art in the context of their inner structure. 
The complexity of this consideration is shown by the "rural versus urban" 
dispute of our day and the parallels of Kálmán Harsányi's conception. Our 
conclusion can probably be that we do not only have to restart moderniza­
tion but we also have to face the destructive paradoxes of Hungarian 
revolutions. 
But the epic truth of A kristálynézők does not depend on this unfinished 
historical, sociological and philosophical evaluation. Fábián Balogh's behav­
iour and concept of the world could be valid even without this if the inner 
structure of the novel's world would justify it. But this inner laws would only 
work if the fantasticality, the criticism of society and of art would be built 
together in A kristálynézők. There is an attempt to it on the level of the story. 
According to Fábián, only those can get into the circle of the crystal-watchers 
who are wounded and helpless because crystal-watching is an intellectual 
suicide. The inefficiently righteous, the gentlemanly Hungarians who refrain 
from the rush, are exactly like this and thus the tragedy of the crystal-watcher 
could be the symbol of their fate. And it would symbolize it if the logic of 
fantasticality became a congruous element in the novel. But the pseudo-
scientific experiment of crystal-watching gains a subordinated role in the 
history of the society and in the critique of art as well. So its fantasticality 
remains a sheer curiosity and conceptions of nation, society and art have to be 
valid in their abstract medium. 
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Harsányi's characters are losing the ground from under their feet, too. They 
do not have real dimensions, their credo is not surrounded by particularities. 
In the preface, the writer tries to defend his characters by saying that he only 
believes in the truth of the points of views and this is why he tackles that his 
characters are torn out from the "fullness of life". At another place Harsányi 
regards every problem as novel because he thinks that this genre is the 
"criticism of man and every criticism has a certain point of view". So he takes 
it for granted that the characters of a novel are mouth-pieces of the author. It 
is not important to prove the problems of such a theory of the novel. He would 
have been able to create a self-justifying fictional world inspite of his teachings. 
This motive, the idea and invention inspiring each other, that would have given 
birth to a living organism, is missing from A kristálynézők. 
DIE „ERZWUNGENE SELBSTKRITIK" 
DES MESSIANISMUS IM VORFELD 
DER REALISMUS-THEORIE VON GEORG LUKÁCS 
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In dem Vorwort zu der von Georg Lukács nach langem Zögern zugestimm-
ten Neuherausgabe seines Werkes Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein im Jahre 
1967 stellt dieser rückblickend auf die für ihn schicksalsentscheidende histori-
sche Wende von den 20er zu den 30er Jahren fest: „Es wurde mir auf einmal 
klar: will ich das mir theoretisch Vorschwebende verwirklichen, so muß ich 
nochmals ganz von vorn anfangen ... ich befand mich im begeisterten Rausch 
des Neuanfangens."1 Auch in bezug auf die in seinem Lebenswerk nachweis-
bare Kontinuität ist Lukács beizupflichten: an den entscheidenden Wenden 
seines Lebens zögerte er niemals, den vorangegangenen Abschnitt seiner 
Laufbahn einer radikalen Überprüfung zu unterziehen, und wenn nötig, diesen 
zu negieren. Dies geschah im Dezember 1918 mit seinem Eintritt in die KPU, 
als er die geistesgeschichtliche Interpretation des „Zeitalters der vollendeten 
Sündhaftigkeit" (Fichte) hinter sich ließ; so verfuhr er auch 1930, dem Jahr 
seiner Umsiedelung von Wien nach Moskau, da seine in der Ungarischen 
Räterepublik von 1919 begonnene und nach derem Sturz in den 20er Jahren 
in der Wiener Emigration fortgesetzte Tätigkeit als Berufsrevolutionär für 
lange Zeit ihren Abschluß fand. 
Ohne einen Blick auf Lukács' geistige Produktion der Wiener 20er Jahre, 
die er später zum großen Teil negierte, sind die eigentlichen Beweggründe 
seiner vielfaltigen und umfangreichen wissenschaftlichen Arbeit während der 
anderthalb Jahrzehnte, die er bis 1945 in Moskau verbrachte, nur schwer 
verständlich. Gemäß der Dialektik von Kontinuität und Diskontinuität gingen 
eben aus dieser Produktion schrittweise und unter häufigen Widersprüchen 
jene neuen Antworten hervor, die Lukács den historischen Herausforderungen 
der 30er Jahre in seiner Philosophie, Ästhetik und Literaturanschauung 
entgegensetzte. Diese enthielten nicht nur eine Absage an das Vergangene, 
sondern lieferten zugleich den Beweis dafür, wie er die alten Fragen von der 
Warte seines sich zunehmend vertiefenden Wissensstandes erneut aufwarf. 
Zu Beginn der 20er Jahre zeugen seine Schriften von einer verspäteten, 
spezifischen Philosophie der konvulsiven Welle nach dem Krieg, zu einer Zeit, 
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als die Stabilisierung des Kapitalismus bereits eingesetzt hatte. Seine Artikel und 
Studien, von denen einzelne Kapitel zeitgleich auf Russisch in den Spalten der 
Westnik Sozialistitscheskoj Akademii erschienen, sind in dem Werk Geschichte 
und Klassenbewußtsein (1923) zusammengefaßt.2 In ihm wird Marx' Philosophie 
den Anschauungen der II. Internationale gegenübergestellt, doch Lukács' Theorie 
bleibt im Gegensatz zur Marxschen Ontologie im wesentlichen hegelianisch. Er 
zog zwischen den Prozessen in Natur und Gesellschaft eine scharfe Trennlinie 
und ließ die Dialektik lediglich im letzteren Fall zu ihrem Recht kommen. Zu 
diesem Zeitpunkt noch in Unkenntnis der in den Ökonomisch-Philosophischen 
Manuskripten verfaßten Hegeischen Kritik, setzte Lukács die Hegeischen 
Begriffe „Gegenständlichkeit" und „Verdinglichung" irrtümlicherweise gleich 
und hob damit als erster die im 20. Jahrhundert so entscheidende Kategorie der 
Entfremdung (bei Hegel: Entäußerung) ins Zentrum der Aufmerksamkeit. 
(Hierin gründet sich bis heute der internationale Widerhall des Buches, 
insbesondere in den Reihen der linken Intelligenz in den westlichen Ländern.) 
Mittels der Hegeischen Gleichsetzung von Subjekt und Objekt wurde indessen 
die Widerspiegelung negiert und es wurde somit einer bestimmten Philosophie in 
Auftrag gegeben, die prononcierte totale Entfremdung aufzuheben. Da die 
anvisierte Gesellschaftsschicht aus mehrfachen Gründen keine reine Bewußtheit 
zu produzieren vermag, obliegt dies dem Philosophen. Laut Lukács: Aufgabe 
der organisierten Vorhut ist es, das Ideal des klaren Klassenbewußtseins (das 
sog. „zugerechnete Bewußtsein") zu vertreten. Dieser offenkundig geradewegs 
bis zu Kant und Fichte zurückreichende Subjektivismus greift soweit, daß die 
Immanenz und Wirksamkeit der ökonomischen Gesetze durch die souveräne 
Rolle des Bewußtseins verdrängt werden. Auf diese Weise wurde das Werk 
Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein zu einem „sonderbaren Gemisch von theoreti-
schem Subjektivismus und politischem Revolutionärismus."3 Es erfolgte die 
ablehnende Kritik seitens der zeitgenössischen politischen Philosophie keines-
wegs ausschließlich auf Grund der „Verspätung" des Werkes. Wie im Vorwort 
der Ausgabe von 1967 bereits dargelegt, unterwarf der Philosoph selbst sein 
Werk einer grundlegenden Kritik und arbeitete sein Leben lang an einem 
selbstkritisch positiven Gegenentwurf. Diesem Anspruch folgt sein letztes 
großes (unvollendetes) Werk Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins, ein 
souveränes und positives Gegenbild. Für eine Gruppe seiner Schüler, der 
sogenannten Budapester Schule, war gerade dies der Anlaß, sich von ihrem 
Meister enttäuscht abzuwenden, da sie mit einer philosophischen Realpolitik, 
die die Fichteanische Haltung aufgab, unzufrieden waren.4 
Zahlreiche Momente führten dazu, daß sich der späte Lukács von dem 
subjektiven Voluntarismus, ethischen Idealismus und messianistischen Sek-
tarianismus von Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein abgrenzte. Ein Jahrzehnt 
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lang, im wesentlichen bis Mitte der 30er Jahre, währte dieser widerspruchsvolle 
Prozeß des Umdenkens, in dem Lukács danach strebte, das Erbe Hegels und 
Fichtes zu überwinden. Um zu einem tieferen Erfassen der Dialektik histori-
scher Prozesse zu gelangen, bedurfte es unterschiedlichster Faktoren: der 
bekannten Kritik in der Frage des Parlamentarismus ebenso wie seiner 
Zugehörigkeit zur realistischer eingestellten, antibürokratischen Landler-Frak-
tion der ungarischen linken Emigration in Wien bzw. der an Lukács geübten 
Kritik auf dem V. Kongreß der Komintern. Sein „Umdenken" bestimmten 
unter anderem die drohende Ausbreitung des deutschen Faschismus wie eine 
objektive Wägung des Verhältnisses in Ungarn und seine theoretischen 
Schlußfolgerungen über den „Aufbau des Sozialismus in einem Land". Sein 
geschichtsphilosophischer Messianismus begegnete in all diesen Geschehnissen 
und Ereignissen einem sukzessiven „Ernüchterungsprozeß". Ein herausragen-
des Moment dieser Besinnung stellt die über Moses Heß verfaßte Studie5 dar, 
in der er zwar das Hegeische Prinzip der „Versöhnung" noch als reaktionär 
einstuft, doch zugleich gegenüber der „abstrakten Utopie" der Junghegelianer, 
jener „wahren Sozialisten", die Hegel von links zu überholen suchten, hier den 
Hegeischen „großartigen Realismus" wahrzunehmen vermag. („Das, was zu 
begreifen ist, ist die Aufgabe der Philosophie", zitiert Lukács aus der Vorrede 
der Hegeischen Rechtsphilosophie.) 
Eine wichtige Station jenes Weges, den Lukács als führender Theoretiker von 
der „Utopie zum Realismus" zurücklegte, stellte die Ausarbeitung der soge-
nannten „Blum-Thesen" (Januar 1929) dar, die der Vorbereitung zum IL 
Kongreß der KPU im Jahre 1930 dienten.6 Bekanntlich setzte nach dem VI. 
Kongreß der Komintern (1928) innerhalb der internationalen linksextremisti-
schen Arbeiterbewegung eine entschiedene Wende ein, als wäre diese durch die 
Weltwirtschaftskrise von 1929 und den damit einhergehenden sozialen Spannun-
gen unterstützt worden. Dadurch wurde bei vielen die Hoffnung auf einen „neuen 
Durchbruch" geweckt. In einem vom 28. Februar 1929 datierten Brief7 berufen 
sich Béla Kun und D. Z. Manuilski - beide Sekretäre der Komintern - darauf, 
daß es 1919 in Ungarn bereits eine Diktatur des Proletariats gegeben habe und 
nun die Erringung der zweiten Räterepublik das richtige politische Ziel sei. Nach 
den ausgebrochenen Kontroversen war Lukács in seiner am 2. Mai 1929 
verfaßten Erklärung gezwungen, seine unterbreitete Vorlage (die Blum-Thesen) 
zurückzuziehen. Die Thesen waren nicht frei von sektiererischen Einschätzungen: 
sie hielten die irrtümliche Losung vom „Sozialfaschismus" aufrecht und 
qualifizierten die bürgerlichen Demokratien allgemein als Quartiermacher des 
Faschismus. Daher sind sie nur zum geringen Teil als theoretische Initiative der 
späteren sogenannten „Volksfrontpolitik" zu betrachten. Doch Lukács' Ansicht 
über die demokratische Alternative zu einer unmittelbaren, sofortigen linken 
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Diktatur war für die Herausbildung einer perspektivisch angelegten, realisti-
scheren Weltsicht von großer Bedeutung. 
Mit der Zurücknahme der Thesen erlitt Lukács eine politische Niederlage. 
Er ging nach Moskau, wo er anderthalb Jahre Mitarbeiter des Marx-Engels-
Lenin-Instituts war. Als gleichsam befreiende Schockwirkung erwies sich die 
im Verlaufe des Studiums von den Ökonomisch-Philosophischen Manuskripten 
gewonnene Erkenntnis, warum die Konzeption von Geschichte und Klassenbe-
wußtsein (die Gleichsetzung von Gegenständlichkeit und Verdinglichung) im 
Grunde verfehlt war. Hier konnte Lukács Lenins Philosophische Hefte studieren, 
entstand mit Mihail Lifschitz eine lebenslange Freundschaft ideell Gleichge-
sinnter. In dem Maße, wie sich Lukács von der unmittelbaren politischen 
Aktivität zurückzog, entfaltete er seine literaturkritische Tätigkeit. Von Bedeu-
tung sind seine in der Moskauer Rundschau erschienenen Kritiken über Werke 
russischer Autoren (bzw. auch Klassiker) in deutscher Sprache.8 Der Adressat 
war in erster Linie die deutsche technische Intelligenz in der Sowjetunion (die 
an der Verwirklichung der dortigen großen Bauprojekte mitbeteiligt war), doch 
gelangte das Blatt auch nach Deutschland. Der Ton dieser Schriften und die 
Art und Weise der Gegenstandsbetrachtung lassen deutliche Bezüge zur 
Literaturideologie der RAPP (Russische proletarische Schriftstellerorganisa-
tion) mit ihren positiven wie negativen Zügen erkennen. Die künstlerische 
Wertung steht hier bei Lukács noch hintenan, es dominiert die Absicht, über 
das sowjetische Leben zu informieren, doch auch eine Überbetonung des 
Aspektes der Klassenherkunft, die an das frühere Sektierertum erinnert (so 
z. B. in den Ausführungen über Scholochow, Dostojewski und Tolstoi).9 All 
dies führte naturgemäß zu unausgewogenen Ergebnissen. Doch zugleich zeig-
ten sich hier in Korrespondenz mit seiner sich langsam umwandelnden 
Philosophie im Keim bereits einige jener Momente (wie der Totalitätsanspruch 
oder die Forderung nach Wirklichkeitstreue), die in die Richtung der späteren 
Realismus-Theorie wiesen. 
Beachtung verdient zweifelsohne Lukács' ausgedehnte literaturkritische und 
-theoretische Tätigkeit in der zweiten Hälfte der 20er Jahre, die in den Spalten 
der ungarischsprachigen Presse, der Wiener Új Március (1926-1930, Neuer 
März), der Budapester 100% (1927-1930) und der in Moskau erschienenen 
Zeitschrift Sarló és Kalapács (1929-1937, Sichel und Hammer) ihren Nieder-
schlag fand. Zu Recht stellte daher ein ausgewiesener Forscher dieses Zeitab-
schnittes fest, daß Lukács' „spätere, sich in den 30er Jahren herausgebildete 
Ideologieauffassung hierher, in die zweite Hälfte der 20er Jahre zurückführte 
... und zwar nicht von ungefähr.Daraus folgt aber auch, daß seine Auffassung 
über Literatur stärker in den ungarischen Verhältnissen verwurzelt ist, als 
vielfach angenommen wird."10 Bereits hier - in Lukács' Skizzen und Artikeln 
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zur Entwicklung der ungarischen Geschichte und Literatur - fallt eine 
großangelegte Kulturkonzeption auf, die die in den 30er Jahren entwickelte 
geschichtsphilosophische Theorie in vielen Punkten förderte. In seiner An­
schauung von der modernen ungarischen Gesellschaft ging Lukács bis zu den 
Ereignissen von 1848 zurück, als sich ein Weg zur bürgerlichen Umgestaltung 
in Ungarn eröffnete, jedoch daran scheiterte, daß die Revolution - nach seiner 
Meinung - nicht zur Volksrevolution wurde. Im Ausgleich mit Österreich im 
Jahre 1867 sah er einen Kompromiß zwischen Adel und Bürgertum; als dessen 
unmittelbare Folgen schätzte er den Verfall der Kunst im geistigen Leben und 
eine Reihe kompromißlerischer Vereinbarungen ein. Dies machte es Lukács 
unmöglich, im Vergleich zum Erbe und den Traditionen eines Petőfi und Ady 
bei solch herausragenden demokratisch-humanistischen Schriftstellern des 20. 
Jahrhunderts wie Gyula Krúdy, Zsigmond Móricz oder Mihály Babits künst­
lerische Werte zu entdecken. Seine enge Sicht in der Frage der literarischen 
Tradition spiegelt sich in besonderer Weise in seiner Stellungnahme äußerst 
sektiererisch-dogmatischen Plattform-Entwurf wider, der von den in Moskau 
lebenden ungarischen Emigranten-Schriftstellern nach der Charkower Kon­
ferenz ausgearbeitet worden war. Lukács stellte hierzu u.a. fest: „In der 
ungarischen Literatur gibt es nach 1867 keinen klassischen Schriftsteller, von 
dem man als proletarischer Autor lernen könnte."11 Seine starre ablehnende 
Haltung gegenüber Lajos Kassák, dem „Vater" der ungarischen avantgard­
istischen Kunst, ist ein Beispiel für seine Jahrzehnte währende Polemik mit den 
modernen Kunstexperimenten. Zugleich stellen Lukács' Hinweise auf die 
großen antifeudalen bürgerlichen Freiheitskämpfe und Revolutionen als Ereig­
nisse, die bleibende kulturelle Werte hervorbrachten, sowie seine Überlegungen 
zu den klassischen und realistischen Formen, zur Rolle der großen Genres (des 
Romans) ein positives Gegenbeispiel dar. Sie zeugen von den Anfangen einer 
konstruktiven ästhetischen Konzeption, zumindest, was die Beispiele der 
Vergangenheit anbelangt, denn von dem zeitgenössischen „dekadenten" Bür­
gertum erwartete Lukács keine ähnliche Leistung, sondern konstatierte eher 
dessen Verfall. 
Auf Ersuchen der IVRS (Internationale Vereinigung Revolutionärer 
Schriftsteller) ging Lukács zur Unterstützung der Arbeit im BPRS (Bund 
proletarisch-revolutionärer Schriftsteller) im Sommer 1931 nach Berlin. In 
seinem Gepäck befand sich die bereits in Moskau fertiggestellte Studie 
Die Sickingendebatte zwischen Marx-Engels und Lassalle. Mit dieser Arbeit 
wird allgemein - auch von ihm selbst - seine eigentliche Entwicklung 
als Ästhetiker angesetzt.12 Die umfangreiche Fachliteratur zum Geschehen 
seines Berliner „Intermezzos" vom Sommer 1931 bis März 1933 konzentriert 
sich in den Analysen verständlicherweise auf die Diskussionen in den Spalten 
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der Linkskurve.13 Weniger Beachtung finden indessen die Publikationen der 
unmittelbar vorausgegangenen Jahre in der ungarischsprachigen und in der 
russischen Presse, obgleich diese - wie bereits erwähnt - das eigentliche, 
wichtige Vorfeld ausmachen. Die Sickingen-Studie ist Lukács' erste anspruchs-
vollere Arbeit, die bereits in Moskau entstand. Sie ist erstes TeiVprodukt des 
von ihm - insbesondere in Zusammenarbeit mit Mihail Lifschitz - unter-
nommenen Versuchs einer Rekonstruktion der Marx-Engelsschen Ästhetik. 
(Diese Rekonstruktion und der Ausbau der sich darauf gründenden Ästhetik 
bilden den eigentlichen Kern der Lukácsschen Tätigkeit in den 30er Jahren.) 
In der Analyse von den „Klassikern" zu Lassalles Drama wurde dessen 
Standpunkt als formalistisch kritisiert. Lukács sah Lassalles herausragende 
Rolle darin, daß er als einziger Dramenautor (anders als Fr. Th. Vischer, 
Hebbel usw.) im Ringen des Alten gegen das Neue entschieden für letzteres 
eintritt. Eben diese Rolle ermöglichte es ihm zu untersuchen, was für Helden 
Lassalle wählt, wie sein Verhältnis zu den nachhegelschen gesellschaftlichen 
Prozessen ist. Und daraus zog Lukács Anfang der 30er Jahre für sich die 
überraschende Erkenntnis, daß Lassalles Absichten dazu führten: „... in den 
konkreter gefaßten Menschen und gesellschaftlichen Verhältnissen bloße 
Träger, Repräsentanten, Sprachrohre der weltgeschichtlichen Idee zu sehen 
und zu gestalten ... Lassalles Idealismus [schlägt] in eine abstrakte Antinomie 
um, weil er ,die Idee der Revolution' in die konkreten Menschen und 
Beziehungen hineinträgt, statt die wirklich konkrete dialektische Beziehung aus 
ihnen herauszuentwickeln, weil er ihre Konkretheit zugleich setzt und auf-
hebt."1* 
Eben hieran entzündeten sich die aufflammenden Diskussionen in den 
Jahren 1931/32 in der Linkskurve. Dies wird besonders deutlich nach der 
Auflösung der „proletarischen" Literaturorganisationen am 23. April 1932. 
Lukács' Publikationen dieser Zeit sind Streitschriften einer widersprüchlichen 
kritisch-selbstkritischen Auseinandersetzung mit der „Fichteschen Ethik". Die 
folgende größere „Rekonstruktions"-Studie, die - zusammen mit seiner Meh-
ring-Abhandlung - nach seiner Rückkehr nach Moskau entstand und hier 
erschien, belegt Lukács' uneingeschränkte Identifizierung mit der Engelsschen 
Kritik an Margaret Harkness' Stadtmädchen: „Das revolutionäre Aufflammen 
der Arbeiterklasse ... ihre Versuche, konvulsivisch, halbbewußt oder bewußt 
ihre Menschenrechte zu erkämpfen, gehören der Geschichte an und können 
ihren Platz auf dem Gebiet des Realismus beanspruchen."15 
Der mit diesem Zitat von Lukács übernommene Realismus-Begriff ist nicht 
mit jenem gleichzusetzen, der sich bei ihm von der Mitte bis Ende des 
Jahrzehnts herausbildete. Er hat zu dieser Zeit eher noch einen pejorativen 
Beiklang und wird - freilich im Zusammenhang mit der „subjektivistischen 
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Idealisierung" - von Lukács als „versöhnlicher Realismus" apostrophiert, in 
der Überzeugung, daß „allein ... ein revolutionärer Realismus ... die inneren 
Widersprüche der ... Entwicklung mit schonungsloser Offenheit, mit uner-
schrocken-zynischer oder revolutionär-kritischer Wahrheit bloßlegt."16 
Dieser „Realismus" war für ihn nur in Verbindung mit dem noch aus der 
Zeit von Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein stammenden Totalitätsbegriff vor-
stellbar, der auch in einigen seiner Artikel in der Moskauer Rundschau eine 
Rolle spielte. Von daher ist seine Aversion gegenüber der Verwendung von 
Verfahren der Reportageliteratur in der Epik und einer Montagetechnik 
erklärbar, die Figuren und Geschehnisse isoliert und eine Zerbröckelung des 
Ganzen zur Folge hat; deshalb wandte sich Lukács insbesondere gegen eine 
Tendenz-Literatur, die von Seiten gewisser Kritiker der vorangehenden Periode 
als Fichtesches Erbe gehandhabt wurde. An ihrer Stelle setzte er einen höchst 
fragwürdigen Begriff der .Parteilichkeit'. Diese unglückliche und später so viel 
umstrittene Kategorie hat selbstverständlich mit der von den deutschen linken 
Schriftstellern angewandten Methode, die zeitgenössische Bewegung in ihrem 
Alltags-Ringen unmittelbar zu unterstützen, wenig gemein; sie stützt sich 
vielmehr auf die von Lukács in seiner früheren Lassalle-Rezension gewonnene 
Erkenntnis. In ihr stellte Lukács fest: „... wird ... der konkrete Geschichts-
prozeß selbst als das originär Dialektische verstanden, der in unseren Gedan-
ken nur zum Bewußtsein gelangt, so können ihm selbst die entscheidenden 
Tendenzen des gesellschaftlichen Geschehens abgelauscht und so zum Gegen-
stand der Wissenschaft gemacht werden. Die Wissenschaft, die so erreicht 
wird, kann als Wissenschaft die Praxis leiten: eine Realpolitik im weltgeschicht-
lichen Sinne ist dadurch methodisch möglich geworden."17 Die Einsicht in 
solche Dimensionen drängt natürlich die früheren fragwürdigen Termini in den 
Hintergrund und läßt die Herausbildung eines zeitgemäßeren Begriffs - der des 
Realismus - anbahnen. 
Der „weltgeschichtliche Sinn" gewann bei Lukács in der Zeit der Ausbreitung 
des Faschismus eine besondere Bedeutung. Er erkannte eher als die meisten, daß 
der Weg zum ersehnten Sozialismus - gelinde gesagt - steinig ist und in die 
verschwommene ferne Zukunft weist. Die „Realpolitik" erforderte bereits zu 
dieser Zeit den Zusammenschluß aller progressiven Kräfte, also auch ein 
Bündnis mit dem Bürgertum. Lukács stellte sich in seiner Literaturauffassung 
auf eine solche Bündnispolitik ein, wenngleich er vor 1935 selbst nicht frei von 
sektiererischen Einschätzungen war und sich von seiner Aversion einer „avant-
gardistischen" Kunst gegenüber im wesentlichen niemals befreien konnte. 
Auf dieser Grundlage ist sein prinzipielles Mißbehagen gegenüber einer 
„Materialästhetik" verständlich, die er in ihrer ästhetischen Funktionalität und 
tendenziösen Ausrichtung für „fichteanisch" hielt. Auf keinen Fall kann aus 
224 LÁSZLÓ ILLÉS 
dieser Position der Schluß abgeleitet werden, daß Lukács' Anschauung kon­
templativ und deterministisch sei oder er sich den Standpunkt der Spontaneität 
zueigen gemacht habe. 
Die Diskussion zwischen Lukács und den deutschen „proletarischen" 
Schriftstellern wurde durch die Geschichte vertagt. Nach der Machtübernahme 
des Faschismus mußte auch Lukács Berlin verlassen und kehrte nach Moskau 
zurück. Die begonnenen Diskussionen und der anvisierte Gestaltung einer 
„Realismus"-Theorie wurden dann unter noch schwierigeren Bedingungen des 
Stalinismus fortgesetzt; die Anfange nahmen zunehmend konkretere Formen 
an und gewannen an Tiefendimension. 
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In the minds of a public tainted with cinematic melodrama, the word "duel" 
brings up Pushkinian visions of a small clearing in a gloomy, perhaps snowy, 
forest where, at daybreak, well-clad gentlemen - disregarding the danger of 
catching cold - had shed their redingotes, and are poised with pistols at the 
ready. Better even, the action has already been completed as one is allowed to 
conclude from the fact that one gentleman, dead or dying, is lying on the 
ground. One might even perceive in the distance a coach in which a veiled and 
distressed lady watches the outcome standing, of course I mean morally, 
behind the man through all the tribulations he would not have had had it not 
been for her.1 
Let me now jump a century or so and move from an unspecified country 
to Hungary, say in the 1930s. The duel is taking place in a well lit gymnasium 
(literally a fencing-room vívóterem) in the presence of four seconds and two 
doctors. The duelists are naked above the waist with bandages protecting the 
neck and wrist arteries. The fencing swords have been duly inspected and 
disinfected. The senior second had already done his duty and called upon the 
parties for a reconciliation. Now he is standing with a sword in his hand and 
gives the first command Vigyázz! ("Attention!"); the two men salute with their 
swords. At the second command Állás! ("On your mark!") the duelists take up 
their position at a distance which would allow the points of the two swords to 
touch when the arms of the antagonists were fully extended. At the third 
command, Rajta! ("Go!"), which would follow almost at once, the duel starts 
and probably in less than one minute there is a clash resulting, in this 
imaginary case, in a small cut on the forearm of one of the men. The leading 
second shouts Állj! ("Stop!"). The fight is over; the insult which caused the 
duel to be fought had been a slight one and it had been agreed that it would 
stop "at the first blood" {első vér). Let us hope that before the duel the 
insulting party had expressed to his own seconds his readiness to apologize to 
the insulted party; he now does so, and the other man accepts the apology; 
reconciliation follows. But even if the ending is not as happy, for all intents 
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and purposes the affair ends here: chivalrous amends (lovagias elégtétel) have 
been given for the insult, quite irrespective of the outcome, i.e. whether the 
insulted or the insulter had been wounded. Subsequently, the four seconds 
would prepare the minutes of the meeting, and sign them; a copy would go to 
each of the parties involved. 
Perhaps it might be useful to introduce the protagonists of the cast; each of 
them plays a double role, one passive and one active. He who suffered the 
insult becomes the challenger, demanding satisfaction while, conversely, the 
insulter becomes the subject of the challenge which he is bound to accept. The 
insulted party, through his representatives, two seconds, has the privilege of 
determining the time and location of the duel, the choice of the weapon 
(mostly swords of differing weights, or pistols), and the severity of the 
conditions. It had to be decided whether thrusts with the sword were allowed 
or only slashes. Thrusts were very dangerous and were allowed only in cases 
of severe insults. Agreement between the seconds had to be reached also on 
the length of the encounter, namely whether the combat should last until the 
first wound had been inflicted or until disablement of at least one of the 
parties. (I will come back to explain how "disablement" was defined.) In all 
these negotiations conducted by the seconds, the wishes of those representing 
the insulted party were decisive: he who made the affront must pay for his 
behavior. 
The opposing parties never meet before a duel or, more precisely and 
accurately, while the "chivalrous course of action" (lovagias eljárás) has not 
been completed. Each of them is represented by two "seconds" (párbajsegéd) 
who not only conduct all negotiations but whose decision is binding on the 
parties involved. The course of action is as follows. He who feels insulted and 
is ready to challenge2 the insulter asks two gentlemen to represent him in this 
affair. They establish contacts with the adversary who will promptly name his 
own seconds. It is the duty of these four men to determine what would 
constitute satisfactory, honorable amends. It is important to remember that 
the seconds are not playing the role of attorneys, defending the interests of 
their clients. For instance when it comes to armed confrontation they must 
abstain from giving advice to their party. The seconds are guardians of the 
well-established chivalrous tradition, and their duty is to make sure that its 
rules are well and humanely followed. Once they have become familiar with 
the circumstances of the insult, they submit their recommendations to their 
respective party who would normally abide by them. 
It should be remembered that there is a perfectly honorable way to put an 
end to the conflict, one that does not involve the recourse to arms. The insulter 
may express his "regrets", or "deep regrets", he may state that he had acted 
DUELLING IN HUNGARY 229 
under a misapprehension, that there is a misunderstanding and he had never 
intended to insult or, indeed, that the words or acts imputed to him had never 
been uttered or committed. Most importantly, he may even be willing to offer 
his apologies; these may or may not be accepted by the insulted challenger. It 
is, of course, also possible that the insulter shows no regret for his action or 
that the insulted may remain dissatisfied with a mere expression of regrets or 
even with an apology offered before the duel, though he may be willing to 
accept it following the armed confrontation. If an agreement is reached on a 
peaceful solution, the two men may never need to meet, avoiding thereby a 
perhaps painful or embarrassing scene. The insulter would simply have to state 
to his own seconds, perhaps in writing, that he would be willing to express his 
regrets or to offer his apologies. The seconds convey this to the seconds of the 
adversary who may or may not accept the olive branch thus offered. In most 
cases he would follow the advice of his seconds, who prepare the minutes of 
their deliberations and signed copies are given to the parties involved. If ever 
needed, each of them can prove that they abided by the code of honor. The 
choice of the seconds is an important one. They should be men of integrity, 
experienced in chivalrous courses of action, and not of a bloodthirsty disposi-
tion. In my recollection most of these conflicts could be resolved without an 
actual duel taking place. 
Let us imagine now a few cases to exemplify how the system worked in 
practice. At a party, a slightly drunk Mr. A calls a Mr. B an ass who, 
understandably upset, issues right then and there, but certainly within 24 hours 
a challenge. By that time a sober Mr. A has come to regard his remark as 
unjust; he offers regrets or apologies which are then conveyed through the 
seconds to Mr. B who graciously accepts them. The affair is closed. 
Now it so happens that a few months later, at another party, the two men 
meet again and the previous scenario is repeated. Once more Mr. A calls Mr. 
B an ass. In due course he is challenged but, this time his apologies would not 
be accepted and, most probably, a duel would ensue. 
Let me spin my yarn a little further. Some time later, at yet another party, 
for a third time, Mr. A calls Mr. B an ass who, this time losing his temper, 
slaps Mr. A Psysical assault being considered more grievous than verbal 
assault, the onus would shift: Mr. A is now the insulted party who will seek 
satisfaction on his own terms which may be quite heavy. Had Mr. B retorted 
"you are an ass yourself he would have kept the status of the insulted. In an 
exchange of verbal insults the insulter is he who began the exchange. 
Not surprisingly, things get much more complicated when women are 
involved. Let me again present a scenario. On a sunny morning a perfectly 
sober Mr. A is standing, say, in the corridor of the university. His reveries are 
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interrupted by a lady, a nodding acquaintance, who points at a Mr. C whom 
she accuses of having followed her for fifteen minutes through the streets and 
into the building in a way which she had found aggravating. Having said so 
much, wrapped in her dignity she moves on. Mr. A and Mr. C gaze at each 
other (probably neither of them has much sympathy for the lady), but they 
have no choice, this is a typical and somewhat extreme case where noblesse 
oblige. The two men exchange their calling cards, the four seconds will gather 
and, this is my hunch, will conclude that Mr. C followed the route taken by 
the lady by sheer coincidence and, though he may have noticed her pleasing 
appearance, he had no intention to become disrespectful. Therefore Mr. C 
expresses his sincere regrets for any temporary distress he may have caused to 
the lady and assures Mr. A of his high esteem of the chivalrous and justified 
steps he had taken in the defense of said lady. The mechanism is set to work, 
the four seconds prepare the minutes, etc.; the matter is settled. The six men 
may derive a modicum of satisfaction from the fact that the lady, though 
probably tortured by curiosity, will never learn what had happened. She knows 
better than to ask, ever so indirectly, but were she to do so, Mr. A would 
pretend not to have heard the question. In all such matters absolute discretion 
is the rule. The lady's name was not mentioned by anyone engaged in the 
proceeding. 
Let me now switch from this trifling affair to another, much more 
consequential. Our friend Mr. C, a moderate person, accompanies his mother 
to the theater. As they squeeze their way through the row towards their seats, 
the lady treads with her pointed heel on a most sensitive corn on Mr. D's foot. 
She apologizes at once but Mr. D, not known for his self-control, lets go a 
string of pejorative adjectives which it cannot be my task to reproduce here. 
Of course Mr. C's first reaction would be to slap Mr. D in his face, probably 
causing him to fall over his neighbor; a mêlée might ensue which would be 
most inconvenient to a great number of people and, almost certainly would 
bring about the arrest of both gentlemen by an ever-vigilant police officer. 
Since the curtain is just about to rise, Mr. C - a moderate as I have just 
said - sits through the first act and uses the interval to exchange cards with 
Mr. D To assault verbally a middle-aged lady in the presence of her son, whose 
responsibility it is to defend and protect her, is no small matter and the 
conditions under which the duel would have to be fought would have to be 
commensurate with the insult. 
It would be my bet that a duel "to disablement" {harcképtelenség) would be 
suggested by the seconds of Mr. C The seconds of Mr. D, to avoid the charge 
of cowardice, would probably agree. In such a case, the first cut would not put 
an end to the duel but, perhaps, with some short pauses the combat would 
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continue until either one of the duelists or one of the doctors present declare 
that one of the combatants can no longer fight effectively (as judged for 
example by losing the firm grip of the sword) or that a heart-attack may be 
imminent. A duel fought under such conditions was no child's play. Of course 
it was still less life-threatening than a duel fought with pistols and allowing for 
several shots to be fired. But duels of that type were relatively rare in interwar 
Hungary and I would abstain from their description. It is probable that Mr. 
D genuinely regretted his harsh reaction but he did not offer his deep apologies 
lest he would appear to chicken out of a difficult duel. At the same time Mr. 
C felt that words alone were insufficient to compensate for the insult his 
mother had suffered. Now, having put up a brave fight, nothing stands in the 
way of a genuine reconciliation between the two men. Let us have a kind 
thought for the mother, uninformed of the details of the proceedings but 
sufficiently familiar with the stakes to know that her son may be carved up 
rather badly. 
The reasoning as given in my imaginary examples may seem complicated. 
In fact it is most straightforward. The party insulted must be given satisfaction 
on his own terms. If for whatever reasons, be it gender, age, or physical 
handicap the person insulted cannot personally seek compensation, any 
member of the family, indeed any able-bodied man whose help was asked for 
immediately following the insult may take up the defense of the weaker (as was 
the case in the aforementioned A versus C scenario). It should be noted that 
there is no winner or loser in a duel; both men satisfied their chivalrous 
obligations and thereby put the matter to rest. 
Life produces smaller conflicts galore and the imaginary cases described 
may give the impression that most of Hungary's male population was 
constantly engaged in chivalrous courses of action. After all, many men follow 
many women in a way which the latter find aggravating, many men are called 
asses on innumerable occasions, and the number of painful corns tread upon 
at any given hour is astronomical. Every society has its contingent of rowdies, 
ready to pick a fight at the slightest provocation - or without it. In Hungary, 
as elsewhere, there was very little one could do to neutralize them. They could 
take offense where there was none, or, conversely, they could gratuitously 
offend any one whom they wished. They would be called by the pejorative 
term of krakéler (a German loan) or, in a slightly ironical tone párbajhős "hero 
of duels". I know of one instance where such a man was converted to more 
civilized behavior by a good, old-fashioned thrashing, administered quite 
outside the norms of any chivalrous course of action. 
When compared to the country's population, and in absolute figures, the 
number of "chivalrous courses of action" taken must have been insignificant. 
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Only a small proportion of the country's adult, male population was expected to 
follow a chivalrous way of action. Men were either párbajképes or párbajképtelen. 
A rough translation of the two terms would be "fit for duel" or "unfit for duel". 
On the analogy of the adjective "clubabble" derived from "club" one might 
suggest "duelable" and "non duelable". The content of these terms was hard to 
define, though all concerned knew how and when to apply them. 
In the interwar years on which I focus, the duelling code compiled by Vilmos 
Clair3 was the authoritative work on such matters. It was for chivalrous actions 
what Robert's Rules of Order are for American debates. Though the two words 
are frequently used on its pages, no definition is given for either of them. The 
excellent one volume Hungarian-Hungarian dictionary Magyar értelmező 
kéziszótár (Budapest 1972) defines párbajképes az, aki a feudális erkölcsi 
szabályok szerint párbajt vívhat, i.e. "he who according to feudal moral habits is fit 
for duelling". The seven volume A magyar nyelv értelmező kéziszótára (Budapest 
1959-1962) gives a much more detailed, and more Marxist definition of the word: 
A kizsákmányoló társadalom uralkodó osztályaiban olyan, rendszerint érettségizett 
férfi, akit a feudális felfogás szerint értelmezett becsülettel összeférhetetlennek 
tekintett cselekmények nem terhelnek, akit ilyenek miatt katonai vagy polgári 
becsületbirósági, ül. bírói ítélettel nem bélyegeztek meg, s ezért mint sértett vagy 
sértő fél párbajt vívhat, i.e. "aman, usually a high-school graduate, belonging to 
the ruling classes of the exploiting society who has not committed acts considered 
incompatible with honor as conceived by feudal opinion, one who has not been 
found guilty by military, civil or courts of honor of such acts and who, therefore is 
fit to duel either as the insulting or the insulted party." 
This is a carefully worded, accurate definition made by men who knew what 
they were talking about because, there is reason to believe, in the earlier years of 
their lives they themselves had been "fit for duel" because they had their érettségi, 
i.e. their high-school certificate and had belonged "to the ruling classes of the 
exploiting society." Clearly, anyone found guilty in a court of justice of a felony 
would be disqualified from taking part in any chivalrous course of action. But if 
the absence of any such blemish would be sufficient qualification for the right to 
fight in a duel, surely the great majority of Hungarian men would have been 
"duelable". Yet this was not the case. I cannot enter here into the discussion of 
the structure of Hungarian society in the interwar years, but at least between the 
men there was a clear dividing line: there were the urak on the one side and the 
rest of the male population on the other. The definition of an úr is a very difficult 
task which I intend here to side-step by simply equating it with the concept of a 
"gentleman". But then who could be considered a "gentleman"? 
If we turn to various dictionaries of English we find some differences in the 
definition of the word. I rather like the one given in the Oxford Advanced 
DUELLING IN HUNGARY 233 
Learner's Dictionary of Current English (1974) "gentleman" is defined thus: 
"a man who shows consideration for the feelings of others, who is honourable 
and well-bred." I would love to believe that this description indeed fits or fitted 
every úr I have had the honor of meeting, but, of course, I know better. So I 
have consulted my The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, the one 
that has been on my shelves since 1938, and discovered that the first meaning 
given for the word "gentleman" is: "man entitled to bear arms but not 
included in the nobility." A combination of the two definitions gives a fairly 
accurate picture of what a Hungarian úr was supposed to be and in most cases 
really was, at least within his own social class. And here lies the rub. Because 
in far too many instances the consideration for the feelings of others did not 
extend beyond his own, úri circle. For example, the man capable of challenging 
another, unknown man because of some slight inconvenience caused to a 
virtually unknown lady, could show the most callous behavior to a woman 
perceived as belonging to an other social class. 
Strong as the wall separating úr from non-«r might have been, it had a 
wide-open door: education. Any Hungarian man having passed the difficult, 
comprehensive érettségi, the examination that ended his high-school studies, 
was thereby qualified to become a military officer, thus, by definition, a 
gentleman, fit to duel. Let me make it clear: the érettségi was not a prerequisite 
of an úri status; but he who had it automatically qualified for chivalrous 
courses of action. In fact, if he had already served in the army, he had to have 
recourse to these proceedings, and this notwithstanding the fact that duelling 
was a punishable offence in Hungarian law. The military code of honor 
prescribed a procedure which, in many cases led to a duel forbidden by law.4 
In practical terms this meant that for every able-bodied man with a high-
school diploma and of military age, recourse to chivalrous proceedings and 
possibly to duelling was not an individual choice but an obligation the 
avoidance of which would have had very unpleasant consequences. 
I have cited the term párbajképtelen "unfit for duel". Interestingly, it is not 
listed in any of the above-mentioned dictionaries. Yet, most of Hungary's 
adult male population belonged to this category. Let us disregard the small 
section of men who, to use the above-given definition, "committed acts 
considered incompatible with honor". The vast majority of men considered 
"unfit for duel" was so categorized merely on account of their social status in 
the strongly hierarchical Hungarian society. Even in the theoretically egalitar-
ian American society one encounters the dichotomy of "white-" and "blue-" 
collar workers. If, somewhat anachronistically, this distinction is projected into 
the Hungarian society of the interwar years, one could say that the latter were 
"unfit for duel". In a perceptive book describing Hungarian society of his own 
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time (1930), István Weis5 put the numerical strength of Hungarian middle-
classes at about 300,000, in a population of 8,688.319, i.e. a mere 3.45 percent 
of the country's population. We obtain a slightly higher figure by looking at 
the number of high-school graduates. In 1930, only 3.6 percent had the 
érettségi.6 It would thus appear that - since women were exempt from 
duelling - no more than about two percent of the country's population was 
"fit for duel". 
Let me now conclude with a brief examination of a conflict arising between 
two men, one of whom is párbajképtelen. In such situation basic decency 
dictates the solution: if asked for satisfaction, the insulter must comply, 
irrespective of the status of the man whom he had insulted. If insulted by 
someone "unfit for duel", he has no obligation to seek "chivalrous satisfac-
tion". 
The societal structure of Hungary in the interwar years was not exempt 
from contradictions; I know of no society which is. The recourse to a 
"chivalrous course of action", let alone to duelling, does seem archaic. It is. 
Yet, having listened to many high-falutin' talks about methods of "conflict 
resolution", I am convinced that it was an excellent way to resolve non-legal 
conflicts arising within a small, restricted, and well defined stratum of society. 
Notes 
* This article is an extended version of a lecture given in March 1993 at an East-European 
Conference held at New College, University of South Florida, Sarasota, Florida. It attempts 
to provide primary material to some future social historian focusing on Hungarian life between 
the two World Wars. The number of witnesses or participants of duels is fast diminishing; such 
value as the present essay may have consists in its claim to be a primary source, a first-hand 
account of duelling as practiced in Hungary, essentially in the 1930s. It was thought that the 
mechanism of the proceedings deserved to be recorded. 
1. The literature on duelling is extensive. V. G. Kiernan, The Duel in European History. Honour 
and the Reign of Aristocracy (Oxford University Press 1986), is by far the best general 
presentation I have come across. It also has a good bibliography. The few remarks the book 
has on Hungary "a duelling country par excellence" are perceptive but do not go into detail. 
Closer to my topic is István Deák: "Latter Day Knights: Officer's Honor and Duelling in the 
Austro-Hungarian Army," österreichische Osthefte 28 (1986), 311-326. Though he focuses on 
the period before the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, some remarks made by Deák are 
relevant to the interwar years. 
2. The technical term for a challenge was kihívás literally "calling out", a term used by Kiernan 
but one I could never substantiate from other sources. 
3. Párbajkódex 25th edition (Budapest 1940). The book has 159 pages covering all contingencies 
of "chivalrous proceedings". I have followed closely the procedures described in this work. 
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4. The first edition of the aforementioned duelling code by Vilmos Clair appeared in 1897; I own 
its 25th, probably last, edition published in 1940. This excellent work, which provides the 
authoritative guide for an action forbidden by law, is dedicated to the Regent of Hungary, 
Miklós Horthy and is prefaced by a distinguished civil servant, former minister of justice. 
5. A mai magyar társadalom (Budapest 1930), 124. For our purpose, to this figure should be added 
an "upper crust" of the society, estimated by Weis to comprise about four thousand people. 
6. Balogh Sándor (ed.), Magyarország a XX. században (Budapest 1985), 504. 
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The unparalleled artistic, cultural, and intellectual upheaval in the final decades 
of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has been amply treated by a growing 
literature, in and out of Austria and Hungary.1 Much of what we call "the 
modernist movement" in music, literature, the arts, social thought, philosophy, 
and psychology was indeed started in the fertile, sensual, and decaying intellectual 
climate of turn-of-the-century Vienna and, also, Budapest. There was a certain 
playfulness and experimentalism in the air, the creative élite became attracted to 
novelty and invention, intellectual challenge and a call for change. 
Less has been written about the link between the spiritual and artistic upsurge 
in that "World of Yesterday" and the subsequent post-World War I exodus of the 
Austro-Hungarian intellectual élite. The revolutionary movement in the arts and 
thought of pre-War Vienna and Budapest was radically transformed right after 
the collapse and dissolution of the Monarchy in 1918-1920. The modernist 
movement suddenly lost momentum and was transformed into a more profes-
sional, and more conservative, tradition. It was also, however, gradually 
relocated into other countries such as Austria, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Soviet 
Russia, Great Britain, and, ultimately, the United States. What follows in an 
attempt to show some of the characteristic patterns of this migration of 
intellectual and artistic experimentalism and innovative spirit, illustrated here by 
three creative Hungarians who contributed to US culture and civilization in some 
major way. 
* Research for this paper was done mainly in the Houghton Library of Harvard University, the 
Mugar Memorial Library of Boston University, as well as in the Library of Congress, and was 
generously supported by grants given by the American Philosophical Society and the Interdiscipli-
nary Humanities Center of the University of California, Santa Barbara. The first draft version of 
the text was presented as a brief lecture at an international conference on Hungarians in North 
America at Indiana University, Bloomington, in the Fall of 1989.1 am indebted to the Rockefeller 
Foundation for a grant to the Bellagio Study and Conference Center in Bellagio, Italy, where most 
of the final paper was actually completed. The article will eventually serve as part or a chapter of my 
forthcoming book, The Exodus of the Mind, on Hungarian intellectual immigration into the US. 
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Budapest Roots 
One of the most well-known examples as to how the experimental mind 
emigrating from Hungary contributed to, or interacted with, American culture, 
is in music. All the Hungarian musicians who went to the US received their 
musical education at the Music Academy of Budapest, founded by Franz Liszt 
himself in 1875. A few remarks on the history of the Academy may help to get 
a better understanding of the musical and intellectual background of the 
innovative generation whom we may call the 'musical grandchildren* of Franz 
Liszt, the great musicians who were educated in the early decades of the 
century in Budapest and left Hungary between the Wars. 
Liszt made a major effort to include his native Hungary into the more 
civilized, Western part of Europe. He is remembered today as a composer and a 
piano virtuoso and less for his organizational achievements in the international 
field of music of which Hungary benefited perhaps most. Right after the 
Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, Liszt settled down in what was Pest, 
then a small, German-speaking, provincial city with a single bridge connecting 
with Buda (they were to be united in 1873). He stayed there from 1868 through 
the early 1870s and his very presence contributed to the spiritual growth of the 
city into Budapest. He literally handpicked the first professors of musicology, 
violin, cello, and some others and founded a musical tradition equal to the very 
best in Europe. He had both the reputation and the authority to attract some of 
the best people, both Hungarians and foreigners, who came to the new Music 
Academy at his invitation. Professor Jenő Hubay gave up a promising career in 
Brussels, where he worked with the great Ysaye, to return to Budapest and 
founded his own school of violin at the Academy where he was to stay for the 
rest of his life. Professor David Popper, originally from Prague and arguably 
the greatest cellist before Pablo Casals, came from a distinguished position as 
concertmaster in Vienna to teach and perform in Budapest and with Hubay he 
formed a unique string quartet to present classical and contemporary chamber 
music, which included quartets, trios, and piano quintets by Johannes Brahms, 
Antonin Dvorak, Josef Suk, Karl Goldmark, and others. Professor Hans 
Koessler came from his native Bavaria and became the teacher of subsequent 
generations of Hungarian composers. Though he was conservative in his own 
music and a follower of Brahms, he allowed his students a great measure of 
freedom to write their own, modern music. His students included Béla Bartók, 
Zoltán Kodály, Ernst von Dohnányi, Leo Weiner, Emerich Kálmán, Albert 
Szirmai and several other well-known composers.2 
None of these examples of late 19th century "modernism" should allow us 
to believe, however, that Budapest was altogether a capital of modern music. 
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Liszt himself was modern, the Academy much less so. His lesser-known and 
certainly less popular late music foreshadowed in some ways the early Bartok 
who himself felt "that Liszt's importance from the viewpoint of the further 
development of music is greater than that of Wagner." As he added in his 
inaugural address at the Hungarian Academy in 1936, "the compositions of 
Liszt exerted a greater fertilizing effect on the next generation than those of 
Wagner.*'3 The Music Academy, however, set out to preserve classical values 
and nurtured conservative tastes. The ideal was the late-Romanticism of 
Johannes Brahms, who often came from nearby Vienna to the Hungarian 
capital where some of his work was first performed by the Hubay-Popper 
Quartet and local pianists like Vilma Adler-Gold stein. Really modern music 
was not appreciated: Gustav Mahler, for example, was applauded as a 
conductor and director of the Budapest Opera (1889-1892), yet his first 
Symphony written and performed during the same Budapest years was treated 
with almost unanimous indifference.4 However, some of the moderns were 
invited to discriminating Budapest including Claude Debussy and Giacomo 
Puccini so it is difficult to argue that the musical public of the Hungarian 
capital was not at all susceptible to the voice of the incoming 20th century. 
It was in the decade that immediately preceded World War I when most 
modern trends swept across the country, in literature, the arts, philosophy, the 
social and the physical sciences. This indeed was a renaissance of Hungarian 
national culture and the birth of modernism in the country. It symbolically 
started with the poetry of Endre Ady (1877-1919) whose Új versek (New 
Poems) made a veritable literary revolution in 1906, and with the poetry 
anthology A holnap (Tomorrow) (1908-1909) with Ady, Mihály Babits, Béla 
Balázs, and Gyula Juhász among the most prominent names represented. The 
movement got into full speed with the launching of the (mainly) literary 
periodical Nyugat (West) in 1908 which was to become the dominating organ 
of the modernists through World War II, and published vintage modern 
poetry and prose by authors like Endre Ady, Mihály Babits, Margit Kaffka, 
Frigyes Karinthy, Dezső Kosztolányi, Zsigmond Móricz, Árpád Tóth and a 
host of others.5 
The literary pioneers had their counterparts in almost every other field. The 
art-group Nyolcak (The Eight) with Károly Kernstok, Róbert Berény, Béla 
Czóbel and other excellent artists were just as important members of this 
generation as Béla Bartók and Zoltán Kodály in music. Modernism was 
present in almost every field, and usually well ahead of many European 
countries. The very best left early, usually during or right after the revolutions 
of 1918-1919. In photography Hungary lost André Kertész, Brassai [=Gyula 
Halasz], in film, Béla Balázs who was the first major film-theoretician in the 
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world (Der sichtbare Mensch, 1924) and a versatile filmmaker, and other 
filmmakers such as Sir Alexander Korda, Michael Curtiz, and Joe Pasternak.6 
Though making their reputation in Germany, avant-garde artists such as 
Sándor Bortnyik, Lajos Kassák, Hugo Scheiber, Béla Kádár returned to their 
native Hungary when Hitler took over in the Reich.7 Some stayed outside the 
country and left for the United States. 
The immediate pre-World War I period nurtured a gifted and ambitious 
generation with politically liberal or sometimes leftists ambitions to change the 
outdated social and political system of the country.8 Most of the people who left 
Hungary after World War I were members, students, or followers of this 
generation. In music, they invariably came from the Music Academy and were, 
often, though not exclusively, Jewish. The best known names are those of the 
conductors: Fritz Reiner, Eugene Ormandy, George Szeli, Antal Dorati, Eugen 
Szenkár, Georges Sebastian, Ferenc Fricsay, István Kertész, and Sir Georg Solti. 
Violinists from the school of Jenő Hubay included Joseph Szigeti, Stefi Geyer, 
Ferenc (Franz von) Vecsey, Emil Telmányi, Ede Zathureczky, and Yelly d'Aranyi. 
The lists are impressive by themselves and they speak highly of the ability of 
many of the professors in Budapest to give not only a thorough musical training 
but also, often, a good sense of how to explore the contemporary world. For the 
post-World War I generation of Hungarian musicians, Béla Bartók and Zoltán 
Kodály were the great examples to look up to and follow. To understand and 
appreciate the importance of their legacy, it is important for us to turn to a major 
representative of that next generation. As Eugene Ormandy pointed out in a 
1937 article for The Hungarian Quarterly, it was due to them "that Hungary has 
emerged as a musical entity. This Hungarian music of the twentieth century is 
intensely nationalistic and, while nationalistic art is of necessity limited and 
destined to a comparatively short life, paradoxically enough the worlds of these 
two composers in the very intensity of their nationalism transcend(ed) national­
istic bounds."9 Ormandy added, "In the dramatic inevitability of Bartók, we 
have a composer who might be compared to Beethoven."10 "Breaking away 
from the over-refined, essentially cerebral and decadent music of the post-
Romantic period, Bartók has injected new life blood into his music. It has a 
savagery and yet withal a youthful vitality that makes it of universal importance. 
... Typical of Bartók are the frequent use of arabesques, rapid, passage work, 
myriads of trills, leaps into strange intervals and an unsymmetrical construc­
tion."11 Bartók and Kodály revived "the racial idiom of Magyar music," 
Ormandy acknowledged, "to portray the distinct individuality of Hungarian 
music."12 
The modernism of the music and ideas of Bartók and Kodály, their 
philosophy and lifestyle, their integrity and puritanism served, in many ways, 
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as a model for their students at the Music Academy, the next generation of 
musicians. Ormandy himself, together with Fritz Reiner and George Szell, was 
the very first to present the music of Bartók to audiences outside Hungary. 
They remained deeply committed to modern music throughout their career. 
Though mainly performing a classical repertoire, Eugene Ormandy also had a 
real interest in contemporary music such as that of Sergei Rachmaninov whose 
work he frequently performed for the first time with Van Cliburn and the 
Philadelphia Orchestra.13 He recorded other Russian composers such as 
Dimitri Shostakovich {Concerto for Cello and Orchestra, Op. 107), and Dimitri 
Kabalevsky {Concerto No. I for Cello and Orchestra, Op. 49) and regularly 
added works by Richard Strauss {Heldenleben, Death and Transfiguration, 
Metamorphosen for 23 Strings). Gustav Mahler was a natural on his program. 
Antal Dorati, besides being a composer himself, performed many of his 
contemporaries including, particularly, Paul Hindemith.14 Both Fritz Reiner 
and George Szell took an active interest in contemporaries. Reiner played 
Stravinsky,15 as well as, quite regularly, Bartók, and also pieces by William 
Schuman, Zoltán Kodály and Leo Weiner. Szell shared his enthusiasm for 
Bartók, recording his music as well as that of Gustav Mahler, Leos. Janácek, 
and Zoltán Kodály, and also performed Jean Sibelius, Sergei Prokofiev, Igor 
Stravinsky, Paul Hindemith, Sir William Walton and lesser known American 
contemporaries such as the young composer Lukas Foss.16 
Szigeti 
The man who did most for modern music among the Hungarian musicians 
was probably the violinist Joseph Szigeti. The virtuoso was perhaps the most 
celebrated and well-known student of Jenő Hubay and carried the Hubay 
tradition literally all around the world. All his life he was most conscious of 
the continuity of the Brahms tradition in both Vienna and Budapest and 
valued this tradition he received from his Budapest professor Hubay. He 
recalled Budapest as a center for the discovery of talented young people like 
Rafael Kubelik, Franz von Vecsey, Isadora Duncan, and, somewhat earlier, 
Gustav Mahler and Arthur Nikisen,17 and, we may add, Hans Richter. The 
example of Szigeti is relevant in demonstrating the strong links between the 
old Music Academy tradition and the musical philosophy of the post-World 
War I generation. 
On one occasion around 1955 Szigeti quoted a letter by Johannes Brahms 
to Eduard Hanslick dated December 11, 1888 inviting the music critic to come 
over to the Billroths' next day "and help Hubay and myself turn pages and 
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play wrong notes - perhaps also to drink a good glass?"18 In an effort to reach 
out for the past, Szigeti added, 
... I felt that these notes might interest the listener of our days who has been to a 
great extent deprived of the real 'habitat' of chamber music: the small Hall and - better 
still - the music room in which the congenial few gather around the players in rapt 
concentration. I was in my late teens when I turned pages at a rehearsal of the d minor 
Sonata. Leopold Godowsky and [my master] Jenő Hubay [rehearsed it] in preparation 
for their concert in Budapest, some twenty years after [Brahms had brought the pencil 
manuscript of his work to my master Hubay for] this Vienna 'try-out.' ... One has 
reason to feel grateful for having been born at a time when these sonatas were still a 
comparative rarity, when [their performances presupposed mature players] they had not 
yet become class room 'material' and grateful Vehicles' for debut recitals. There were 
at the time no dozen - or - so recordings from which the student could choose his 
'model'; ... As the rare live performances he heard were mostly by mature interpreters 
and took place in halls of modest proportions (world famous performers like Ysaye, 
Sarasate, d'Albert, Busoni played in Vienna's Bösendorfer Saal, in the old Paris Salle 
Pleyel in the rue Rochechouart seating barely 4 or 500, in the small 'Royal' Hall in 
Budapest) the intimate chamber-music characteristics of these sonatas were brought 
home to him... Hubay told me at the time how much these fine points meant to Brahms, 
how literally he took his markingfs]...19 
Disapproving of Hubay's approach toward chamber-music, Szigeti also 
attended some of the classes in quartet playing under Budapest professor 
David Popper, cellist of the renowned Hubay-Popper Quartet.20 
Szigeti mastered practically the entire classical violin repertoire, and yet he 
became one of the few leading soloists in the world who was naturally 
attracted to contemporary music. Even the solo sonatas by Bach he started to 
play at the instigation of Milán Füst, a modernist poet who was his Budapest 
friend in their young days and became one of the leading spirits of the 
modernist movement in Hungarian literature and aesthetics.21 For him the 
living tradition of late 19th century music in Budapest and Viennna also 
implied the inclusion of contemporary music. This became evident right from 
the beginning, as Otto Eckermann carefully observed it as early as 1922, 
stating, "Mr. Szigeti is one of the few violinists who always brings novelties 
(the others always play the concerts which they studied in the Conservatory), 
and he commissioned me to look for appropriate new works."22 Composer 
Kurt Atterberg added in 1958, "It is very interesting to read just now that you 
were interested in new music already in 1922."23 "Szigeti was always eager to 
learn new things and to understand music from the composers' point of view: 
Tor what would the lives of mere interpreters be without the fertilizing 
influence of this vital contact with »Work in Progress?«' Szigeti believed that 
artists grew from their autosuggestive insights and stated, 'If we concede — as 
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I am inclined to do — an important role to this autosuggestive faculty in our 
work, what better schooling in it than commerce with new works and their 
composers?' " 2 4 Eugene Ysaye said of Szigeti's art after World War I, "I found 
in Szigeti that rare combination of musician and virtuoso. As an artist he 
seemed conscious of a high mission into which he put all his faith, and he 
placed technique entirely at the service of musical expression."25 
At 80, he was awarded the George Washington Award of the American 
Hungarian Studies Foundation for identifying "himself with the new, untried 
and progressive," giving of himself "unstintingly so that a significant new 
voice in music might be heard."26 More contemporary composers of all 
nationalities dedicated their work to, or were commissioned by, Szigeti than 
perhaps any other contemporary soloist. Often at an early stage of their career, 
he readily lent the power of his charisma to Hungarians such as Béla Bartók, 
Pál Kadosa, Antal Molnár, Americans like George Templeton Strong, Rus-
sians such as Nikita Magaloff and Sergei Prokofiev, the Armenian Aram 
Khachaturian, Irishmen like Sir Hamilton Harty, Englishmen like Alan 
Rawsthorne, the Italian Alfredo Casella, the Lithuanian-Jewish Joseph Ach-
ron, the Swiss Ernest Bloch, and the Polish Alexander Tansman. He consider-
ed it important to keep a whole series of contemporary music on his program, 
such as work by the Polish Karol Szymanowski, the French Albert Roussel 
and Darius Milhaud, the Roumanian Filip Lazar, the Russian Igor Stravinsky, 
the Italian Ferruccio Busoni and Ildebrando Pizzetti, as well as the Englishmen 
Sir Edward Elgar and Sir Arnold Bax,27 and, later, the American David 
Diamond, Charles Cadman, and Henry Co well.28 He also worked in close 
collaboration with both Paul Hindemith and Igor Stravinsky. There was a 
great deal of the Liszt tradition continued in these gestures. He often invited 
composers to appear in recital with him performing their own work "thus 
creating a little oasis in a recital program where the composer and not the 
reproducing artist is the center of interest."29 In the 1950s, he repeated a 
number of series entitled "20th Century Cycles" in several US universities and 
music centers,30 which he recalled as a "pleasure evening series of eleven 
contemporary master-pieces, entitled 'Sonatas of the 20th Century.' I give this 
series about fifteen times on different campuses in America and also in Zurich 
and over the Italian Radio in 1959.1 recorded it for the Swedish Radio."31 In 
cases where he could not promote a contemporary work himself, he did 
everything in his power to make other artists interested, as it happened for 
example in the case of Gian Francesco Malipiero's Concerto for Violin and 
Orchestra which he showed "to my friend, Maestro George Szell," as well as 
to Leopold Stokowski in New York and Henri Barraud at the Radio Diffusion 
Française in Paris.32 By carrying the tradition of an active interest in the 
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contemporary, Szigeti made an example to his entire generation throughout a 
long and productive life. As Manoug Parikian saluted him in The Royal 
Academy of Music Magazine on his 80th birthday in 1972, "All this would 
seem commonplace in these days of over-consciousness of contemporary 
music; in the 1920s and 1930s, in the midst of virtuoso-type recitals and 
endless repetitions of the same five or six concertos it was a brave crusade. His 
deep knowledge and understanding of the spirit of Bach, Mozart and Beetho-
ven was as important as his search for new music.33 
In the US, Szigeti's delayed popularity has been attributed to the slow 
growth of intellectual sophistication in American audiences. His was a long and 
tedious journey toward making contemporary music recognized in the country. 
His pioneering efforts in front of select audiences of metropolitan music halls, 
enterprising campus groups and on elitist radio programs were often unnoticed 
and at best not remembered. When he received a copy of Henry Cowell's new 
Sonata for Violin and Piano (1945) from the Publishers asking him to perform 
it, Szigeti ironically noted on the cover letter, "They sent me this Sonata which 
was written for me and which I had premiered at Carnegie!! Machine-made 
'promotion'..."3* Gelatt asserts that this fact "...detracts nothing from Szigeti's 
personal achievement. For no one has contributed more to that growth than 
the violinist himself."35 He was of course often criticized for his programming. 
"Playing the Roussel Sonata No. 2 once lost Szigeti a prospective manager who 
heard him perform at Carnegie Hall. Modern composers do not sell programs, 
Szigeti was promptly informed. Recalling this incident Szigeti wrote, 'needless 
to say I was entreated once again to mend my already notoriously incorrigible 
ways of programming.' "36 Yet, his pioneering efforts led to a break-through 
even in the US where his philosophy of musical programming came through 
triumphantly when playing the world premiere of the Bloch Concerto in 
Cleveland in 1938; Bartók's Contrasts with Benny Goodman and the composer 
in Carnegie Hall in 1939; Prokofiev's Sonata in D, op. 94 in Boston in 1944 and 
his F minor, op. 80 in San Francisco in 1946; and premiered Prokofiev's 
Concerto in D and the Ravel Sonata in the United States.37 
For one particular contemporary composer, self-exiled Béla Bartók, Szigeti 
did more in the United States than perhaps anybody else between 1940 and 
1945. Their friendship started in the 1920s. They then toured together in Berlin 
in 1930. Szigeti used his connections to make Bartók's music available and 
popular to audiences in the US. He appeared with Bartók in recitals at the 
Library of Congress and played with the newly arriving Hungarian composer 
in 1940 in the Carnegie Hall. He was in touch with leading US conductors such 
as Leopold Stokowski and tried to get Bartók's American compositions 
performed. Szigeti was one of the loyal supporters of Bartók during his last 
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illness and tactfully helped the poor though proud composer to receive help 
from wealthy patrons such as Mrs. Elizabeth Sprague Coolidge in 1943. He 
was ready to be at Bartók's disposal to the very last when the terminally ill 
composer requested his help to interest conductors in his Piano Concerto, the 
third and last he composed.38 After Bartók's death, Szigeti served as one of 
the trustees on the board of the Bartók Archives in New York.39 
Joseph Szigeti lived most of his adult life abroad though he visited Hungary 
regularly to the end of his life except for a gap after World War II. 
Characteristically, the Leningrad (today: St. Petersburg) Conservatory headed 
by the famous composer Alexander Glazunov thought of him in 1928 as the 
right candidate to succeed the great Hungarian-born Maestro Leopold Auer 
as their violin professor, an invitation which he did not accept.40 (After several 
decades as the head of the institute, Glazunov himself left the Conservatory 
that same year to live abroad.) 
Throughout, Szigeti maintained excellent relations with Hungarian musi-
cians and helped a number of them start their own careers. He was instrumental 
in launching the career of cellist Janos Starker at the Indiana University School 
of Music when he stated in a letter of recommendation to Dean Wilfred C. Bain 
that Janos Starker is "not only a superb virtuoso but a sound musician, versed 
in all fields of chamber music and a man who, in his conversations with me on 
technical matters, revealed himself to be a thinking pedagogue and theoreti-
cian.41 He was glad to be associated with Hungarian causes, and, together with 
Arthur Koestler and Nobel Laureate Albert Szent-Györgyi, was acknowledged 
by the honorary membership of the Association of Hungarian Authors in 
Foreign Countries, located in London, right after the revolution of 1956.42 
Newcomers from post-1945 Hungary such as pianist Tamás Vásáry were glad 
to register their homage to the maître.*3 Szigeti found it important to publish 
his autobiography in Hungarian as well thinking that "this new Hungarian 
intelligentsia should get to know me a little."44 He asked Hungarian-American 
diplomat Andor C. Klay how he felt about it and Klay's answer was most 
enthusiastic: "I have found that they know about you to a degree which is 
surprising in the light of your long absence from Hungary and their long years 
of isolation from the West. I recall examples from Camp Kilmer when I visited 
there in order to select some refugees to form a delegation which could be 
presented to the President and the Secretary. I raised various questions, ranging 
from the political to the cultural, in order to gauge their range of knowledgea-
bility. Your name was repeatedly mentioned; I made a firm mental note of this. 
(No one knew, however, that you were living in the United States.)"45 
Szigeti always tried to include Hungarian pieces in his US programs and 
even his most popular ones such as the People's Symphony Concerts on CBS 
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included a Scène de la Csárda by his master Jenő Hubay, Rhapsody in C by 
Ernst von Dohnányi and a piece by Bartók played together with the com­
poser.46 
Moholy-Nagy 
Comparable in many ways to the achievement of Szigeti in the performing 
arts was the New Vision of László Moholy-Nagy, a most dramatic testimony 
to the significance and range of the modernist contribution in the visual arts 
from Hungary. Coming from the same generation of Jewish Hungarians, 
Moholy-Nagy (1895-1946) was probably the most versatile among the Hun­
garian artists, being an architect, photographer, designer, prolific author, and 
filmmaker.*7 Together with fellow-Hungarian Marcel Breuer, he was a found­
ing member of the Bauhaus school first in Germany and later, in 1937, in 
Chicago. Moholy became a pioneer in a number of diverse fields such as 
non-figurative, geometric art, in kinetic sculpture, typographical design, as well 
as in photography. Bauhaus founder and lifelong friend Walter Gropius also 
approached Moholy-Nagy's abstract art, his "new vision," in musical terms at 
the opening of the Moholy-Nagy Exhibition at "London Galleries," at the 
very end of 1936, providing one of the most lucid and rational explanations of 
abstract art ever given. 
You know that musical work, a composition, consists, just like painting, of form 
and content. But its form is only in part a product of the composer, for in order to make 
his musical ideas comprehensible to any third person, he is obliged to make use of 
counterpoint which is nothing more than a conventional agreement to divide the world 
of sound into certain intervals according fixed laws. These laws of counterpoint, of 
harmony, vary among different peoples and in different centuries, but the changes are 
very slow... In earlier days the optical arts also had firm rules, a counterpoint regulating 
the use of space. The academies for art which had the task of keeping up and developing 
these rules, lost them - and art decayed. Here the abstract painters of our day took up 
the threads and used their creative powers to conquer a new statutory law of space. This 
new counterpoint of space, a new vision, is the core of their achievement.*s 
Gropius described Moholy-Nagy's whole work as "a mighty battle to 
prepare the way for a new vision, in that he attempts to extend the boundaries 
of painting and to increase the intensity of light in the picture by the use of 
new technical means, thus approximating nearer to nature. Moholy has 
observed and registered light with the eye of the camera and the film camera, 
from the prospective of the frog and the bird, has tried to master impressions 
of space and thus developed in his paintings a new conception of space."49 
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Indeed, Moholy-Nagy was a most intense and insightful observer of the 
"modern" world of the 1920s and 1930s. Like some of the very best of his 
generation, he went very far in the visual exploration of form, construction, 
spacial relationships, and light effects.50 "We might call the scope of his 
contribution 'Leonardian,' so versatile and colorful has it been," Walter 
Gropius eulogized him at his Chicago funeral in 1946.51 "His greatest effort 
as an artist was devoted to the conquest of pictorial space, and he commanded 
his genius to venture into all realms of science and art to unriddle the 
phenomena of space. In painting, sculpture and architecture, in theater and 
industrial design, in photography and film, in advertising and typography, he 
constantly strove to interpret space in its relationship to time, that is motion 
in space."52 
What Gropius tried to explain particularly was the source of Moholy-
Nagy's modernism, the basis of his deep and enthusiastic interest in anything 
new. "Constantly developing new ideas he managed to keep himself in a stage 
of unbiased curiosity from where a fresh point of view could originate. With 
a shrewd sense of observation he investigated everything that came his way, 
taking nothing for granted, but using his acute sense for the organic."53 
"Many of us will remember his peculiar freshness when he was facing a new 
problem in his art. With the attitude of an unprejudiced, happy child at play 
he surprised us by the directness of his intuitive approach. Here I believe was 
the source of his priceless quality as an educator, namely his never ceasing 
power to stimulate and to carry away the other fellow with his own enthusi-
asm. What better can true education achieve than setting the student's mind 
in motion by that contagious magic?"5* 
Just like many other contemporary artists of the early 20th century 
representing varied brands of modernism, Moholy was aptly described as a 
technical pioneer "who was fascinated and stirred by the dynamic pace of the 
machine age. His élan vital thrived on the tempo and the motorized rhythm of 
big-city life."55 He deeply believed in the new unity of art and technology.56 
The big European and American métropoles exerted an unmistakably "mod-
ern" influence and left a lasting imprint on his whole generation. The great 
experience of Moholy's life, too, was the big city and the continuous mechan-
ization of the world and human life with it. For him, modern man's structure 
was indeed mechanical, "the synthesis of all his functional mechanisms."57 
"Man is unique in the insatiability of his functional mechanisms, which 
hungrily absorb every new impression and never cease to crave for more. This 
is one reason for the continuing need for the creation of new forms," he went 
on explaining his artistic philosophy in his Malerei, Photographie, Film.58 As 
an artistic expression of his functionalist artistic philosophy, Moholy-Nagy 
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experimented with what he called the "space modulator,"a pioneering optical-
kinetic sculpture pointing towards a new art form. Some of his other ideas 
contributed significantly to new branches of knowledge such as cybernetics 
and semantics. 
Experimentation was a natural in Moholy's whole life, starting with his 
participation in the Ma group in Budapest and his cooperation with Lajos 
Kassák. But it was in Germany, in the early Bauhaus period that his 
experimenting qualities started to blossom and young Moholy became particu-
larly productive. 
A primary example is his discovery of a new kind of creative photography, 
a new artistic discipline. He became convinced that photography came to 
replace painting in representing reality. In his painting, he was striving for 
"organized order." In his photography he proved to be a superb master of new 
techniques, but his photographs became artistically significant really through 
"his completely novel and individual manner of looking at familiar things -
the use of bold foreshortening, unusual angles, and superimposed light-dark 
structures, such as the shadow of a net or a fence."59 His growing reputation 
made Sir Alexander Korda request that he do the special effects for his The 
Shape of Things to Come, based on a novel by H. G. Wells. 
His experimental photography gave fresh impetus to advertising techniques. 
To this end, he renewed the art and technology of typography as well, in order 
to create a new form for communicating messages. He suggested that "printing 
processes had not undergone a significant change, either technically or aesthe-
tically, since Gutenberg's time, and that the printed image should be made 
lively and interesting and should be brought up to date to make it worthy of 
the twentieth century."60 Here again, his innovative spirit was almost preoc-
cupied with "modern technology and the use of machines. To express the 
character of the technological age, contemporary products of the printing 
industry will have many points in common with the latest machines, i.e. they 
will have clarity, compactness and precision. ... Opportunities for innovations 
in typography are constantly developing, based on the growth of photography, 
film, zincographic and galvanoplastie techniques. The invention and improve-
ment of photogravure, photographic typesetting machines, the birth of neon 
advertising, the experience of optical continuity provided by the cinema, the 
simultaneity of sensory experiences - all these developments open the way for 
an entirely new standard of optical typographic excellence; in fact, they 
demand it."61 
Though Moholy-Nagy in his American years continued to do the experi-
mental art of his German Bauhaus period and gradually became a very 
influential teacher of his ideas, he, just like Szigeti, had a long fight for the 
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recognition of the modern in the United States. It all started very promisingly. 
While a refugee in London, in May 1937 he received a telegram from the 
Industrial Artists Association saying "starting industrial design school in fall 
[-] backed by industrialists [-] modest beginning but real opportunity to 
establish project along lines bauhaus [-] looking for head [-] gropius recom-
mends you highly [-] would you consider it [-] at what figure [-] cable."62 The 
idea to invite him came from his mentor Walter Gropius, then Chairman of 
the Department of Architecture at Harvard, who worked out even some of the 
details with the people in Chicago. For Moholy this sounded like intellectual 
salvation, as in London he had bitterly complained that "from a spiritual point 
of view one can reach here nothing or only the minimum and that every 
stimulus and every excitement is missing."63 He was also anxious to get back 
and work in a school just as in the old days of the Bauhaus. Now the chances 
were good to build up an American version of the Bauhaus in Chicago and 
Moholy eagerly answered, "for plan highly interested [-] please send more 
details."6* 
His friend Walter Gropius, then 60, was most optimistic about the US 
environment, "We feel very well;" he wrote to Moholy shortly afterwards, "a 
lot of the aspects of our stay here are brilliant, and I think if we succeed in 
making good use of our chances something will be allowed to be built here."65 
He called America a "pleasant continent," and gave details as to the Chicago 
plans based on the money of department-store-millionaire Marshall Field and 
located in one of his buildings. One of the crucial points of Moholy-Nagy's 
candidacy was his many relations with British and German industry, and firms 
like Simpson and International Textile, as well as Julian Huxley were provided 
as references. Huxley gave "a magnificent testimonial" saying how sorry he was 
to see Moholy leave England. Moholy characteristically noted, "Nevertheless 
we have the notion that every Englishmen feels easier and less responsible if we 
get such offers from America."66 In fact, it was Huxley's personal relationship 
with the President of the Board of Trustees of the Association of Arts and 
Industries, E. H. Powell, that ultimately helped the artist to get his contract.67 
After what he labelled [this] "enervierenden kleinkram hier" Moholy was 
eager to leave Britain and relocate, as it were, the Bauhaus spirit in Chicago. 
"Everything calls here for a better design in industry," Gropius underlined the 
nature of the new job he helped to find for Moholy.68 He planned four classes 
in industrial art, in metal, wood, "typo-photo-film (commercial graphic)," and 
textile. Gropius suggested that he would "be given free hand to develop the 
thing in a direction as you like fit."69 He also thought Moholy could put 
together his faculty as he pleased and the opportunity to start from scratch 
seemed to have particular advantages. 
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Moholy put enormous energies into what became officially called "the new 
bauhaus - American School of Design, founded by the Association of Arts and 
Industries." First he had to fight for the very name bauhaus itself, for he 
thought that since the Americans had adapted Weltanschauung, why couldn't 
they have bauhaus as well.70 Immediately, he wanted to become part of the 
Bauhaus exhibition of the Museum of Modern Art at the Rockefeller Center 
in New York.71 He also intended to continue the old Bauhaus book series, 
particularly as the Nazi takeover closed the German market for the Bauhaus 
publications.72 He shared, however, the opinion of Gropius who saw great 
potentials in bringing over the Bauhaus to the US but considered it essential 
to adapt its methods to the country and to the character of her people.73 
The new bauhaus was finally opened in Chicago on October 18, 1937, "at 
the announced time," as Moholy proudly reported to Gropius.74 He was 
pleased with his first experiences which he found interesting, particularly as he 
had earlier considered the Americans not clever enough and he had to realize 
how mistaken he had been. "Their intellectual standard, the quick copying of 
the facts is fascinating. Only their capacity of experiences must be enlarged, I 
think. They eat knowledge really with the spoon, with large, real, round soup 
spoons."75 He persuaded some of the very best available people to join his 
faculty, including Archipenko for modeling, David Dushkin for music, the 
journalist Howard Vincent O'Brien to lecture on "the meaning of culture," as 
well as three professors of the University of Chicago, Charles W. Morris to 
teach "intellectual integration," Ralph W. Girard for life sciences, and Carl 
Eckart for physical sciences. "Kepes will arrive, with all the gods' help, in the 
middle of November," he added to the list.76 
The first academic year was successful. By the end, however, it brought 
about financial difficulties to an extent that Moholy-Nagy was advised by the 
Association of Arts and Industries to tell his faculty that if they were offered 
other positions "they should take them because the Association's financial 
position made it probable that we would not open next semester."77 Moholy-
Nagy felt especially bitter about experiencing a typical émigré situation: "After 
I and my teachers were asked by the Association of Arts and Industries to 
come to this country and after we have shown every possible amount of good 
will, that the reason why she [Miss Stahle of the Association] could not raise 
money for the school was the resentment against foreigners in this country."78 
The school started to disintegrate: teachers were dismissed, the necessary 
equipment was less and less available. Moholy felt he had to look for other 
sponsors and get out of the Association. Gropius called the story "the first case 
of Chicago gangsterism that we experienced in actual fact," and tried to use 
his prestige to help.79 Moholy, however, thought he should solve his own 
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problems "without bothering my friends." He added emphatically at the end, 
"America was always a country of pioneers and there is no doubt my next time 
will be a justification of this term."80 The students, about sixteen, showed 
"wonderful enthusiasm to continue the Bauhaus,"81 and though Moholy felt 
compelled to send farewell notes to his colleagues, he continued to fight for 
their survival. "Now sometimes I think why is to fight? As stranger in a 
foreign country! But I found such a great enthusiasm everywhere I go for the 
Bauhaus that I think it would be a pity to drop it. Also the last year I felt that 
I grew really, more and quicker than in the past 5 years all together."82 Oddly 
enough, he felt at home and, correspondingly, he wrote most of his letters, 
even the ones to Gropius, increasingly in English. 
At Christmas 1938 the situation was still unchanged and Moholy's wife 
Sybill complained bitterly to Mr. and Mrs. Gropius, "Es ist immer und immer 
die alte schmutzige Geschichte mit ihnen..."83 Moholy himself wrote a few days 
later a long letter to The New York Times and gave it a detailed story of their 
humiliation. Soon he was able to gather enough support and it became possible 
to open the school again under a new name, School of Design, at a new 
address, starting February 22, 1939. The "Sponsors' Committee" included 
distinguished names such as Alfred H. Barr, Jr., Walter Gropius, and Julian 
Huxley. Soon he was able to offer a summer course for 1940 and a series of 
evening lectures for 1939-1940. By Christmas 1939 the storm was over and 
Moholy confidently reported to Gropius, "Indeed the school looks fine. We 
have much more and better machines and equipment than we had on Prairie 
Avenue [the location of the new bauhaus in Chicago] and as good luck, my 
public lecture on 'The New Vision and Photography' drew about two hundred 
and twenty people and was very well received."84 He was also able to secure a 
grant of $10,000 from the Carnegie Foundation and again $7,500 somewhat 
later, and this was a major triumph.85 Characteristically, at this point he 
planned to invite Stravinsky to lecture and perform at the School. By March 1, 
1942 the School had 120 students "which is absolutely wonderful as it is 20% 
more than last semester and so many art schools and colleges have lost rather 
than gained students."86 
The School was blossoming when leukemia claimed Moholy's life in 1946.87 
Robert J. Wolff commented on the book by Sybill Moholy-Nagy on her 
husband, "Laszlo Moholy-Nagy will perhaps be best remembered as the man 
who not only helped to formulate one of the most vital manifestos of our time, 
but who, unlike many of his brilliant Bauhaus colleagues, had the power and 
the faith to fight to the point of death for the social implementation of the 
brave young words of the original Bauhaus documents."88 
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Von Neumann 
For a third and last look at the relocated fine, experimental minds of Hungary 
there is the case of John Von Neumann (1903-1957). The son of a rich and 
upwardly mobile Budapest banker, Von Neumann "was very much a Budapest 
type," a "good Budapester of his time and social class," as his longtime friend and 
fellow Hungarian, economist William Fellner noted.80 Though also of Jewish 
origin, the great mathematician had little to fear, even in Horthy's Hungary after 
1919-1920. His upper-middle class and well-connected family fled to Austria 
during the Soviet-type Republic of Councils of the Spring and Summer of 1919. 
Unlike most fellow-Jewish-Hungarians he was not victimized by the numerus 
clausus quota system set up by the incoming Horthy administration and was 
accepted at the University of Budapest in 1921. Yet he almost immediately left for 
Berlin, Göttingen and, later, Zürich where he became a student of those 
prestigious universities and their professors, including Albert Einstein and David 
Hubert. His is an important case to help us better understand the situation after 
1919-20. Not only were Communists, Leftists, Radicals, and simply Jews 
victimized by the consequences of the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy, the revolutions of 1918 and 1919, and the ill-designed Peace Treaty of 
Trianon (1920) that partitioned Hungary herself. Whether or not they were 
technically harassed by rightwing thugs or stopped in their careers by the 
anti-Semitic numerus clausus legislation of 1920, the devastating aftershocks of 
World War I left little or no chance for major creative talents to develop their 
abilities and forced them to leave the country.90 Hungary, and to a lesser extent 
Austria, ceased to provide the shelter where genius had been produced, nurtured, 
and educated over the previous several decades. Modernization was no longer 
possible, and it was not even wanted. Economic development came to a stop, 
there was no money available, and in the ensuing spirit of neo-conservatism, the 
prevailing political and social forces pushed out most of the people who were to 
introduce new ideas. After Trianon, progress was no longer the creed and cry of 
the post-War generation which was influenced by the various shades of 
conservative thought of Ottokár Prohászka, Gyula Szekfű, or Cécile Tormay.91 
First invited to Princeton in his late twenties, John Von Neumann was 
certainly one of those who, in the words of his friend and First biographer 
Stanislaw Ulam, desired "to blaze new trails and to create new syntheses."92 
Ulam distinguished this group of mathematicians from those who wanted to 
contribute "to the edifice of existing work" and added: "It was only toward 
the end of his life that he [Von Neumann] felt sure enough of himself to engage 
freely and yet painstakingly in the creating of a possible new mathematical 
discipline," namely the theory of self-reproducing automata, as Ulam put it.93 
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Stanislaw Ulam may have been right from a purely mathematical point of 
view, though he should have added Von Neumann's pioneering studies on the 
theory of games and economic behavior, or his last efforts on the mathematical 
modelling and interpretation of the brain. But the real "modernism" of Von 
Neumann is indeed an all-embracing feature of his entire work and Weltan-
schauung. Von Neumann brought his (and his family's) optimism and faith in 
technology and modernization to the United States from some of Hungary's 
best years of economic development. He thought of new technology as 
something basically beneficial: developments in technology captivated him to 
such an extent that "he could barely find the time to work out his highly 
innovative mathematical ideas."9* Von Neumann's optimism, his belief in 
"progress" was rooted essentially in a 19th century European tradition which 
had been based on French Enlightenment philosophy as well as the thinking 
of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer and transmitted continuously by the 
best Hungarian gymnasia. The celebrated Sándor Mikola (1871-1945), the 
dominating physics teacher and later principal of Von Neumann's Budapest 
high school, based his entire textbook A fizika gondolatvilága (The Mind of 
Physics, 1933) on the underlying philosophy that "starting from some basic 
qualities, human spirit is in constant progress." 
When and why did Von Neumann turn from pure mathematics toward 
artificial and natural automata, "computing machines" and the brain? Some time 
during the early 1940s he realized that the safety of a system is not so much 
dependent upon the nature of its constituent elements but rather on its 
organizational principles, its complexity, and the quality and quantity of the 
information processed by it. His turn toward the theories of control and 
information was highly motivated and influenced by regular contact with his 
mentor and friend Rudolf Ortvay (1885-1945), professor of physics in the 
University of Budapest. Many of the ideas that came to captivate Von 
Neumann's mind through the 1940s and 1950s originated in his long correspon-
dence with Professor Ortvay who considered it his special duty to support and 
encourage young and talented people both in and out of his physics seminar. In 
his 1939 letters from Budapest, Ortvay literally pushed his young Princeton friend 
into dealing with complex issues such as the axiomatic method, the theory of 
games, computing machines, and particularly brain research.95 Though it would 
be misleading to overestimate Ortvay's influence, it did prove to be profound and 
lasting especially for two reasons: it was pertinent to the philosophical 
foundations of Von Neumann's future work and it came just on the eve of World 
War II which gave Von Neumann's interest an entirely new focus. 
From the very early 1940s, the war effort directed Von Neumann's work 
toward a whole series of new problems mostly related to defense, the struggle 
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against Nazi Germany, and, finally, the Cold War. The war years put him on 
an unending trail of government connections, starting, as of 1940, with his 
membership in the Scientific Advisory Committee of the Ballistic Research 
Laboratories, and his consultancy with the Navy Bureau of Ordnance as well 
as with the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. By the time he became one of 
the Atomic Energy Commissioners in 1955, he was invited to serve on some 
20 other defense-related boards and committees working on very practical 
issues for the US Armed Forces, and particularly for the Air Force and the 
Navy. This impressive number of government commissions resulted in a wide 
array of pioneering tasks of a highly technical and practical nature where his 
experimental mind and engineering abilities were at their best. The list included 
the National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Weapons 
Systems Evaluation Group, the RAND Corporation, as well as nuclear 
research centers such as the Oak Ridge and the Livermore Laboratories and 
the Sandia Corporation.96 Toward the end of his life Von Neumann became 
one of the nation's top defense experts involved in dozens of projects highly 
innovative and experimental in nature. When the newly established Enrico 
Fermi Award was conferred on him, almost too late, in 1956, he was 
applauded primarily for his contributions "to the art and science of the design 
and application of fast electronic calculating machines," and was cited as 
"teacher, inspirer and original contributor to the profound problems of the 
logic of programming for the most effective use of these expensive and 
elaborate devices.97 
It is probably justified to consider the computer a product of the war effort 
and the Cold War atmosphere. It became central to Von Neumann's thinking 
also during World War II. His correspondence with Professor Rudolf Ortvay 
seems to suggest that the idea was first brought up by Ortvay from Budapest 
in early 1941.9B It was also Ortvay who, repeatedly from 1939 through 1941, 
hinted at the importance of brain research and the mechanism of the nervous 
system as a whole, providing a number of useful starting points for an 
elaborate research project.99 "I looked into your paper on [the theory of] 
games again...," Ortvay wrote to Von Neumann in January 1941. "I liked it 
at the time very much as it gave me the hope that if I succeeded in directing 
your attention toward the connection of the brain-cells, you might be able to 
expose this problem."100 Though war-related issues certainly contributed to 
Von Neumann's development of large computing machines, such as ENIAC, 
ED VAC, and chiefly, JONIAC, it is highly likely that Ortvay's encouragement 
and ideas had a fair share in alerting him to the links between complicated 
automata and the human nervous system. Even though his first major article 
in this field, "The General and Logical Theory of Automata," was read as a 
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lecture only after the war, at the Hixon Symposium in September 1948, the 
roots of his experimental interest in automata and brain theory go back to the 
immediate pre-war years. Thus, his celebrated though tragically undelivered 
Silliman Lectures at Yale University, published as a booklet only after his 
death, in 1958, were partly built on the very ideas first brought up by Ortvay 
in their correspondence almost 20 years before.101 Nevertheless, no credit was 
given to Ortvay in the little book, or, indeed, by Arthur W. Burks in the edited 
text of Von Neumann's Theory of Self-Reproducing Automata.102 
It is therefore possible to argue that Von Neumann's long-standing experi-
mental interest in automata and the nervous system, probably his single most 
important contribution to modern science, has its origins in the immediate 
pre-war years and in his continued links to Budapest colleagues such as Rudolf 
Ortvay. It is evident that the potential to deal with these issues was already 
there in his younger years and in his very first papers on the theory of games. 
The genuinely innovative character of his research and inquiry was only 
deepened and accentuated, rather than produced, by World War II and his 
long stay in the United States which, just as in so many other cases, helped to 
bring out the best indigenous qualities of the immigrant European mind. The 
spiritually liberating yet intellectually reinforcing two-way effect of leaving 
conservative Hungary and entering the US can be considered a most typical 
experience of Hungarian-American intellectual migrations. 
"Commentators on American traits delight in quoting De Crèvecoeur's 
classic remark that 'the American is a new man who acts on new prin-
ciples.'"103 To the many aspects of American exceptional ism and uniqueness 
one may add perhaps an often neglected though basic secret of innovative 
immigrant success in 20th century US: the genuinely heart reception given to 
the pioneering spirit, inconceivable in any European country at the time, the 
sheer sensation caused by the profoundly hospitable welcome to new ideas, 
novel approaches, fresh methods, unexplored dimensions of the human mind. 
Productive abilities were incomparably more readily welcomed, eagerly ap-
preciated, and carefully accommodated, indeed, institutionalized, in the US 
than in the threatening atmosphere of totalitarian and dictatorial systems 
prevailing all across Europe, including the calamities of World War II, and the 
subsequent threats of the Cold War. 
Though often overlooked, one of the very special forces that drew a large 
number of major people to the US in this long period of time from the 
1930s into the 1980s was not just material benefits but the uniquely appreci-
ating American welcome which liberated the innovative spirit and experimen-
tal eagerness for fresh inquiry from several generations of European scien-
tists, scholars, and artists. For non-conventional minds such as those coming 
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from Hungary, this provided features and stimuli they so very badly missed in 
their homeland. Increasingly, the US represented the exhilarating experience 
once offered by turn-of-the-century Paris to the earlier generation of the 
Hungarian poet Endre Ady who felt "noble, fair, and great" not "beside the 
Danube [where] a demon army jibes and screams," but "beside the Seine" 
only.104 
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PLANNING ON HUNGARY 1942-1946 
IGNÁC ROM SI CS 
Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest 
Hungary 
Three weeks after Pearl Harbor, on December 28,1941, President Roosevelt 
approved the Department of State's setting up of the Advisory Committee on 
Post-War Foreign Policy. Its task was to work out the policies that would guide 
the U.S. in the postwar negotiation of peace. Though under other names, the 
Committee continued to function, in fact until the end of the war. 
The accumulated material was deposited in the National Archives by the 
State Department in 1970. The collection was catalogued as the Notier File, 
and made available to researchers in 1974.1 The purpose of this study is to 
present the various points of view that emerged in the course of the Advisory 
Committee's discussions of the future of Hungary and its place in the proposed 
"East-European Union". 
1. The Composition of me Advisory Committee 
The Advisory Committee first met on February 12, 1942. It included not 
just scholars and university professors, but also leading associates of the 
Department of State. The chairman of the Committee was Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull, its deputy-chairman was Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, 
while the person who actually ran the day-to-day workings of the Committee 
was Leo Pasvolsky (1893-1953), an economist of Russian descent, and one of 
Hull's advisers. The Advisory Committee spent its first meeting setting up six 
subcommittees, the most important of which were the Political Subcommittee 
and the Territorial Subcommittee. The former, whose sessions were generally 
chaired by either Hull or Welles, dealt with global and regional political issues. 
The latter, the Territorial Subcommittee, was charged with mapping the 
territorial and ethnic disputes of the world and suggesting border revisions that 
might eliminate or at least minimize these tensions. 
The chairman of the Territorial Subcommittee, and one of the key figures 
of the Advisory Committee as a whole, was Isaiah Bowman (1878-1950) a 
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professor of geography. As president of the National Geographic Society from 
1915 to 1935, Bowman had travelled the world over, his interest in geopolitics 
making him an avid student of international relations, his specialty at Johns 
Hopkins University after 1935. The other key figure of the Advisory Commit-
tee was Hamilton Fish Armstrong (1893-1973), the member of the above two 
subcommittees best versed in European affairs, and the editor of Foreign 
Affairs, the semi-official quarterly of the Department of State. Armstrong, 
whose job as editor since 1922 had gained him an extraordinary range of 
contacts, was particularly knowledgeable about Eastern Europe. 
Other names that we come across in reading the minutes of the various 
subcommittee sessions as those of Adolf A. Berle (1895-1971), a lawyer and 
from 1938 Deputy Secretary of State; Anne O'Hare McCormick (1882-1954), 
foreign policy analyst of the New York Tunes and the first woman journalist 
to win the Pulitzer Prize; Herbert Feis (1893-1972), economist, economic 
consultant to the Department of State at the time, and later one of the 
best-known historians of the war and cold war years, and Cavendish W. 
Cannon (1895-1962), a career diplomat, and head of the State Department's 
Southeast European Section in 1944-1945. 
The Advisory Committee and its various subcommittees had a research staff 
to help them in their work. By the summer of 1942, thirty graduate students 
who had just received their Ph.D. degrees 'or were just about to' were recruited 
specifically for this job. The research staff consisted of fifty-five people at the 
end of 1942, of ninety-six in mid-1943, and of seventy-seven when it was 
terminated in 1944. The de facto head of the research staff was a youngish 
career diplomat, Harley Notter (1903 -1950). His lieutenant, and also the head 
of the group of research staffers working on territorial issues, was Philip E. 
Mosely (1905-1972), a Harvard graduate, and a specialist in East European 
history. In the early 1930's, Mosely, then a young teaching assistant, spent two 
years in the Soviet Union; the years 1935-36 saw him spend a number of 
months in the Balkans. It was at that time that he also visited Transylvania. 
Except for Armstrong, Mosely was the member of the Advisory Committee 
most familiar with the Danube region. Other members of the research staff 
working on Eastern Europe, and thus on Hungary, were Harry N. Howard 
(1902-1987), John C. Campbell (1911 - ) . Cyril E. Black (1915-1969), and 
Thomas F. Power (1916-1988). All of them young historians at the start of 
their careers, in the postwar years they were to follow their boss, Philip E. 
Mosely, in making a name for themselves in the postwar decades as the chief 
East-European experts, Balkan experts and Kremlinologists of the United 
States.2 
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2. Hie "East-European Union" and Hungary 
The idea of a confederation of "eastern", "east-central" or "central" 
European states-was first raised in the U.S. in the fall of 1918, once the fate 
of the Habsburg Monarchy was sealed. Once the U.S. delegation withdrew 
from the Paris peace talks at the end of 1919, however, and particularly after 
President Woodrow Wilson lost the 1921 election and isolationism became the 
order of the day, the idea was shelved, until Hitler's Drang nach Osten gave it 
a new urgency. 
By 1942, the time the Advisory committee started its work, postwar 
economic and political cooperation between the countries of Eastern Europe 
was taken for granted, and it was only natural that the Political Subcommittee, 
in charge of regional planning, should give it considerable attention. Eight 
entire sessions were devoted to the matter in the spring and summer of 1942, 
and the issue was returned to periodically in 1943 and 1944. Of the concrete 
proposals discussed, four were considered particularly carefully: those of 
Wladislaw Sikorski, of Edvard BeneS, of Otto von Habsburg, and the plan 
jointly worked out by Tibor Eckhardt and János Pelényi. Sikorski, the head 
of the London-based Polish government-in-exile, advocated a loose, primarily 
economic confederation of all the states lying between the Baltic Sea and the 
Adriatic, and Germany and the Soviet Union. Benes's idea, which enjoyed the 
support of a number of the exiled politicians of the countries concerned, was 
two confederations: a Balkan federation centering on Yugoslavia and Greece, 
and a Central European federation centering on Poland and Czechoslovakia. 
The Yugoslav-Greek pledge of cooperation of January 15, 1942, and the 
Polish-Czechoslovak agreement of January 19 of the same year seemed to 
have laid the groundwork for such a system. Archduke Otto's proposal was a 
Danubian federation of the lands of the former Habsburg Monarchy, one in 
which dynastic and national aspirations were reconciled in the spirit of the 
twentieth century. Though this never concretely specified, it was clear that he 
himself was to be the Habsburg at the helm of this federation. The Eckhardt 
-Pelényi proposal envisioned three loosely-knit federative units, the Balkan, 
the Polish-Baltic, and the Danubian-the last much like the Danubian Union 
envisioned by Archduke Otto, consisting of Austria, Hungary, Bohemia, 
Slovakia, Transylvania and perhaps Croatia.3 
The Political Subcommittee examined the above proposals from two salient 
points of view: security and economic viability. The security consideration 
meant that they wanted the new federation to be proof against a possible 
German or Russian attack, and even a joint Russo-German aggression, 
as in 1939. The other main consideration, economic rationality, involved 
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establishing a unit of the size optimal for a domestic market, so that a 
functional economy might serve to alleviate some of the social tensions 
endemic to the region, and become the basis of a functioning democracy. 
Both security and economic considerations argued for the Subcommittee's 
taking a stand for the largest and strongest units possible, already at its very first 
sitting. This ruled out the Eckhardt-Pelényi plan for a tripartite region, and also 
Archduke Otto's proposal, which had left out the Balkans and the Polish-Baltic 
Sea region. What remained was Sikorski's suggestion, and perhaps BeneS's. 
Another point at issue in connection with the proposed federation was its 
precise nature and organization, i.e. the measure of autonomy the member 
states would retain, and the competence of the organs of central government. 
The majority on the Subcommittee agreed that given the legacy of national 
conflict and non-cooperation in the region, federation was, at best, a long-
range goal; initially, what was realistic was a loose confederation of sorts. The 
issue arose as to how far it was necessary or feasible to carry economic 
cooperation over into the political sphere. Some of the members would have 
been content to see no more than a tariff and currency union for a start. Others 
insisted on the need for close political cooperation without political coordina-
tion.4 
The Political Subcommittee dealt very little with the matter of borders, 
leaving it to the Territorial Subcommittee to do so. It did, however, declare 
that the confederation must aim to bring about "cohesive national groups", 
and that possibly, border adjustments would need to be made to this end. 
Furthermore, the creation of smaller national units than the ones existing at 
the time was not out of the question. The points on which the Political 
Subcommittee had reached a consensus as of June 19, 1942, were outlined in 
a few pages by the research staff, the gist of which reads as follows: 
The regional organization should have the form not of a federation but of a union 
of independent and sovereign states, cooperating for limited objectives through com-
mon non-legislative institutions, loosely rather than tightly organized. Provisionally the 
union is considered as including all states of Central and Eastern Europe between 
Russia and Germany from and including Estonia on the North to Austria on the West 
and Greece on the South.5 
The Political Subcommittee returned to the East-European Union issue at 
several sessions in late 1942 and early 1943. One reason for this was that they 
had "polled" the émigré politicians of the region, and had found little 
enthusiasm for a plan that wanted to see the entire region become one federal 
unit. 
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That a federation embracing the entire region would indeed, be problematic 
was the conclusion arrived at also by Notter, Mosley, and other members of 
the research staff. They concluded their analysis of February 10, 1943, by 
pointing out that an Eastern Europe spreading from Finland to Greece was 
illusory in the extreme: the areas involved looked back on no common history, 
were heterogeneous in respect of culture and religion, and, in fact, had 
absolutely nothing in common besides their backwardness and subjection to 
Germany. With no internal cohesion to bind it, they noted, it was very dubious 
if this test-tube baby of a federation would prove in any way viable. Notter 
and his group believed the federation would stand no real chance unless the 
victorious allies or some international body were to assume protectorate over 
it "for an indefinite period".6 
The Political Subcommittee sought to bridge the chasm between its own 
recommendations and the reservations of the exiles and its own research staff 
by espousing, as of early 1943, also "a possible but less desirable alternative", 
a plan calling for two East European federations, a "Balkan" and a "north-
ern" union. This, naturally raised other problems, such, for instance, as where 
Austria and Hungary were to belong, and even Croatia and Slovenia, in the 
absence of a Unified Yugoslavia. Since the "Danubian countries" as such 
belonged organically neither to the Balkan unit nor the Polish-Czech unit, a 
number of people began to toy with the idea of a South German-Austrian-
Danubian unit, which, of course, was tantamount to the rehabilitation of the 
Eckhardt-Pelényi, and the Otto von Habsburg proposals. As of the summer 
of 1943, the Political Subcommittee was able to come up with no unanimous 
stand on this matter. After that, it no longer wanted to, for it would have been 
senseless to force a decision on a matter which, more and more obviously, 
would fall to the Soviet Union to decide on and not the United States or Great 
Britain.7 
It was in December of 1941, on the occasion of Foreign Secretary Anthony 
Eden's visit to Moscow, that Stalin first informed his Western allies that one 
of the Soviet Union's goals is to restore the borders agreed in the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact, in short, to reannex certain parts of Finland, the Baltic 
States, Eastern Poland, and Bessarabia. Stalin also mentioned that he regards 
Eastern Europe and the western half of Central Europe as likewise of 
immediate interest to the Soviet Union, and that it might be best to divide 
Europe in British and Soviet spheres of influence.8 The British and the 
Americans refused to sign a secret agreement as to the postwar territorial 
division of spoils, and publicly insisted that territorial disputes will be settled 
after the cessation of hostilities by a peace conference more fair-minded than 
the one of 1919-1920 had been. At the strictly confidential sittings of the 
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various peace preparatory committees, however, they were already discussing 
what of Stalin's demands might be acceptable. 
By the end of 1943, U.S. diplomacy had more or less officially agreed to let 
Stalin have his way in Eastern Europe. In Teheran, Roosevelt agreed to have 
Poland "pushed" west, and agreed to the 1941 borders in the north and south 
as well. Somewhat earlier, Cordell Hull had told a fellow diplomat that he 
could, of course, go to Moscow to discuss the Baltic States and Poland's 
eastern borders, but in that case "he ought to take some of the U.S. Army and 
Navy with him".9 An expedition of this kind, however, was something that 
neither Hull nor Roosevelt, nor any other American political force of conse-
quence wanted to see. For though the United States had its own version of the 
postwar Eastern Europe that would be desirable, it was not in its interest to 
use military force to achieve it. This conviction was clearly reflected in all the 
statements made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense 
in 1943-44. Repeatedly, these communiqués emphasized that the U.S. was not 
to get involved "in the area of the Balkans, including Austria", and that "the 
Balkans and their troubles were beyond the sphere of proper United States 
action".10 
In the course of the Moscow and Teheran conferences, it became an 
accepted fact that Central and Eastern Europe were particularly significant 
from the point of view of Soviet security, and that this gave Moscow certain 
privileges. The question, as of the end of 1943, therefore, was not whether or 
not Europe would be divided, but how divided it would be, and where the line 
of demarcation would lie. This latter set of questions, however, was the 
wellspring of much animated debate in Washington throughout 1944. 
The controversy produced two camps, the "cooperationists" and the 
"confrontationists". Walter Lippman, an influential political theorist was one 
leading spokesman of the cooperationists. As Lippman saw it, the time was 
past when the small states could feign independence, seesawing between sets of 
great powers all the while. The postwar world would consist of three, perhaps 
four, spheres of influence, and the small nations would have no choice but 
voluntarily submit to the directives of the dominant great power allotted them 
by geopolitics. In view of the fact that the Atlantic Charter nations had very 
little direct economic or strategic interest in Central and Eastern Europe, the 
countries of that region, much as they might deplore this on historical, cultural 
and psychological grounds, would have to accommodate to the Soviet Union.11 
The confrontationist point of view, shared by Roosevelt's successor, Harry 
Truman, was formulated by Sumner Welles, who had resigned from govern-
ment in the fall of 1943. Though Welles, too recognized the 1941 borders, and 
somewhat hypocritically assumed that "... the peoples of the Baltic States 
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desire to form an integral part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics", he 
was determined to put a stop to further Soviet expansion. As late as 1944, 
Welles stood firm by the need for independent states in East Central Europe, 
joined together in some kind of federation.12 
The Advisory Committee itself, specifically a new subcommittee headed by 
Armstrong dealing with the reorganization of Europe, finally took a stand on the 
matter of the future of Eastern Europe. That the region east of Danzig 
(Gdansk)-Sudetenland-Trieste line would belong to the Soviet sphere of 
influence they took for granted. It was a. fait accompli. American policy, they 
argued, would depend on how the Soviets interpreted the concept of sphere of 
influence. If they meant by it something akin to what the U.S. meant by the 
Monroe Doctrine, and, on the pattern of the Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement of 
1943, made treaties of friendship and cooperation with the various countries, thus 
obliging them to an amicable foreign policy without interfering in their domestic 
governments or their trade relations with any other nation, then this was 
something the Americans could hardly take exception to. If, on the other hand, 
the Soviet aim was the "annexation" or "subjugation" of the states of Eastern 
Europe, this had to be thwarted as unacceptable. On the basis of testimony heard 
from Charles E. Bohlen, First Secretary at the Moscow embassy, and subsequent-
ly U.S. ambassador to Moscow, the subcommittee more or less assumed that the 
war will have exhausted the Soviet Union, especially its economy so thoroughly 
as to make it impossible for it to aim at more than a "minimal program" akin to 
that embodied in the Monroe Doctrine.13 
Proceeding on this assumption, Armstrong's subcommittee still did not 
completely give up on the planned regional federation, or at least cooperation. 
It was clear, however, that this cooperation, if it came about at all, would be 
a far cry from what the Advisory Committee envisaged in the spring and 
summer of 1942. That official Washington had more and more reservations in 
connection with the original proposal is indicated also by the change in 
terminology. Instead of the terms "East-European Union", "confederation" or 
"federation", the 1944 documents, for the most part, contain the expression 
"regional groupings." A memo in connection with "a Democratic Danubian 
or East European Federation," dated January 22, 1944 notes: "At the present 
such regional units are viewed with disfavor in official quarters."14 
3. Hungary's borders 
Both President Roosevelt and his Wilsonian Secretary of State believed that 
the most important guarantee of lasting peace in the postwar world was the 
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creation of an international organization which-unlike the League of Na-
tions-was strong enough, if it saw fit, to defend the status quo in the face of 
any aggression anywhere in the world. At the same time, they were only too 
aware of the fact that the only status quo that could be preserved in the long 
run was one which did away with the territorial injustices conserved-or 
created-by the previous postwar settlement. A great deal of the Advisory 
Committee's efforts therefore, were focused on identifying the various terri-
torial disputes the world over, and coming up with proposals for their solution. 
It was specifically the job of the Territorial Subcommittee to do so. 
The members of the Territorial Subcommittee did not aim at a radical 
revision of territorial boundaries. Though their chief goal was ethnic fairness, 
at the very first sessions they introduced the "Principle of Minimum Change", 
and this was to be the guideline in decisions involving both borders and 
population exchanges. In practice, this meant that they wanted to change the 
borders established in the wake of the First World War only to the extent 
absolutely necessary on ethnic, strategic, or economic grounds. Accordingly, 
they decided to look into not borders as such, but only the most disputed 
segments of each country's frontier.15 
Besides the principles of ethnic fairness and of minimum change, the matter 
of which side the given country was on in the war also entered into the 
Territorial Subcommittee's deliberations. We must note, however, that the idea 
of "punishment" of "retribution" was never a dominant consideration, not 
even in the case of Germany or Japan. In the case of "satellite countries" such 
as Finland, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary, it was a very minor consider-
ation indeed. Roosevelt and his Secretary of State, as is known, considered 
these countries "victims", not aggressors, and did not take seriously their 
declarations of war. Most members of the Territorial Subcommittee shared 
their view. Thus, as we shall see in a moment, the Subcommittee not only 
strove for ethnic fairness in the case of two enemy countries, but, in the case 
of an allied and an enemy country, was capable of deciding in favor of the 
latter.16 
Of the over fifty areas of tension identified and examined by the Territorial 
Subcommittee, thirty-four were in Europe, and of these, twenty-four in 
Eastern Europe (cf. Map 1). Except for where Hungary bordered on Austria, 
every section of the Hungarian border-the Yugoslav-Hungarian, the 
Slovak-Hungarian, and the Romanian-Hungarian streches of the fron-
tier-was included among the areas in dispute. A fourth area of territorial 
tension with an impact on Hungary's future, and one separately listed and 
treated, was the Kárpátalja (Subcarpathian Ruthenia), a region that had 
belonged to Hungary until 1920, was part of Czechoslovakia between 1920 and 
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1939, and was reannexed to Hungary in 1939. (The Soviet Union annexed it 
in 1945, and it would remain part of the USSR until its recent break up.) 
The Subcommittee first dealt with the Slovak-Hungarian border in the 
summer of 1942. By that time, Mosely and his research staff had prepared a 
number of background studies on the ethnic composition of the region, on 
Slovakia's development between 1919 and 1938, and on the findings of the 
American peace delegation of 1919-20. Though their report included the 
relevant data of the Hungarian census of 1910, because of the alleged 
distortions in the Hungarian count, and because the Czech figures were more 
recent, they took the 1930 Czechoslovak census as the more reliable. On this 
basis, the ethnic Hungarian population of Slovakia-without Ruthenia-was 
not 650,000 (as the more impartial figures of the 1921 Czechoslovak census 
also showed), but only 571,000.17 Even so, it was clear that the 
Slovak-Hungarian border drawn in 1920 considerably farther south than the 
ethnic frontier, and that it would be neither fair, nor expedient-unless one 
wanted to feed Hungarian irredentist feeling-to restore the 1920 demarcation 
line. Since they were dealing with two enemy nations, Mrs. McCormick 
suggested that they might leave the 1938-39 borders well enough alone. The 
majority on the Subcommittee, however, rejected this proposal. In the course 
of the debate, Mosely pointed out that the First Vienna Award had been based 
on the Hungarian census of 1910, and was, thus, prejudicial to the Slovak 
population. He noted, moreover, that the 1939 reannexation of Ruthenia had 
absolutely nothing to do with the ethnic composition of the population. It had 
been a strategic decision bolstered with historical arguments. Thus, rather than 
keeping the 1938-39 borders or restoring those imposed by the Treaty of 
Trianon, he recommended a compromise solution which, in effect, split the 
difference between the two boundary lines. The new border would involve no 
real hardship for Czechoslovakia's transportation system on economy, and 
was maximally fair from the ethnic point of view. The Czechoslovak census of 
1930 had shown that Hungarians comprised the absolute majority of the 
population in ten border districts: six of them in the Csallóköz (Grosse 
Schuett), three in Central Slovakia, and one in Eastern Slovakia. It was this 
area of 2,355 square miles, with a population of 396,000, seventy-eight percent 
(309,000) of which was Hungarian, that Mosely wanted to see returned to 
Hungary. He also thought it desirable that the southern parts of the fifteen 
districts north of the border districts-areas of mixed population, with the 
Hungarian comprising the largest single group (for instance, the areas around 
Gálán ta and Érsekújvár-Nővé Zámky)-also belong, wholly as in part, to 
Hungary. On this proposal, the size of the pre-1938 Czechoslovak re­
gion-excluding Kárpátalja-that would have remained in Hungarian hands 
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was a minimum of 2,700 square miles, and a maximum of 4,500 square miles, 
with populations of 484,000 and 854,000 respectively. Redrawing the borders 
along the above lines would have decreased the ratio of ethnic Hungarians 
within the whole population of the area to 64 percent in the first scenario, and 
the 59 percent on the second (cf. Map 2). It was to improve these ratios 
somewhat that Mosely recommended that some measure of population ex-
change take place as well.18 
The Territorial Subcommittee had Mosely's proposal on its agenda on five 
separate occasions. The main, and only serious opposition to it came from 
Hamilton Fish Armstrong, who adduced every possible argument in the effort 
to leave Hungary with as little of the disputed territory as possible. The 
vehemence of Armstrong's arguments was not something that other members 
of the Subcommittee could match, nor, probably, did they really want to. For 
while they did not agree with Him on every detail, they did not really try to 
refuse his arguments. The vote on September 4 rejected Mosely's proposal, and 
recommended that Hungary be allowed to keep only the above six south-
western districts-an area of 1,400 square miles, with a population of 275,000, 
79 percent of which was ethnic Hungarian (cf. Map 2, Table 2). By way of a 
compromise, they left open the matter of where the three central and the one 
eastern district along the border would belong. The Subcommittee recommen-
ded that further research and discussion precede any decision on this issue.19 
Transylvania-which had been part of Hungary prior to 1920, was part of 
Romania between 1920 and 1940, and was split between the two by the Second 
Vienna Award, i.e. between 1940 and 1944-was discussed by the Territorial 
Subcommittee on three consecutive occasions in February of 1943. The 
rapporteur was John C. Campbell, a thirty-two year old assistant professor of 
history. Campbell outlined four possible solutions, of which he deemed none 
to be particularly satisfactory. Restoration of the borders determined at 
Trianon was undesirable because even the 1930 Romanian census figures 
showed Trianon to have placed a million and a half ethnic Hungarians under 
Romanian rule. "It would", as Campbell put it, "perpetuate a difficult 
minority situation". Restoration of the pre-Trianon status quo, i.e. returning 
all of Transylvania to Hungary, was even worse: it would create a minority of 
three million Romanians, and was difficult to reconcile with the Principle of 
Minimum Change. The third possibility presented for consideration was to 
keep the borders drawn by the 1940 partition. Economic and infrastructural 
considerations argued against that solution, as well as the fact that the 
partition had annexed to Hungary not only the purely ethnic Hungarian 
easternmost region, the Székelyföld (Szeklerland), and the western regions with 
their predominantly ethnic Hungarian populations, but also the million 
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Romanians living in the ethnically mixed regions. The fourth possibility was 
that of an independent Transylvania. "The idea of an autonomous Transyl-
vania held certain attractions but it was hard to say how it would work since 
it would not be a satisfactory solution either to Hungary or to Rumania or to 
the local Magyar and Rumanian population." Though Campbell conceded 
that there might indeed be such a thing as sense of Transylvanian identity, he 
thought it probable that both ethnic groups would want to see an independent 
Transylvania become a part of the "mother country": the Romanians, of 
Romania; the ethnic Hungarians, of Hungary. 
Like Campbell, the members of the Subcommittee, too, found themselves 
in a quandary. The only point they all agreed on was that Transylvania would 
have to come under the supervision of Allied or United Nations forces for the 
first few postwar years to ward off the danger of armed conflict between its 
Hungarian and Romanian population. Deputy Secretary of State Berle, who 
had raised this possibility, expressed his hope that such a transitional period 
would provide time for tempers to cool, enough, perhaps, for the two ethnic 
groups to themselves agree on some kind of long-term solution, without 
interference from the great powers.20 
The next session, on February 12, likewise closed without a resolution. 
Campbell and Mosely gave a detailed account of Transylvania's ethnic 
composition, with the conclusion that the matters of the Székelyföld (Szekler-
land) had to be distinguished from that of the predominantly ethnic-Hungar-
ian strip along the border, and different solutions be found for each. To this, 
Adolf Berle made a quite unexpected counter-proposal: 
"It might be a more fruitful approach to the Transylvanian problem to 
abandon all efforts to disentangle the population and to start from the theory 
of constructing a state. By that method one would concentrate on what would 
appear to be the most powerful element in the population, the one most likely 
to maintain itself as a group, and turn over to that group a territory included 
within the frontier most likely to lead to its stability. This would mean either 
enlarging Hungary as far as the Carpathians or the recreation of Versailles' 
Rumania."21 
At the third session on Transylvania, the Subcommittee again reviewed 
all the possible approaches to the problem. Cavendish W. Cannon, head 
of the State Department's Southeastern European Department, advocated 
that they opt for an independent Transylvania, or rather, for a trialistic 
solution-a loose federation of Romania, Transylvania and Hungary-remi-
niscent of an old idea of a former prime minister of Hungary, Count 
István Bethlen. Bowman, Mosely and Campbell were inclined to have the 
border strip go to Hungary, with the Székelyföld to enjoy autonomy within 
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Romania. Armstrong continued to oppose the idea of an independent Transyl-
vania, and wanted to see the whole go to Romania, except for a narrow border 
strip. Finally, John MacMurray, an adviser to Cordell Hull, look a stand for 
restoring the Trianon borders on the grounds that it was impossible to come 
to a fair decision in the matter of the Hungarian-Romanian territorial 
dispute. With no consensus forthcoming, Bowman adjourned the meeting, 
with hopes that those present would continue to study the matter and arrive 
at a resolution at the next session.22 
Bowman's intentions notwithstanding, the Territorial Subcommittee never 
again returned to the question of Transylvania. What was taken to be its 
recommendation was the minutes of the March 2, 1943 meeting, which 
summarized the proposals that had been made in a way that gave preference 
to two of them. Most highly preferred was the idea that Transylvania should 
belong to Romania, with the Székelyföld enjoying wide-ranging autonomy, 
and the Romanian-Hungarian border revised to coincide with the linguistic 
border, or to lie just a little to the east of it. In second place was the notion 
of an independent state of Transylvania, which was to be a member of the 
proposed East-European Union, or a condominium of Romania and Hun-
gary.23 
The matter of the Yugoslav-Hungarian border was discussed on February 
12, at the Subcommittee's second session on Transylvania. The rapporteur in 
this case was Cyril Edwin Black, an assistant professor at Princeton. Based on 
his background research, Black distinguished five separate areas where the 
borders were open to dispute. Along the southwestern frontier established at 
Trianon, there were twenty-eight predominantly ethnic Hungarian communi-
ties in an area of Wend Settlement; these he recommended that the postwar 
adjustment recognize as belonging to Hungary. The greater part of the 
Prekomurje, however, which was inhabited by Wends, and the predominantly 
Croatian Medjumurje, Hungarian territories since the spring of 1941, Black 
considered to be parts of Yugoslavia on ethnic grounds. Along the southern 
border, in Baranja, Backa, and in the Banat, he recommended a compromise 
solution reminiscent of the American proposal of 1919, and one that followed 
linguistic borders to the extent possible. The compromise would have left 
about as many Hungarians (150,000) under Yugoslav rule as there would have 
been Yugoslavs under Hungarian rule (174,000) if the recommended northern 
districts were returned to Hungary. This northern tract, an area of 2,476 
square miles, had a population of 486,000, whose ethnic distribution, accord-
ing to the 1921 Yugoslav census, was the following: ethnic Hungarians, 
forty-seven percent; South Slavs, thirty-six percent, and German speakers, 
sixteen percent (cf. Map 4). 
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Black's consistent attempt to implement the principle of ethnic fairness was, 
however, taken exception to in this case by Berle and Cannon, the very people 
who had been inclined to side with Hungary in the matter of its borders with 
Romania. Yugoslavia was an ally, and they took its side, more precisely, 
Serbia's side. Clearly there was no guarantee that the Yugoslav federation 
could be restored after the war. But Hungary, noted Berle "had broken its 
word and had behaved badly" in breaking its 1940 treaty of perpetual 
friendship with Yugoslavia, and in having joined in Germany's 1941 aggres-
sion against it. Certainly, this was not the kind of conduct that they wanted 
to see rewarded at Yugoslavia's expense. The issue was decided by Pasvolsky. 
The head of the Advisory Committee found no reason for the United States 
to recommend changes to the pre-1941 Yugoslav-Hungarian border, and the 
Subcommittee voted unanimously for the status quo ante bellum.2* 
On Subcarpathian Ruthenia, the research staff completed its report in late 
October of 1943. Of the possible options, Harry N. Howard considered the 
réunification of Czechoslovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia "the best pos-
sible solution". He did not recommend either the creation of an autonomous 
Carpatho-Ukraine nor the region's autonomy within whether the Ukraine, or 
the Soviet Union, or Poland, or Hungary. He did, however, have his reserva-
tions about the proposed solution. "Simple restoration, however, might not 
solve the problem, since it might leave open the door for new revisionism on 
the part of Hungary, or possibly on the part of the Soviet Union." By way of 
a preventive measure, Howard thought that certain border adjustments might 
perhaps be made in favor of Hungary in the southwestern corner of the region, 
where even the Czechoslovak census of 1930 had put the ratio of Hungarians 
in excess of fifty percent. What argued against such change, on the other hand, 
was the layout of the transportation and communication network, particularly 
of the railway system. To leave with Hungary an area even approximating the 
one it had regained by the First Vienna Award, argued Howard, would out 
the entire region off from Czechoslovakia, and would make communication 
between the various settlements of the region very difficult.25 
Howard's report was distributed to the members of the Subcommittee on 
November 12, 1943, with the purpose of putting it on the agenda for debate 
in the near future. In fact, it never was put on the agenda. For the remainder 
of the year, the Subcommittee dealt exclusively with Asian affairs. Its last 
session was on December 17,1943, for the Subcommittee as such was dissolved 
as part of the Advisory Committee's reorganization. 
For, by summer of 1943, the Advisory Committee had accomplished a great 
deal of what it had been set up to do, while the series of Allied victories raised 
hopes that the war was rapidly drawing to a conclusion. It was this hope that 
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led Secretary of State Hull to reorganize the peace preparatory committee. 
Though certain of its subcommittees, for instance, the Territorial Subcommit-
tee, continued to sit for the rest of the year, the emphasis shifted from debate 
to summaries which, as Hull put it, "can serve as a basis of more specific 
considerations of policies and proposals." The task of recapitulating the 
debates and whatever proposals had emerged fell to the research staff, 
restructured as the Division of Political Studies already in January of 1943.26 
The summaries dealing with Hungary were prepared by the research staff 
between summer of 1943 and January of 1944. They presented a detailed 
account of the debates up to that time, including the Subcommittee's propo-
sals. Still, reading them, one cannot help detecting small shifts of emphasis, 
and perhaps a selective grouping of arguments and counter-arguments. The 
purpose, one feels, is to make the original expert recommendations — based, 
as far as possible, on the principle of ethnic fairness—seem far more attractive 
than the Subcommittee's subsequent suggestions, motivated, without a doubt, 
by more partial considerations. We might, thus, with some exaggeration, see 
these documents as the circumspect "rebellion" of the disinterested young staff 
of experts against the political motives of the older generation, and the 
strategic considerations of the pragmatic career diplomats. 
The summary dealing with the Slovak—Hungarian border, for instance, 
presents as the first of the proposed solutions the Subcommittee's resolution 
that Hungary be allowed the six districts of the Csallóköz. Very fairly, it notes, 
further, that "the Territorial Subcommittee did not favor suggesting wider 
territorial concessions to Hungary." It goes on, however, to present as an 
equally possible alternative solution one that Mosely had held to be optimal, 
but which Armstrong had repudiated in the strongest terms: namely, that the 
ten southern districts where ethnic Hungarians formed an absolute majority, 
as well as the southern parts of the adjacent six northern districts be ceded to 
Hungary. Altogether, this would have meant an area of 2,740 square miles, 
with a population of 484,000, sixty-four percent of which was ethnic Hungar-
ian (cf. Map 2, Table 3).27 
We see much the same story repeated in the case of the Yugos-
lav—Hungarian border. Black briefly stated the Territorial Subcommittee's 
advice that the entire disputed border region be given to Yugoslavia on 
political grounds, and that there had been no support for carving up the area 
by ethnic groupings. He then went on to describe his own proposal—the one 
the Subcommittee had more or less rejected—as a possible compromise. "This 
solution has not been discussed by any of the subcommittees," he noted, 
bending the truth somewhat, to put it mildly. The only change his "compro-
mise proposal" contained over the one he had presented in February was that 
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the line of demarcation to run through Backa and the Banat had been refined. 
The population of the area he proposed to be granted to Hungary fell from 
486,000 to 435,000, with the figures for the South Slavic minorities dropping 
from 174,000 to 148,000. The number of ethnic Hungarians left in Yugoslavia 
by the new variant, on the other hand, rose from 150,000 to 160,000.2B (cf. 
Map 4, Tables 3 and 4, Adjusted line.) 
The summary most closely reflecting the Territorial Subcommittee's stand 
was the one dealing with Transylvania. The Subcommittee, as will be recalled, 
in the absence of a consensus, had postponed making a clear-cut recommen-
dation for a later session never in fact held. As compared to the earlier 
documents treating of Transylvania's future, Campbell's August 1943 sum-
mary was a forward step in that it specified the size of the strip of land along 
the western border to be returned to Hungary: an area of 3,475 square miles, 
shown by the 1930 Romanian statistics to have a population of 591,000, fifty 
percent of which was ethnic Hungarian. The alternative recommendation, less 
closely based on ethnic boundaries, involved leaving Hungary in possession of 
5,600 square miles of post-Trianon Romanian territory, with a population of 
1,980,000, only thirty-six percent of which was ethnic Hungarian (cf. Map 3, 
the two top tables). For his part, Campbell unequivocally supported this latter 
solution. The first of his two reasons was that the Arad-Nagyvárad railway 
would, in that case, run all the way on Hungarian soil, instead of criss-crossing 
the border at several points. The second was that, not counting the 
Székelyföld, this latter solution would leave roughly equal numbers—about 
half a million each—of Romanians and ethnic Hungarians under foreign rule, 
and the exchange of these populations, as Campbell saw it, would be relatively 
easy to effect.29 
The abstract dealing with Subcarpathian Ruthenia differed from the Sub-
committee presentation of late 1943 primarily in being much more construc-
tive. For one thing, Howard specified the possible forms that the southwestern 
strip to be ceded to Hungary might take. He presented three options: 
recognition of the borders established in 1938 by the First Vienna Award; the 
purely token gesture of returning 125 square miles of the area to Hungary; and 
a "compromise solution" between the two extremes, which would leave 
Hungary with 535 square miles of the 731 square miles reannexed in 1938. Of 
the population of 90,000 involved, the 1930 Czechoslovak census specified 
fifty-nine percent as ethnic Hungarian, as compared to the 1910 Hungarian 
census figures also given by Howard, which put their ratio at eighty-eight 
percent (cf. Map 5).30 
The above-outlined summaries prepared by the research staff became the 
basis of "more specific considerations of policies and proposals", even as Hull 
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had intended them to be. The groups that were to "consider" them were the 
Inter-Divisional Country and Area Committees set up in late summer of 1943, 
which set to work immediately, and continued to study the reports all of the 
first half of 1944. These Committees consisted of members of the research 
staff, and of the officials of the Department of State involved with the 
countries and areas in question. Bowman, Armstrong, and other prestigious 
members of the Subcommittees, though called in for consultation, were not 
involved directly in this work either.31 
The first of the Inter-Divisional Country and Area Committees to be set up, 
on August 12, 1943, was the Inter-Divisional Balkan and Danube Region 
Committee. Harry N. Howard was appointed chairman. By the spring of 1944, 
the Committee had submitted its recommendations regarding Hungary's 
borders in reports of a page or a little more. As compared to the research staffs 
summaries of 1943, these were both more concrete and more unambiguous, 
containing, for the most part, only the recommended solutions. For all that, 
they did leave room for some flexibility. In the case of the Slovak—Hungarian 
border, for instance, the Committee recommended the cession to Hungary of 
only the six districts of the Csallóköz, on the grounds that Czechoslovakia's 
postwar government would not be willing to agree to more. It did not, however, 
rule out the possibility of supporting "a more just solution on a purely ethnic 
basis", i.e. the cession of ten entire districts, and parts of another six, "if later 
circumstances should be favorable to its adoption". In view of the military 
situation, and of the Soviet Union's expansionist plans, the Committee 
suggested alternative solutions in the case of Subcarpathian Ruthenia as well. If 
the postwar settlement was such that the region was returned to Czecho-
slovakia—the alternative the Committee preferred—they wanted to see the 
borders revised in a way "which would leave predominantly Magyar districts in 
Hungary" without, however, disrupting railway communications toward 
Slovakia. Should Subcarpathian Ruthenia end up as part of the Soviet Union, 
however, they wanted to see the borders redrawn to coincide with ethnic 
boundaries, independently of any other consideration.32 
For the Yugoslav—Hungarian border, the Committee supported Black's 
compromise proposal. This meant that, as opposed to the Territorial Subcom-
mittee's stand, this higher-ranking Committee was for Hungary's keeping the 
northern parts of the Baranja-Baëka-Banat region.33 
No pithy recommendation was ever made concerning Transylvania, due, 
perhaps, to the significance of the matter, or perhaps to its basic insolvability. 
The Committee accepted the research staffs 1943 summary; the only change 
it made was to mark some of the solutions as "recommended" solutions. As a 
temporary measure in the immediate postwar period, it suggested keeping the 
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1940 borders, i.e. the ones established by the Second Vienna Award. As a 
long-term solution, it recommended that the strip stretching from Arad to 
Szatmár— an area of 5,600 square miles, with a population of 1,098,000 — be 
ceded to Hungary, with the Székelyföld to enjoy autonomy within Romania. 
The idea of an independent Transylvania, until this phase a preferred solution, 
was listed as one of the possible, but not recommended solutions in this 
document of April 20, 1944. The reason for this is probably that the idea of 
an East-European federation of which an independent Transylvania was to be 
a part was coming to appear more and more chimerical in the light of the 
Soviet Union's ever more evident expansionist plans, especially given the 
advances being made by the Soviet army.34 We shall see in what follows how 
far the Committee's plans in connection with Hungary's borders were in-
fluenced by this very real political consideration. 
The Committee's recommendations with regard to Hungary were outlined in 
a fourteen page document, dated May 1,1944, and headed: "The Treatment of 
Enemy States: Hungary." The paragraphs on the Czechoslovak—Hungarian, 
Yugoslav—Hungarian, and Austro—Hungarian borders were verbatim tran-
scripts of the respective April précis on the subject. The paragraphs treating 
Transylvania, however, were very different. There was no reference to an 
intermediate, postwar phase, nor to U.N. peace keeping contingent. There was 
no talk of autonomy for the Székelyföld within Romania. Of all the recommen-
dations made to redress Romanian—Hungarian territorial grievances, all that 
remained was the suggestion that the "small strip" between Arad and Szatmár 
be ceded to Hungary. The idea of an independent Transylvania, on the other 
hand, crapped up again, as something which, despite the problems it involved, 
"should not be excluded from consideration."35 
The recommendations of the Country and Area Committees were presented 
to a high-level select committee set up by the Department of State in early 
1944, the Committee on Post War Programs. Its chairman was Cordell Hull, 
and its deputy chairman the new Undersecretary of State, Edward R. Stet-
tinius; members included the Deputy Secretaries of State, department heads, 
Pasvolsky, who had headed the 1942-43 Advisory Committee, the chairmen of 
the various Subcommittees, for instance Bowman, as well as the leading 
members of the research staff, such as Notter, Mosely, and Howard. The 
fourteen page proposal on Hungary was discussed and accepted at the May 26 
session. In his commentary, Mosely emphasized that the most difficult of the 
territorial problems, and one that was hardly likely to receive a satisfactory 
solution, was the issue of Transylvania, or rather, the matter of the Szeklers 
of the Székelyföld. His comment, however, was received in silence. The little 
debate there was, centered on the tone of the proposal.36 
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Like the idea of an East-European Union, the real value of all this 
painstaking study of Hungary's disputed border regions depended on how far 
these recommendations would be put into practice. Initially, the members of 
the Advisory Committee were optimistic on this score. Their optimism was 
based on "assuming a complete victory for the United States and a free hand 
in reconstruction." A corollary of this assumption was Bowman's belief that 
"larger countries like the United States could exert influence without any 
direct intervention."37 
Besides their exaggerated notion of the position of strength in which the 
United States would find itself after the war, the Department of State was 
encouraged also by the fact that the emigre politicians of the countries 
concerned did not reject offhand the idea of a settlement that was perhaps less 
advantageous from their own point of view, but was, on the other hand, more 
fair. As Benes, the ex-president of the Czechoslovak Republic, declared in July 
of 1940: "Nothing that has been imposed upon us since Munich do we 
consider to be valid in law... This does not mean that we desire as our war aim 
a mere return to the status quo of September, 1938. ... We wish to agree on 
our frontiers with our neighbours in a friendly fashion... Changes in detail are 
possible..."38 An article of his of 1942 contained much the same message.39 
Similar statements were made by other members of the Czechoslovak govern-
ment-in-exile as well, for instance Finance Minister Ladislav Feierabend 
speaking to several members of the Advisory Committee on April 12, 1943, 
and Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk in an interview conducted by Ferenc 
Göndör on November 13, 1943, and in an other statement on April 4, 1944.40 
The Yugoslav government in-exile made no such promises. Their commu-
niqué of May 20, 1942, stated no more than their determination to restore the 
Yugoslavia of before 1941.*1 Since, however, neither the American nor the 
British government would guarantee this—any more than they would the 
Czechoslovak borders drawn at Trianon—in 1942-43 it was still quite 
conceivable that the matter of the Yugoslav—Hungarian border, as of the 
Slovak—Hungarian border, would be decided by bilateral negotiations. The 
American experts working on the peace proposals thought this all the more 
likely as they had no very clear-cut notion of Yugoslavia's future. While, with 
small adjustments of its borders, they supported the restoration of pre-193 8 
Czechoslovakia, repudiating the idea of both an independent Slovakia and of 
an independent Subcarpathian Ruthenia, they were not at all convinced of the 
expediency of restoring pre-1941 Yugoslavia. Roosevelt was as uncertain on 
this score as anyone else. Twice in 1943, in the course of this discussions with 
leading members of the Advisory Committee, he spoke of Yugoslavia's 
restoration as improbable, and of an independent Serbia and an autonomous 
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Croatia as possibilities.*2 As late as September of 1944, Otto Habsburg recalls 
him saying that "Yugoslavia is, in his view, an unnatural state. It should be 
transformed into a federation."*3 
The "third party" with an immediate interest in Hungary's borders was the 
Soviet Union. In the first phase of the war, as is common knowledge, Moscow 
repeatedly reassured Budapest that the Soviet Union had no territorial claims 
against Hungary, and that the Soviet leadership considered Hungary's claim 
against Romania to be well founded, and one that would enjoy Soviet support 
when it came up at the postwar peace conference.** After the summer of 1941, 
however, when Hungary joined in Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, the 
Soviet stand changed. Thenceforward, the Soviet Union called into question 
the legitimacy of Hungary's revised borders with Czechoslovakia and Yugo-
slavia alike, as well as of the Second Vienna Award. The first indications to 
this effect reached Washington in early 1942. Ambassador Winant reported 
from London that Sir Anthony Eden had information that Stalin meant to 
compensate Romania for the loss of Bessarabia with "territory now occupied 
by Hungary", i.e. with Transylvania. The information was confirmed by 
Molotov's memorandum of June 1943, which, among other things, noted that 
the Soviet Union did not "consider as fully justified the so-called arbitration 
award carried out at the dictate of Germany in Vienna on 30th August 1940 
which gave Northern Transylvania to Hungary."*5 It was at this point, as we 
have noted, that the members of the Advisory Committee, recognized the 
contingent nature of all their planning, and shifted from comprehensive 
reorganization proposals toward a solution as far as possible in keeping with 
the Principle of Minimum Change. For all that, they continued to strongly 
oppose the en bloc restoration of the 1920 borders. 
The United States first came up against the Soviet Union's alternate plans 
for Transylvania directly in the spring of 1944, at the time that the Romanian 
armistice was negotiated. The Department of State wanted to see the settle-
ment of territorial disputes postponed until the peace conference, and wanted 
an armistice agreement that contained absolutely no reference at all to borders. 
The Soviet Union, however, wanted an armistice agreement to contain 
guarantees that it would get back Bessarabia—which had been annexed to 
Romania after the First World War—and was, thus, willing to include in it 
the compensatory condition that after the war, "Transylvania or the greater 
part thereof would be returned to Romania. The conflict was finally settled 
in a compromise. At Churchill's insistence, the American side agreed to the 
Soviet formula against its better judgement; while the Soviet Union, for its 
part, agreed to have appended to the sentence on Transylvania a qualifying 
clause: "subject to confirmation at the peace settlement".*6 
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Washington had no real way of knowing the Soviet stand on Subcarpathian 
Ruthenia. The Advisory Committees reports, thus, took account of two 
possibilities. Though the preferred solution was to have the region returned to 
Czechoslovakia, they were prepared to see Subcarpathian Ruthenia become 
part of the Soviet Union.47 
4. Views on Hungary's postwar government 
Interwar American opinion on Hungary was typically Janus-faced. There 
were scores of diplomatic reports, travelogues, press reports and memoirs that 
spoke of the 1920 Treaty of Trianon as an outrage, and pointed with approval 
at the modernization the country had achieved in spite of the crippling blow 
the treaty had dealt the Hungarian economy. On the alternative, no less 
schematic view, the postwar disintegration was no more and no less than the 
inevitable catching up with multinational Hungary: the country's difficulties 
were rooted not in the terms of the peace settlement, but in the selfish and 
narrow-minded policies of the still ruling "feudal" aristocracy, which clung to 
the system of great estates, had suspended the secret ballot, in short, lorded it 
over a country that enjoyed not even a modicum of social and political 
democracy. Which of these two pictures someone presented depended as much 
on his political predilections and prejudices, as on who had served as his guide 
as he strove to discover Hungary. Classic examples of how far this was true 
are the two U.S. ambassadors to Hungary in the '30s: Nicholas Roosevelt, 
who served from 1930 to 1933, and John F. Montgomery whose tenure lasted 
from 1933 to 1941. Reading their memoranda, one has the feeling that they 
are speaking of two different countries. As Roosevelt saw it, the "survival of 
feudalism" was the country's salient feature. "Most of the Hungarian peasants 
were living under conditions but little removed from those of the serfs in 
Russia of the nineteenth century."48 In Montgomery's view, on the other hand, 
the "stories about feudal Hungary" were stories and no more, told "in order 
to calm the world's conscience, which was a little troubled by the fact that in 
the name of national self-determination, more than three million Magyars had 
been put under Czech, Rumanian and Serbian rule." In reality, Hungary was 
well on the way to modernization, and though the conditions of the agricul-
tural workers fell somewhat short, the condition of the industrial working class 
was on a par with that of American workers.49 
Each one of the two pictures had its appeal to certain groups within the 
American business, political and scholarly communities. Among "official" 
Hungary's known supporters were Professor Archibald Coolidge, the founder 
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of Foreign Affairs, whose sympathy for the "Hungarian case" dated back to 
his 1919 travels in Central Europe (he had been a decided opponent at the time 
of the new border arrangements being planned for Hungary);50 General 
Bandholtz, the American member of the Allied mission to Budapest in 
1919-1920, the man who had protected the Hungarian National Museum's 
collection from the Romanian armies, and who was on friendly terms with 
Count Albert Apponyi, among others;51 Jeremiah Smith, the Boston lawyer 
stationed in Budapest between 1924 and 1927 as the commercial representative 
of the League of Nations; and most importantly Senator William E. Borah, 
Wilson's opponent and chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee to 1940, 
perhaps the most influential of all the Americans urging the revision of the 
Treaty of Trianon.52 
There is some indication that President Roosevelt, too, was pro-Hungarian 
in sentiment. His personal sympathy was said to be based partly on his having 
bicycled through certain parts of the Monarchy during his student years, 
Transylvania being one of these parts. The experience, so the story goes, had 
a positive and lasting impact on him. The second impression was just as 
personal, and dated back to his years in the navy during the First World War. 
While in Rome on one occasion, he found that the Italians spoke with great 
admiration of a "daring" Hungarian admiral of the Austro-Hungarian navy, 
Miklós Horthy—the man who was elected Regent of Hungary in 1920. That 
this episode was something Roosevelt was fond of recalling is indicated by the 
message he had Montgomery convey to Horthy in 1937, which made reference 
to their shared naval past. In September of 1943, the President is reputed to 
have told Queen Zita, Otto Habsburg's mother, that "he liked Hungary... 
more than any other country in Europe", and that "he wanted to save the 
country."53 Be that as it may, Roosevelt's sympathy was certainly not 
unconditional, and did not keep him from being critical of many aspects of 
Hungarian policy. For instance, he believed the system of land tenure to be 
quite obsolete, and we know from a letter of Montgomery's that when they 
spoke in the summer of 1937, he "expressed considerable interest in the subject 
of dividing up estates in Hungary."54 
The other picture, that of a deplorably feudal Hungary, was most efficiently 
kept in the limelight by Hamilton Fish Armstrong. Armstrong essentially 
subscribed to the views of Mihály Károlyi, Oszkár Jászi, Rusztem Vámbéry 
and Seton-Watson, and criticized Hungary's interwar political status quo from 
their democratic point of view.55 Like Armstrong and Nicholas Roosevelt, 
Sumner Welles, too, was highly critical of the Hungarian domestic political 
scene, relying—over and above the official sources—primarily on Benes for 
his information. Armstrong and Welles, however, different on one essential 
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point when it came to Hungary. Armstrong considered the Trianon borders to 
be basically acceptable, and thought the problem to lie only in the successor 
states' ungenerous treatment of the minority nationalities; Welles, on the other 
hand, believed that readjustment of Hungary's borders was a sine qua non of 
a just peace in the Danube region, and wanted particularly to find a 
satisfactory solution to the problem of Transylvania.56 
The Advisory Committee, as well as the members of the research staff 
dealing with the future of postwar Hungary—Mosely, Howard, Power and 
Bradshaw—were as critical of interwar Hungary as Armstrong and Welles. 
Textual analysis as well as personal contacts point to the influence of Rusztem 
Vámbéry on their thinking. It followed that they saw absolutely no chance of 
the Horthy regime's surviving the war, and expected that defeat would bring 
in its wake Hungary's radical democratization. 
Land reform was the issue that they gave most attention to. In late 1943 
and early 1944, thoroughgoing studies examined the state of Hungarian 
agriculture, and the history of post-1918 reform legislation.57 Two further 
studies in the spring of 1944 contained concrete proposals for postwar land 
reform. The radical redistribution of holdings was specified in both documents 
as "a prerequisite for the establishment of a more democratic Hungary." 
Thoroughgoing land reform—argued the author, probably Power—"... 
would open the way for peaceful development of social and political democ-
racy and would eliminate the control of a reactionary minority which has 
monopolized political power at home and threatened the peace and security of 
the Danubian region through its cooperation with an agressive Germany." For 
all that, though he did not rule out the possibility of an indiscriminate and 
wholesale land grab, the social discontent among the peasantry being as 
pervasive as it was, this was not something that he would have liked to see. 
What they would have preferred was "a rationally planned reform under the 
guidance of competent agronomists and with proper physical and financial 
implementation." In concrete terms, this would have meant nationalizing 
estates of over fifty-eight acres (a hundred hold), and parcelling them out as 
farms of between eight to fifty acres in size. The five thousand landowners thus 
deprived of their lands were to receive no compensation, but would have got 
some form of financial aid to help them set up a new livelihood. Those who 
wanted to stay in agriculture would have been allowed to keep "peasant-sized 
farms". The entire process was envisioned as requiring about ten years.58 
The other problem studied in depth was the matter of the postwar political 
system, and the desirable composition of the future government. The studies 
prepared in early 1944 distinguished and reviewed the possibilities of five 
different kinds of political organization: authoritarian, soviet, centralized 
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democratic republican and decentralized democratic republican (the distinction 
is Vámbéry's), as well as the constitutional monarchic system. The preferred 
possibility was "a democratic government in either a monarchical or republi-
can form." The studies expressed strong reservations in connection with both 
the authoritarian and the soviet systems, and thought it highly unlikely that 
the Hungarian people would opt for either of these.59 
For the leaders of any democratic government, they looked to a popular-
front-type coalition of Social Democrats, Smallholders and Liberals, to 
Károlyi and the democratic émigrés he headed, as well as to certain 
intellectual groupings within Hungary. Of the latter, specific reference was 
made to the populist writers, as well as the younger generation grouped 
around the bourgeois radical Századunk, the Catholic Jelenkor, and the 
Ország Útja. 
The research staff thought it impossible for the political élite of the Horthy 
government to remain in power, and particularly for the Regent himself to do 
so. "The Russians have expressed their objection to the retention of the 
Regency and of the regime of the landlords." What was more, the old guard's 
remaining in power "would mean the continuation of an authoritarian regime. 
In all probability Hungary would again be a factor of instability in the 
Balkan—Danubian region." Their objection went beyond the person of 
Horthy himself, and extended, naturally enough, to the far rightist Arrow-
Cross Party and the government party, and even to "conservative-liberal" 
opposition figures like István Bethlen, and to "pseudo-Smallholders" of the 
likes of Tibor Eckhardt, who spent the last years of the war in the U.S.60 
The research staff did not rule out the possibility that the new democratic 
Hungary would be a monarchy. This, however, was by no means tantamount 
to their supporting Ottó Habsburg's claim to power. There is no denying, of 
course, that Ottó's name came up frequently in their discussions. But only as 
a possible option, never as the solution recommended, or desirable from the 
U.S. point of view. This was so in spite of the fact that Ottó had confidentially 
reassured the Department of State that he would assume the Hungarian throne 
only subsequent to being confirmed in his claim by a plebiscite.61 
In general, there were two weighty reasons given against Otto's kingship. 
One was that there was no trace in his writings of his favoring land reform, 
and that his ties to the aristocracy were too strong. In short, he was not enough 
of a democrat. The other reason was that the putative postwar leaders of the 
neighboring successor states would not have him. In the light of this, on 
January 27,1944, the Inter-Divisional Balkan and Danube Region Committee, 
like the preliminary studies and committees, rejected the notion of "the 
restoration of the Habsburgs to the throne of Hungary."62 
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Unlike the Advirosy Committee's suggestions for an East-European Union 
and for border readjustments, the above program for Hungary's postwar 
political reform appeared to be realistic even in the last phases of the war. This, 
in spite of the growing fears in the course of 1943-44 that the Soviet Union 
would not be content to interpret the notion of sphere of influence in the 
limited sense of the Monroe Doctrine, but would aim at the sovietization of 
East-Central Europe. The "Declaration on Liberated Europe," however, 
signed at the Yalta Conference, which reiterated the right of all peoples to free 
and democratic self-determination, laid these concerns to rest. The only cause 
for anxiety subsequently was Roosevelt's compromise-probably made in the 
interest of having the Soviet Union join in the war on Japan-not to insist on 
the high-level four-power commission, whose job it would have been to make 
sure that the terms of the Yalta Declaration were observed, though the 
Department of State had ascribed as much importance to the commission as 
to the Declaration itself.63 Those who, like Charles E. Bohlen, knew something 
of the Soviet mentality - "the Soviet leaders attached less weight to general 
principles than did the leaders of the western powers"-saw this as a bad 
omen.64- In 1945, however, they formed a minority. The rest of those in he 
Department of State thought with their own heads, and naively believed that 
people were bound by their written and spoken word. 
5. The game is up 
The idealistic plans formulated between 1942 and 1944 behind the padded 
doors of the Department of State disintegrated during the last year of the war, 
and in the course of 1946-47. That they did so was due not to some 
conceptual void in American diplomacy, as some have suggested, nor to 
Roosevelt's illness, but to the Soviets establishing their dominance in the 
region, and to the Americans having no material interest in challenging this 
predominance. In what follows, we shall examine some of the major steps in 
this process. 
Basically, Washington had no objections to the new Hungarian regime that 
took shape in 1944-1945. While it was obvious that both the interim 
government and the national assembly came into being under Soviet tutelage, 
the Department of State acknowledged that Béla Dalnoki Miklós's cabinet was 
"a well-balanced group representing the significant pro-Allied political forces", 
and that "it is a group of responsible personalities."65 As opposed to the 
governments of Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, which it justly considered 
Soviet "puppet governments", Washington accepted the Hungarian leadership 
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as representative, and made no demand for its reorganization. Consequently, 
Hungary's internal affairs were not among the controversial issues at either 
Yalta or Potsdam, and the Hungarian government was the first of all the East 
European governments to be recognized by the United States, as early as 
September 1945, prior even to the election of the national assembly. This 
decision, made by James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State under the new U.S. 
government formed after the death of Roosevelt in 1945, was meant to 
underline that the United States would encourage democracies, and reject 
communist dictatorships.66 
During the year and a half following the election of the national assembly 
in November of 1945, Washington took exception to two significant events on 
the Hungarian domestic scene: nationalization-particularly the nationali-
zation of the oil industry, in which American investment reached 59 million 
dollars, and the gradual elimination of political pluralism and of political 
liberty, a dictatorial tendency subsequently referred to as "salami-tactics" (i.e. 
the gradual whittling away of political and personal freedoms). The White 
House and the Department of State voiced their objections regularly at the 
meetings of the Committee, as well as at other bilateral and international 
forums. Still, as long as the Smallholders' Party held the majority of the seats 
in parliament, and Ferenc Nagy was the head of the coalition government, 
they considered the regime democratic and representative, and did not relin-
quish their support. There was, however, a permanent qualifier attached to this 
support. In the internal slang of the Department of State, it was "limited 
encouragement". This meant that unlike the Mediterranean and other, eco-
nomically or strategically important regions, Hungary was a place where 
Washington was determined to confine itself strictly to economic and political 
measures to maintain its influence in the country.67 
That the United States would not go beyond "limited encouragement" was 
amply manifest in its loans and economic aid to Hungary between 1945 and 
1947, as well as in the discussions preliminary to, and during the negotiations 
at the 1946 Paris Peace Conference. American support for Hungary's foreign 
policy objectives was strong against Romania and the Soviet Union in the 
matter of Transylvania, but, contrary to what one might have expected from 
the work of the Advisory Committee, was much weaker against Czecho-
slovakia and Yugoslavia. 
The Potsdam Conference of July, 1945, was the last time that U.S. foreign 
policy objectives included an ethnically-based solution to the Czecho-
slovak-Hungarian and Yugoslav-Hungarian border disputes.68 By the time 
the Allied foreign ministers met in London in September, the issue had 
received a new formulation. There, and from there on, the Allies were in 
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agreement in that "the frontier with Hungary should be, in general the frontier 
existing in 1938," and the only subject still in dispute was Transylvania, and 
the Romanian-Hungarian border.69 
Several factors contributed to the Americans' abandoning the principle of 
ethnic fairness, which they had considered so important at the time of the 
peace preparations. The most significant was that contrary to Washington's 
expectations, the governments in Belgrade and Prague were most adamant 
against any kind of frontier adjustment. The same politicians who, in 
1942-43, and even in early 1944, had considered the redrawing the Hungar-
ian-Slovak border a distinct possibility, believed, from the summer of 1944, 
that the only way to resolve the border dispute between the countries was to 
remove the Hungarian population from Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak 
government-in-exile first expressed this view to the American government on 
November 23, 1944, and then reiterated its position from time to time after its 
return to Prague, at which time it also registered its claim on five Hungarian 
villages in the Pozsony area.70 
Similar tendencies could be observed in Yugoslavia as well. The government 
in Belgrade asked for Allied permission to "exchange" forty thousand Hun-
garians, over and above those who had already fled to escape retaliation at the 
hands of the Yugoslav guerillas; it registered an official claim to a fifty square 
mile area of the Austro- Hungarian border region north of the river Drava; 
and emphasized in its propaganda the legitimacy of annexing other border-
region Hungarian territories (mainly in the province of Baranja), and the 
necessity of preserving the "South Slavic character" of northeastern Yugos-
lavia.71 
It is due primarily to the firmness of the United States Government that the 
Yugoslav claims were not satisfied, and the Czechoslovak demands were only 
partially met. The Department of State took exception to unilateral mass 
relocations even in the case of the German population. As far as the 
Hungarian and other East European populations were concerned, Washington 
strongly objected to solving territorial differences by punishing entire ethnic 
groups for the sufferings of the war. It took a particularly firm stand against 
the government in Prague, which, nevertheless, managed to get three of the 
five villages it had asked for, in exchange for giving up its notion of unilaterally 
relocating 200,000 Hungarians.72 
The Truman administration, however, would not go so far as to follow the 
recommendations of the Advisory Committee in order to eliminate the 
possibility of future territorial disputes between Hungary and its neighbors. 
The fact that these issues did not even come up at the various rounds of the 
peace talks had very little, I believe, to do with the roles played by these 
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various countries in the course of the war. In the case of the Italian-Yugoslav 
dispute over Istria, for instance, Washington was quite capable-on the 
grounds of ethnic fairness-of siding with the ex-enemy, Italy, thereby 
moderating somewhat the excessive Yugoslav-Soviet demands. It is probable 
that if Hungary had been more important strategically-if, for instance, oil 
from the Near East got to Western Europe not through Gibraltar, but up the 
Danube-and if Washington had a military presence at hand to give weight to 
its proposals, as indeed it did in the case of Istria, the Advisory Committee's 
recommendations would not have been so soon forgotten. There is yet another 
reason why the matter of the Czechoslovak-Hungarian and Yugoslav-Hun-
garian borders never came up in the course of the postwar negotiations: 
Britain's attitude. The British government had decided to support the restora-
tion of the 1938 borders even before the Potsdam Conference.73 All the above 
being as it was, it would have been a Quixotic gesture indeed for the U.S. to 
insist on trying to implement the Advisory Committee's suggestions. 
Unlike the Csallóköz and the Baranja-Backa-Banat issues, the status of 
Transylvania remained uncertain until May of 1946, with the status quo ante 
bellum being finalized only in August. Washington had been irked by the 
Soviet-approved restauration of Romanian local government in northern 
Transylvania on March 9, 1945, and questioned the government's legitimacy. 
Accordingly, the American delegation in Potsdam recommended that "the 
three principal Allies proceed in the near future with preliminary talks 
concerning the establishment of a definite boundary between Hungary and 
Romania, and that favorable consideration be given to revision of the pre-war 
frontier in favor of Hungary on ethnic grounds".74 
When the preliminary talks were held at the September, 1945 meeting of the 
Council of Foreign Ministers, the Soviet delegation made no secret of the fact 
that it wanted to see "the whole of Transylvania" go to Romania. The joint 
British-American stand, however, was for "examining the respective claims of 
the two States." Secretary of State Byrnes noted in the course of the debate 
that "the change which he had in mind would not affect more than 3,000 
square miles." This was about five hundred square miles less than the 
minimum area recommended by the Advisory Committee in 1943-44, and 
there is no knowing how exactly Byrnes arrived at the figure. It is possible that 
he simply rounded down the original figure of 3,475 square miles. No decision 
was taken on the matter at the London session, and the Council agreed to 
adjourn the debate.75 
The next time Transylvania was discussed was at the April, 1946 meeting of 
the deputy foreign ministers, likewise held in London. The Soviet govern-
ment-which a few days earlier had the highlevel Hungarian delegation visiting 
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Moscow believe that Hungary's raising the matter of its territorial claims 
against Romania was something the Soviets considered to be justified-76 
insisted in London that the Trianon borders be restored. With Britain and 
France refusing to support it, the United States was not in a position to press 
its own revisionist plans, but did suggest that "provision be made to leave the 
way open for direct negotiations between the Governments of Rumania and 
Hungary with a view to adjusting the frontier so as to reduce the number of 
persons living under alien rule." The Russians, however, refused to agree to 
even this.77 
With no consensus forthcoming, the deputy foreign ministers submitted 
two-a Soviet and an American-recommendations to the May session of the 
Council of Foreign Ministers. Had he had British and French support, and 
Roosevelt to back him, it is possible that Byrnes would have insisted on at least 
a token compromise. Alone as he was, however, he judged the matter to be a 
lost cause, and did not want to further test Soviet-American relations, which 
were strained enough as it was, with insistence on having his way in a 
"third-rate" issue of this sort. In return for a trivial Soviet concession, he thus 
withdrew the American motion, and accepted the Soviet plan.78 
Byrnes came in for a great deal of ciriticism for his permissiveness not only 
in this, but in other matters as well. Sumner Welles, a number of the senior 
members of the Department of State, and later even President Truman 
expressed dissatisfaction with his conduct of affairs. This gave some credibility 
to the American efforts to reassure the dejected Smallholder Govern-
ment-which had been misled in Moscow and now felt itself abandoned by 
Washington-that the game was not yet up, that what they had agreed on was 
only a draft of the peace treaty, and that the conference itself would be the 
place to effect changes in it. This was the gist of what Philip Mosely told the 
Hungarian delegates to Paris on May 17, 1946, and this was the assumption 
that guided Arthur Schoenfeld, the American ambassador to Budapest, in his 
activities.79 
Trusting that Mosely and Schoenfeld would turn out to be right, at the 
August 14 session of the peace conference the Hungarian Foreign Minister, 
János Gyöngyösi, asked that Romania surrender to Hungary an area of 22,000 
square kilometers, and a population of two million people. A few days later, 
on American advice, he modified his demand to 4,000 square kilometers, with 
a population of less than half a million.80 
The American support he had counted on, however, was not forthcoming. 
At the September 5 session of the Romanian territorial and political commit-
tee, where Hungary's demand was reviewed again for the last time, the U.S. 
delegate, William Averell Harriman, made the following statement about the 
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draft peace treaty: "The United States had not been a strong supporter of the 
proposed text but wished to make it clear that he would vote for it since it had 
been agreed by the Council."81 With this, the issue of Transylvania-which 
Sumner Welles had called one of Europe's most pressing problems in his book 
published in 1945-was taken off the agenda, much to the dismay of the circle 
of American experts who realized that ignoring the problem would by no 
means make it disappear. "How can it be imagined", asked Welles, "that the 
cession of this entire region... to either Rumania or Hungary can ever result 
in anything but new conflicts, new complaints, new oppressions and a festering 
sore in the body politic of Europe?"82 John C. Campbell, secretary to the 
American delegation, and the Advisory Committee's Transylvanian expert, 
concluded his article on the territorial settlement agreed at the peace confer-
ence by noting that the compromises born "did not conform to American 
hopes and American principles". This being so, "it should be possible for the 
world's statesmen to look again at the map of Europe and to make changes 
which are called for by the interests of the European peoples themselves".83 
The defeat suffered by American diplomacy had its repercussions in 
Hungary, where, in June of 1947, Ferenc Nagy was forced to leave the country, 
and the systematic liquidation of the Smallholder Party got under way. The 
United States was outraged by the Hungarian Prime Minister's exile. President 
Truman called it a disgrace, and the Department of State spoke of it as a coup 
d'état. Once again, however, Washington's vehemence was soon spent. Some 
junior members of the Department of State did suggest that the Nagy case be 
brought before the United Nations, but the idea was rejected by the head of 
the European Department, H. F. Matthews, who did not want the matter to 
distract the Security Council's attention from the problem of Greece.84 
As Americans saw it, in the summer of 1947, Hungary became one of the 
communist states of Eastern Europe. The country's short-lived democracy was 
commemorated by John F. Montgomery in a book published in 1947, 
probably with the State Department's approval. "For a second time within a 
decade, a small European country, Hungary, is being turned into a satellite of 
an overwhelmingly strong neighbor."85 
Interestingly enough, American diplomacy never quite gave up on Hungary, 
nor on the rest of Eastern Europe. For over forty years, with but slight shifts 
of emphasis, it had on its agenda a goal first formulated in 1948: "The gradual 
retraction of undue Russian power and influence from the present satellite area 
and the emergence of the respective eastern-European countries as independent 
factors on the international scene."86 
Far from being up, perhaps the game is just starting. 
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Introduction reflecting on this conference dedicated, as it was, to stock-
taking the recent developments and possible future trends in Cultural Studies 
- a politically committed, activist mode of theorizing broad cultural and social 
issues - I sensed that the current Eastern-European metamorphoses had 
relatively scarce manifest impact on the intellectual agenda or even on the 
intellectual atmosphere of the event. To put it in another way, I sensed a 
curious tension in the conference constituted by the 'said* and the 'not-said'. 
Stuart Hall talked about the imperative of cultural theory to come to terms 
with what he described as 'a series of new times' and 'new conjunctures'; about 
the need to revise paradigms of the past which these 'new times' have 'thrown 
open to inspection'. Even if my reading is not congruent with his intended 
meaning (which I hope is not the case), I regarded his statement as a reference 
to the Eastern-European 'Other', which, though not for the first time but 
perhaps more radically than ever before, has been urging Western Marxists 
and other leftists to re-theorize their positions. Apart from a few other isolated 
remarks concerning particular aspects of Eastern-European societies, little else 
was said on this subject. Since the theoretical framework of Cultural Studies 
was developed in Western Europe and North America, it is natural that its 
primary focus has been advanced capitalist society. Additionally, because of 
the presence and impact of anthropology on this multi-disciplinary inquiry 
into cultures and - not unrelated to this - , the political pull of the so called 
Third World, Cultural Studies have had a lot to say on the dominated or 
colonized 'Other' as well, on the cultural interaction between capitalist and 
traditional societies. It is all the more interesting how those societies which up 
to quite recently had been the site of what was called 'existing socialism' are 
left virtually unexplored by Cultural Studies. I have wondered whether this 
apparent lack of interest might be due to western leftists' ambivalence towards 
these societies perceived as sites of a compromised, abused and now eventually 
defeated utópia? Could there have been a fear that a critical stance towards 
these political systems (while they were still socialist) would threaten the 
Hungarian Studies 8/2 (1993) 
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 
300 ANNA SZEMERE 
distinctive political edge of Cultural Studies and western leftism in general, 
vis-a-vis the 'mainstream' dominant discourse on socialism in their own 
society? Whatever inhibitions constituted the so called Second World as a 
virtually blank space, it is obvious that fundamental contributions to cultural 
studies related to this part of the world should primarily come from re-
searchers located in Eastern and Central-Europe. The Hungarian revolution of 
1956 is an event of special significance not only for Hungarians, who have 
recently elevated it to the rank of a national holiday, but also for the western 
socialist and communist movements. Referring once again to Stuart Hall's talk 
at the conference, 1956 Budapest marked the beginning of the disintegration 
of Marxist theory and, as well-known, the beginning of a crisis within the 
international Labor movement. In contemporary Hungarian historical con-
sciousness the predominant meaning of the revolt is somewhat differently 
inflected. Rather than signifying crisis and breach, it enjoys moral approval as 
an act of resistance and defiance against an oppressive tyrannical order. The 
present paper is an attempt to capture the initial discursive construction of the 
uprising in the public political domain. 
From 1956 to 1989 
We must be ready to receive every moment of discourse in its sudden irruption; in 
that punctuality in which it appears, and in that temporal dispersion that enables it to 
be repeated, known, forgotten, transformed, utterly erased, and hidden, far from all 
view, in the dust of books. (M. Foucault) 
The timeliness of a close investigation of the Hungarian national uprising 
of 1956 is evidenced by its recent official réévaluation. It does not seem 
unnatural that a new regime, which came to power as a result of free elections 
early this year, (in April 1990), would rewrite national history and its special 
events. The reassessment of 1956, however, had been initiated by Imre 
Pozsgay, an eminent reformist within the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party 
(at the time a state-party) a year before. To the astonishment of many of his 
comrades, Mr. Pozsgay proposed to qualify the 1956 events as a 'national 
uprising', thus dismissing the officially still effective label of 'counterrevolu-
tion' expressing the political views, sentiments and interests of an ever 
shrinking minority of communists, who had been rapidly losing political 
control even inside of the Communist Party. A set of significant events 
inevitably followed from the renaming of what in colloquial speech had been 
merely referred to as 'fifty-six'. The oppositional parties demanded that 
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October 23rd, the initial day of the uprising be commemorated as a red-letter 
day (paid holiday) and replace the imposed-upon celebration of another 
October Revolution, the one which had brought about the first socialist society 
in Russia in 1917. The leading figure of the 1956 events, Prime Minister Imre 
Nagy came to be rehabilitated. Imre Nagy was himself a Communist leader 
whose political orientation would classify him a reformist in our days. 
However, in the early 1950s, during the Rákosi era1 he was pushed aside with 
the less benign label "revisionist" and was even excluded temporarily from the 
Communist Party. As the revolution commenced, however, there was a 
massive pressure to appoint him Head of the Government. He enjoyed the 
support not only of the revolutionary crowds but apparently that of the 
Hungarian and even the Soviet Communist Parties (Kopácsi, 1986). Neverthe-
less, two years after defeat of the revolt, Imre Nagy was executed as a result 
of a death sentence brought at a secret trial. Together with hundreds of 
predominantly rank-and-file participants, he came to be buried in an unsigned 
mass prison graveyard. In her study of the political culture of the French 
revolution, Lynn Hunt (1984:34-38) has discussed its successive stages in terms 
of theatrical genres. She has argued that comedy was followed by romance, 
which eventually grew into tragedy. Analogously, I would suggest that the 
Hungarian uprising conformed to the script of a tragedy. More particularly, 
the circumstances and the mode of Imre Nagy and his comrades' execution 
revived a theme known from ancient Greek tragedies. Sophocles' Antigone 
may come to one's mind, a piece in which the tyrant Creon forbids the 
protagonist to bury her father, a victim of Creon's lust for power.2 No wonder 
that during the thirty-two years of the Kádár regime (1956-1988), the name of 
Prime Minister Imre Nagy was hardly ever mentioned, and his undignified 
death was known to, and remembered by, only a small politically active 
minority. However, as a doctrinaire Communist control over the definition of 
1956 had been removed, a bewildering multiplicity of previously muted or 
suppressed voices came to be heard, literally, through the mass media as well 
as via the printed word. In the spring of 1989 the streets of Budapest were 
flooded by books - exhibited on temporary news stands - , great many of them 
dedicated to this subject. The releases included other 'classics' - previously on 
index - and more recent writings; local and foreign publications; memoirs and 
archival materials, facsimile re-issues of contemporary newspapers and so 
forth.3 Imre Nagy and the politicians closest to him thus joined the lines of 
publicly recognized national heroes, a process culminating in a grandiose 
funeral ceremony where each of the several hundred victims of the post-
revolutionary terror were individually commemorated. The extent to which 
definitions of the revolt affected the very basis of the political system is 
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indicated by the choice of the day of October 23 for the declaration of the 
Republic of Hungary. Substituting for the denomination People's Republic, a 
shorthand term for proletarian dictatorship, the new name signifies the 
restoration of pluralist democracy abandoned in 1948. The eventual acknowl-
edgement of the 1956 events as a national democratic revolution was of great 
symbolic significance not only in shattering the old socio-political system but 
in establishing and cementing the one arising in its wake. As the rivalry 
between the major new parties grew into nasty confrontations, particularly 
during the election campaigns, it became imperative to emphasize images and 
events evoking a sense of unity and bond between as diverse political forces as 
represented by conservative Christian Democrats and Radical Liberals, Re-
form Communists and Peasant Smallholders. The memory of the revolt proved 
sufficiently powerful in the Hungarian collective consciousness to serve such a 
purpose. As a headline of a local daily paper has recently announced, '1956 is 
the grounding of our future'. The use of concepts 'revolution' versus 'counter-
revolution' defining the nature of the revolt does not only signify opposing 
political interests, ideologies, sentiments, but also stand for competing narra-
tive accounts of what actually took place between October 23rd and November 
4th of that year. The conspiracy theory, which János Kádár resorted to in an 
attempt to legitimize his Soviet backed power, persisted in official political 
publications even as recently as 1986. Thus, for example, János Berecz's book 
(1986) issued on occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the event, attributed 
the uprising predominantly to the organized conspiracy of the inner and outer 
enemies comprising western imperialist and local fascist elements. Contrarily, 
most 'unofficial' accounts have emphasized the spontaneous character of the 
revolt. During the Kádár era the validity of the 'conspiracy-theory' could not 
overtly be challenged. Yet on the level of choice of words denoting 'fifty-six', 
an implicit debate and negotiation had been going on for a long time.4 As a 
result, voices on both sides, adversaries and supporters of the revolt, tended to 
avoid names explicitly qualifying it. In the official domain the more neutral 
phrase 'tragical event of '56' was gradually replacing the term 'counterrevolu-
tion' connoting violent retaliations and the betrayal of the cause of indepen-
dence. In other sites of public discourse, the term 'uprising' had gained 
legitimacy. Imre Pozsgay's proposal of 'popular uprising', denoting a cautious 
acknowledgement of a rightful cause, aimed at creating an alliance between 
those more or less reform minded communists who had feared or refused to 
name 'fifty-six' a revolution or a freedom fight, and those diverse, increasingly 
visible political groups who have been struggling for the sanctification of this 
event. 
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Discourses of oppression and liberation and 
the French revolutionary tradition 
The debate over the name and the meaning of the October events did not 
start after the revolt had been put down. From the very first sign of civil unrest, 
the contest of diverse political forces over the definition of the participants' 
political goals and actions was apparent. This contest was not merely running 
parallel to, or reflecting the events. The interpretations and reinterpretations of 
what was taking place seem to be integral and directly relevant to the 
revolutionary process as a whole. In attaching special significance to revolution-
ary rhetoric, to speaking and naming, I am drawing on Lynn Hunt's afore-
mentioned discussion of the political culture of the French revolution. Hunt has 
been interested 'in the logic of political action as it was expressed symbolically', 
in the ways people 'put the Revolution and themselves as revolutionaries into 
images and gestures' (ibid. p. 14). Symbolic practices, including rhetoric speech, 
have been seen by her not as epiphenomenal to non-linguistically constituted 
realities. Hunt has viewed them as practices shaping the actors' consciousness 
and their resulting intentions, interests and activities. This methodology shares 
its basic assumptions with constitutive theories of human activity in treating 
language as an active political force (for an overview of constitutive theory, see 
Mehan et al. 1990). However, the specific relevance of Hunt's study for my 
present investigation lies in her application of post-structuralist theories to 
revolutionary discourse. Hunt has contended that the very concepts of modern 
politics and ideology were forged by the French revolutionaries in the sense that 
they 'managed to invest these concepts with extraordinary emotional and 
symbolic significance' (ibid. pp. 2-3). Extending this line of thought I would like 
to argue that public discourse in modern non-democratic and non-pluralistic 
political contexts - exemplified by any unitary language, revolutionary and 
totalitarian alike - follows distinctive rules. First of all, the relative significance 
of discursive practices vis-a-vis non-linguistic/non-symbolic ones is greatly 
enhanced. In other words, representation assumes an unproportionate amount 
of autonomy in relation to social praxis. As Hunt has observed, 'the crumbling 
of the French state let loose a deluge of words,' to make talk the 'order of the 
day* (ibid. pp. 19-20). However, as Francois Furet has emphasized, 'speech 
substitutes itself for the power' and 'the semiotic circuit is the absolute master of 
polities'. This is explained by the disruption of what he has considered 'the 
normal relationship between society and polities'. Therefore, according to the 
logic of this argument, 'politics becomes a struggle for the right to speak on 
behalf of the Nation. Language becomes an expression of power, and power is 
expressed by the right to speak for people' (quoted by Hunt, ibid. p. 23). 
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The French revolution has, in my view, established a double-faced tradition. 
In its struggle against royal tyranny and its fervor to establish civil rights and 
bourgeois freedoms, the revolution showed its liberatory and democratic face. 
On the other hand, as the process of radicalization moved - to borrow Hunt's 
metaphors - from comedy and romance towards tragedy, a distinctly different 
face, an increasingly oppressive one made itself visible. With its paranoid 
obsession to detect conspiracy; with the elevation of denunciation of civil duty, 
as well as with its repeated re-writings of history, the Terror laid the grounds 
for twentieth century totalitarian political systems. Typically, in admitting to 
their indebtedness to the French example, revolutionary movements tacitly 
identify it with its liberationist face. Hungarians acted so in 1848 for the first 
time, struggling for bourgeois democracy and national sovereignty. In 1956, 
because some of the most crucial of those 19th century demands had not been 
met (civil rights) or became topical once again (national sovereignty), the 
French revolution became once again an empowering model to follow. The 
inclusion of the Marseilles among the revolutionary musical repertory in-
dicated how the liberationist ethos of that tradition helped shape a new 
collective consciousness. 
In my close analysis of the Hungarian Radio's broadcast programs I am 
attempting to trace and identify elements of two modes of discourse viewed as 
constituting as well as articulating the two facets of the revolutionary tradi-
tion: a liberationist/democratic one and an oppressive/terroristic one. Ironi-
cally, in Hungary of the mid-1950s, the liberationist efforts - as part of the 
broader process of de-Stalinization throughout Eastern Europe - were being 
directed at transforming a system that had perceived itself as revolutionary. 
Hence, the controversy over designating the revolt as revolutionary versus 
counterrevolutionary. The spokesmen of the Stalinist regime were bound to 
speak the language of terror, even under the radically changed circumstances 
of the uprising. Instead of the passive or compliant acceptance, typical for the 
times of uncontested domination, their rhetoric was now received as provoca-
tive and prompted violent forms of resistance as well as opposing accounts of 
reality. The revolutionary voices spoke diverse dialects of what I will call 
'liberationist' language. Although feeding on national historical traditions of 
liberation movements, the unity of this discourse was extremely precarious for 
having been based upon very different understandings of democracy, freedom 
and 'Hungarianness*. The relative strength of this popular alliance was ensured 
and enhanced by the anti-Soviet theme, dramatically foregrounded throughout 
the course of the events, due to the initial intervention of the Red Army, their 
unceasing presence, and the threat of a total invasion. It is important to note, 
however, that individual voices representing particular social groups, political 
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forces or institutions cannot be neatly classified along the variable of 'liber-
ationist' versus 'terroristic'. Firstly, as I have tried to point out, both modes 
of discourse were of totalizing character in the sense of claiming to represent 
the whole nation. This involved the predominance of a dichotomous value 
system, a black-and-white world-view underlying meaning construction. Cer-
tain inflections of the national theme, in particular, which had started as part 
of liberationist discourse, assumed elements of terroristic rhetoric. Speakers of 
the Stalinist status quo, on the other hand, attempted to coopt the ' liberators' ' 
nationalistic rhetoric. It follows that liberationist and terroristic modes of 
expression were not fixed with particular ideologies. The diverse articulations 
and elaborations of central concepts and themes such as national independence 
and unity or the democratic renewal of socialism involved a constant flux of 
value-emphases and incessantly changing accents and refractions of meanings. 
Additionally, acts of genuine conversion were also the order of the day. This 
can be captured in the extremely dynamic formations and re-formations of 
what may be called discursive alliances. Following Foucault's idea of the 
unities of discourse (1969), I view these alliances as carriers of relations that 
are not arbitrarily imposed, yet tend to remain invisible for conventional 
political analyses operating with pre-given categories. What themes and issues 
defined the formation and rearticulation of discursive alliances? How were 
particular political goals translated into revolutionary rhetoric? How did the 
revolution create its own myth and what kind of myths did it feed on? Before 
attempting to answer these questions, I need to discuss the special role of the 
Hungarian Radio as a preeminent site of public political struggle during the 
revolt. 
Radio, action and discourse 
During the 1950s in Hungary, the radio was the only electronic mass 
medium and, as a state monopoly, it functioned primarily as a political 
institution. Therefore, the struggle for the control of the Radio was of great 
symbolic and strategic importance. How crucial the mass media had become 
for totalitarian systems was first remarked upon by Horkheimer and Adorno 
(1972:159) arguing that the wireless was as instrumental to the National 
Socialists' cause in Nazi Germany as the printing press to the Reformation. A 
tragic dimension was added to the liberationist struggle to abolish the Stalinist 
monopoly of this medium by the fact that the incident around the Radio 
building on October 23rd served as a spark in turning the peaceful and 
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disciplined demonstration, led by the students, into an armed confrontation. 
The students, having listed a set of demands of the Government, marched to 
the premises in the hope that these would be broadcast. Instead, they found 
themselves intimidated by the arms of the Secret Police (Kopácsi, op.cit.). 
Their demands addressed, among others, such civil rights issues as the freedom 
of speech (Fabó, 1957:12). It took another week for the rioters to liberate the 
Radio, which signalled not only the elimination of the Communist Party's 
censorship, but also the expulsion of Stalinist voices from the Radio personnel. 
Attempts were made to establish the guidelines for a new democratic broadcast 
policy (Nagy, 1984). Radio Kossuth marked its renewal by inserting the 
distinctive 'free' into its name. From the start, however, the Radio assumed a 
direct and active political role, unusual in times of peace and order. Due to the 
permanent flux on the top echelons of the Communist Party and the Govern-
ment, the Radio served as a loudspeaker for the leaders to address the 'people 
out there*. These speeches and the various public notices - threats, promises, 
warnings - had a special urgency with their intent to directly interfere with the 
armed fights. In a sense, the Radio belonged to the community of the nation 
- not because it was to be used by anyone or everyone, but because it 
addressed people as members of a collective rather than casual listeners. From 
time to time, in order to address the fighters directly and immediately, listeners 
were requested to place their sets out in the windows. This act spatially 
reinforced a specific communicational arrangement whereby the atomized 
individual households or families, typical contexts for radio use, were dissolved 
into one undivided space. In this sense, the radio with its modified purpose 
may have helped shape a new kind of collectivity with a special force. The 
frequently recurring metaphors for the nation as 'family' or a 'wounded body'; 
or the description of the armed clashes as 'fratricide' thus may have grown 
closer to people's lived experiences than in pre-modern eras, when communi-
cations technology was not essential to political life. With all its preeminent 
role, the Radio did not represent the public discourse of the revolt in its 
entirety. The most extremist voices speaking the brutal language of revenge 
and lynching, anti-Semitism and chauvinism, did not make it to the studio. 
Certainly, accounts of those bound to perceive the events as counterrevolution, 
exaggerated the presence of right wing extremism. Nonetheless, the repeated 
appeals by respectable personalities to the public to preserve their sobriety and 
restrain from the lynch-law indicates the existence of a revolutionary under-
world (Fabó, op.cit.). 
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Discursive alliances at the beginning of the revolutionary process 
This afternoon an enormous youth demonstration took place in our capital. Perhaps 
you, Hungarians living abroad will be surprised to hear this piece of news. We, the 
witnesses of this wonderful ferment, having manifested itself in passionate assemblies and 
newspaper articles over the past few weeks, have been expecting it to happen. (Fabó: 15) 
The enthusiastic and sympathetic report portrayed the youth's symbolic 
evocation of the War of Independence of 1848 by reference to their songs, 
national banners, cockades and emblems. It further recounted their demands, 
which addressed a range of political and economic issues. All this was located 
in the context of the past few years' democratic movement aiming to 'purify' 
the 'sacred ideals of socialism' from the 'sins' attributed to the Hungarian 
Communist Party leaders. The emergence of this voice was significant in that it 
conveyed the political and moral concerns and passion of the university 
students and the intellectuals, initiators of the revolution. In identifying himself 
with the demonstrators, the radio reporter assumed the historically informed 
rhetoric of the revolution in emphasizing its central symbols and metaphors in 
statements like 'Budapest celebrating a new March 15th in the October 
spring'.5 The report was aired on Radio Freedom, a state-run station airing 
programs for Hungarians abroad. Half an hour later, the First Secretary of the 
Communist Party (named Hungarian Workers' Party and abbreviated HWP) 
Ernő Gerő delivered a speech denouncing the youth's movement as 'poisoned 
by chauvinism' and 'reactionary'. In a similar vein, he condemned their 
manifesto's call for pluralism and civil rights for allegedly pointing to bour­
geois rather than socialist democracy (Fabó: 16-18). These two voices set the 
tone for the confrontation and negotiation taking place between two discursive 
alliances during the initial stage of the uprising: one comprising predominantly 
socialist reformist 'liberators' empowered by a particular reading of national 
history; the other representing the Stalinist ruling elite. This tone radically 
altered as the Stalinists and subsequently the communists in general were 
losing ground. Already months prior to the outbreak of the revolt a relative 
tolerance for different, though not openly contesting voices characterized the 
Radio's broadcast policy (Scarlett, 1980:31). It is worth noting that the youth 
demonstration itself was officially approved by the Minister of Interior. 
Nevertheless, until they were removed, the Radio Party leadership had 
exercised overall control in setting the agenda and providing the definitive 
interpretations for the actual situation. The representation of active political 
forces was distorted and censorship was in effect. The chronicling of the events 
blatantly contradicted many observers' and participants' experiences. Alterna­
tive accounts, which I will discuss later in this paper, surfaced only after 
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successive changes had taken place in the composition of the Party adminis­
tration and the Government. The distinction which I have suggested between 
the liberationist and the terroristic mode of language is based upon their 
contrasting statements in attempting to make sense of what was actually 
happening, as well as on the different style and nature of their rhetoric. I will 
attempt to capture these differences in three closely interrelated areas of 
debate: a) the definitions of the actions and the identity of the actors as to 
their socio-political status, interests and intentions; b) the general 
moral/cultural frame underlying the fight between opposing political forces for 
the meaning of such quasi-religious notions as 'honesty', 'sin', 'sacredness*, 
'pollution' and 'purification', and c) the 'national issue' where differing 
constructs of patriotism and forms of national historical consciousness were 
set against one another. Who were the revolutionary actors and in what 
activities were they involved? The struggle on this issue between the 'liber-
ationists' and the Stalinist rulers had started before the demonstration had 
turned into a bloody conflict. What the radio report described as 'wonderful 
ferment' (Fabó:15) was referred to by the Party Secretary Gerô as 'evil 
nationalist poisoning' (Fabó:18). The two texts suggested incompatible con­
cepts of national history and identity. As I have argued, the reporter drew on 
the ethos of 1848 so as to promote a sense of unity through reviving and 
reliving history.6 In contrast to this, Gerő implicitly identified Hungarian 
history with that of the local communist movement, even though it had 
represented a rather inconsequential political force until the end of WW2: 
We, communists are Hungarian patriots. We were patriots in the prisons of 
Horthy-fascism7 during the hard decades of illegality... (Fabó: 17) 
Both voices foregrounded the youth as centers of the present movement. 
Whereas the reporter projected an image of them modeled after the legendary 
revolutionary youth of 1848, celebrated by successive generations, Gero 
claimed that these young people were merely acting under the influence of 
certain inimical forces. The sinister abstractness of the phrase 'enemies of our 
people' (Fabó: 17) curiously contrasted with the radio report's empirical 
everyday concreteness in depicting the actual adherents of social and political 
change. Speakers of totalitarian and terroristic discourse typically employ 
abstract sociological categories or labels to refer to social subjects ('working 
class', 'peasantry', 'intelligentsia', 'imperialists', enemy of the people'). As 
opposed to this, the reporter substituted a spontaneous classification for the 
established one and that was based upon demographic, occupational and 
situational roles - all to the overall effect of articulating, and at the same time, 
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promoting an emerging collective identity. Naming the actors as 'young 
workers, pedestrians, soldiers, old people, high school students, conductors' 
suggested a diversity in a developing unity of action (Fabó: 16). The following 
morning the Hungarian Cabinet announced to radio listeners that 'fascist 
reactionary elements' had launched an armed attack against what was referred 
to as 'our public buildings' and 'our armed forces' (Fabó: 21). The voice of the 
Ministry of Interior spoke about 'looting counterrevolutionary groups' (ibid.). 
Many more notices reported on the outbreak of the revolt in a similarly 
terroristic manner. Significantly, the act of taking up arms against the 
establishment earned the insurgents not only the nastiest political label 
available in the existing vocabulary ('fascists'), but also the stigma of ordinary 
criminals attached to it. 'Counterrevolutionary bandits', 'hordes' etc. were 
accused of murdering 'ordinary citizens, soldiers and secret policemen' 
(Fabó: 22). Through this minor manipulation of facts - arranging the classes 
of victims in a particular order - , the official voice suggested nothing less than 
the fighters were mindless killers. Additionally, the defeat of the 'counter-
revolution' was declared to be the sacred goal of the nation and 'every honest 
Hungarian worker' was summoned to condemn the 'bloody ravage' (ibid.). 
This mode of criminalizing political adversaries and commanding uncondi-
tional loyalty on a moral basis remained a decisive feature of terroristic 
discourse, despite its subsequent re-adjustments. October 24th witnessed im-
portant personnel changes in the State and Party apparatus. Imre Nagy 
became appointed to the post of Prime Minister and called back to the 
membership of the Central Committee with a few other previously silenced and 
persecuted Party leaders. Nagy proclaimed the institution of summary justice 
for the fighters, but the deadline of granting amnesty to those unwilling to lay 
their arms had to be repeatedly extended. A communicational rearrangement 
occurred when radio listeners were requested to place their sets out in the 
windows so that fighters could be called on directly to end the shootings. This 
was a remarkable turn in that revolutionaries, up to then stigmatized as 
criminals and enemies, came to be acknowledged and addressed as members 
of the body social. From that moment onwards, the Radio was exploited by 
the power elite as a major tool of negotiation with the insurgents. Rather than 
calming down, the fighting became ever more intense. The intervention of the 
Soviet Red Army troops, unexpected and incomprehensible even for some 
members of the ruling elite, prompted many to take sides with the revolution-
aries, including entire units of the Budapest Police and the Army (Kopácsi, 
op.cit.). Official public notices displayed signs of pressure to recognize elements 
other than 'counterrevolutionary' such as 'drifting and misled young people'. 
This ideological concession was compelled by the Party and Government's 
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immediate need to exert influence on the armed masses and have them 
surrender by means of persuasion. Imre Nagy's speech later during the day 
added a respectable voice of support to the uprising. Firstly, his informal and 
inclusive mode of address made no distinction between the fighters and the 
general public: 'People of Budapest' were meant to include the insurgents as 
part of the city's community. Secondly, while rhetorically constructing this 
unity, he claimed to be part of it rather than distancing himself as a leader. 
Thirdly, for the first time, the complexities of the situation were addressed by 
way of distinguishing between three groups of revolutionaries: the young 
'peaceful demonstrators', the 'good-willed workers* and some unspecified 
'hostile elements*. Although qualifying the workers as 'good-willed' was not 
exempt from a tint of condescension, Nagy no longer used the omniscient 
terroristic language of the Party elite. Lastly, the Prime Minister refused to 
condemn the revolt by labelling it; he simply referred to it as the 'fight'. This 
speech made a shift towards redefining the Stalinist rulers* agenda. Despite his 
call for reconciliation and peace, Nagy's idea of restoring order was proposed 
as a means rather than an end in itself. He saw it as a precondition of carrying 
out what he called 'our sacred national program', one of consistent democra­
tization in every domain of the political and economic life - a program he had 
proposed as early as 1953. By transferring sacrality from the Party's objective 
of merely restoring order, the Prime Minister made a political as well as a 
moral commitment for social change. A believer in peaceful reforms, Nagy 
regarded the armed confrontation as a moral threat: 
... we must not allow that blood pollute our sacred national program. (Fabó:23) 
The Communist Party's hard-liners applied various discursive strategies to 
enhance their communicative efficacy and regain control. Firstly, they appro­
priated certain elements from Nagy's speech, for example in making clear 
distinction between the students' demonstration and the activities of hostile 
forces who were persistently designated as 'robbers', 'murderers' and 'counter­
revolutionary bandits' (Fabó: 24-29). Secondly, they coopted a nationalist style 
of rhetoric removed from the cause of sovereignty. The Hungarian Popular 
Front, a mouthpiece of the Party, for example, crowded its text with the 
adjective 'Hungarian' ('shed Hungarian blood', 'Hungarian future') to appeal 
to as broad masses as possible. It subverted itself, however, due to the 
contradiction inherent in the right wing fascistic connotations of its phrasings 
and the left wing extremism carried by two elements of the text: the brutal, 
derogatory language decrying the 'provocateurs' and the de-historicized con­
cept of national identity. As exemplified by Gerő's speech, this mode of 
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de-historicized discourse carried with it the assumption that the existence of the 
country was entirely a communist accomplishment.8 As a result of confusing the 
Hungarian people's interests and history with those of the Party, the insurgents 
emerged in this construct as a threat, not to the regime but to the survival of the 
nation as a whole (Fabó: 34). Thirdly, the Party targeted specific segments of the 
population via pseudo-autonomous organizations controlled by itself. The 
address of the National Council of Hungarian Women represented perhaps the 
most militant and aggressive version of terroristic speech (Fabó: 24). Apart from 
indiscriminately labelling the fighters as 'murderous provocateurs', 'slanderers' 
and 'liars', the short notice was packed with threats and commands. Like the 
appeal of the Popular Front, this rhetoric was also bound to fail. The very idea 
of calling on women to hold back their relatives from street battles was to 
appeal to women's assumed domesticity and instinctive rejection of violence. 
The militant tone undermined the effectiveness of such a strategy, which was, by 
the way, out of line with the communist ideology of women's emancipation. The 
National Peace Council issued a similar notice appealing to women's traditional 
roles and attitudes, but now in a sentimental redressing: 'Wives, mothers, 
Hungarian women!... Wives, mothers! You must know what the blessings of 
peace are. Help so that bloodshed be ended...' (Fabó:25) 
A fourth discursive strategy on the part of the Radio Party leadership 
consisted in publishing a host of telegrams reportedly received from work 
collectives and student committees. These texts displayed a striking uniformity 
in content and style. The recurring motifs included the condemnation of the 
'counterrevolutionary provocation'; greetings for the newly elected Central 
Committee of the HWP and the Prime Minister; the approval of his program 
of renewal; lastly, the assurance of the State and Party leaders of the 
collective's loyalty and trust for them. It would be difficult to detect the 
authors of these telegrams. Interesting to note, nonetheless, that they were 
aired in quick response to the Party's official call to 'every honest worker' to 
'condemn the bloody ravage of the counterrevolutionary gangs'. This leaves 
scarcely any doubt as to the pre-existence of a script, after which these 
standardized texts were modeled, presumably by low-level Party committees, 
on behalf of particular communities, which were apparently excluded from the 
process. The desired consensus was thus translated by the Party into fiction, 
into a simulacrum of political representation. Broadcasting these telegrams 
epitomized how far the world of public discourse had been detached from the 
world of experiential realities, and yet invading it. The terroristic politics of 
representation tended to reduce people into passive characters, if not puppets, 
of a very real script, written by distant authors according to inscrutable rules. 
This voluntaristic political practice - one which deliberately confuses a desired 
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state of affairs with the actual one - is seldom effective in molding people's 
perceptions and judgements of reality, but it is definitely self-defeating when 
discourse is not monopolized by one speaker. The credibility of the telegrams was 
seriously undermined by more balanced accounts. One of these, the Journalists' 
National Association argued for a massive working-class participation in the 
revolt. Rather than finding excuse for them for having been 'misled', the 
journalists claimed that their struggle was 'just and perfectly justified* (Fabó: 31). 
With this reading of the uprising, however, the Association's aim was to make a 
more powerful case against the perceived minority of 'hostile provocateurs' 
disrupting the revolutionary process. For, at this point, the Stalinist and the 
'liberationism speakers did not merely compete for the discursive control of the 
situation, but also shared some common goals resulting from apprehension and 
fear as to where all the fighting would lead to; how far the right wing forces would 
push the angered masses. To put an end to the combats was seen by both groups 
as the most important immediate goal. The appointment of Imre Nagy and the 
formation of a new Government must have felt a disturbing concession for the 
Stalinist elite and an encouraging prospect for future change in the eyes of the 
intellectuals and the students. Contrarily, the masses of workers, especially in the 
countryside, were less trustful and tended to see Nagy as 'just another 
Communist' who could only deserve credit by ridding his Government of its 
predominantly compromised personnel and shake off Soviet domination. 
Therefore, the discursive construction of Imre Nagy by 'terrorist' and 'liberation-
ist* speakers alike as a wise ruler capable to restore order expressed a shared 
interest of speakers having access to the Radio. The difference between the two 
political forces lay in their differing motivation of supporting him. The Stalinist 
elite adhered to him for strategic reasons, while the democratic reformers 
promoted the image of a trustworthy leader out of genuine conviction. 
Transferring the leading role of administration to Nagy, however, involved 
shifting the center of power from the Party to the Government. In fact, this was 
compelled by the Party's acute crisis of legitimation. The unpopular First 
Secretary Gero resigned (and escaped to the Soviet Union) to be replaced by 
János Kádár, who attempted a cautious departure from the Stalinistic agenda. 
Purity, unity and the rhetoric of the national democratic revolution 
On October 25th an abrupt change occurred in the general tone of the 
Radio. At this point, the Radio seemed to get into the very center of the 
revolutionary process. The communique issued on Kádár's appointment to the 
post of First Secretary was repeatedly broadcast and followed by a call 
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addressing 'Hungarians' to celebrate and put out national flags. They were 
summoned to return to their homes and workplaces from street demonstra-
tions. Reports were subsequently aired on people's ecstatic mood as they were 
hooraying, kissing and embracing in the streets. The national Anthem and the 
Marseilles were played. Broadcasters created the impression of the revolt 
having arrived at a turning point, if not at victory. Without relying on other 
sources, it is difficult to unravel whether these reports were edited and 
orchestrated rather than reflecting people's mood. In any case, the program 
served to introduce and accentuate Kádár's and Nagy's upcoming speeches. 
Keen to adjust himself to the 'liberationist' or 'national democratic' mode of 
rhetoric, by now the dominant one, the First Secretary of the Party seemed 
desperate to formulate a differentiated and balanced account of the past few 
days' events. To abandon the overall derogatory tone of his predecessor, at the 
same time expressing his serious reservations about the politics of the move-
ment as a whole, seemed like dancing on a tight-rope: 
The demonstration - honest as to most of its goals, - in which part of our youth was 
involved in; a demonstration starting out peacefully degenerated, in a matter of hours, 
into an armed revolt against the state power of the People's Democracy - according to 
the intentions of counterrevolutionary elements, enemies of our people. (Fabó: 56) 
For Kádár, the People's Democracy, that is, the monopolistic Party rule 
'remains and must remain sacred' (ibid.). To support this claim, he gave a 
twist to the notion of 'liberation' as understood by forces supporting Imre 
Nagy. It was the socialist dictatorship which Kádár saw as the guarantee of 
freedom from the 'old yoke', a popular communist metaphor for the semi-
feudal capitalist system characterizing Hungary during the pre-WW2 era. 
Contrarily, the Prime Minister shifted the accent from the counterrevolution-
ary elements to the workers and justified their participation by contextualizing 
it: 
A small number of counterrevolutionary instigators launched an armed attack 
against the order of our People's Democracy. They enjoyed the partial support of the 
workers of Budapest, who had been desperate over the prevailing conditions in our 
country. This desperation was aggravated by the severe political and economic mistakes 
committed in the past, the redemption of which should be an imperative both regarding 
the country's situation and the general wish of the people. (Fabó: 56) 
Such a portrayal of the process did not only invalidate the Communist 
Party's 'theory of deception', which had denied coherence and meaning to the 
mass' activities, but established an obvious causality between the destructive 
political practices of the regime and the revolution. The crucial moment of the 
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speech, however, was Nagy's promise to start negotiations with the Soviet 
Union on the withdrawal of their troops from Hungarian territories. Embracing 
the theme of independence, eventually leading him to declare Hungary's 
neutrality at the United Nations, earned Imre Nagy a genuine mass following. 
This manifested itself in his ability to terminate the combats by the last days of 
October. With the Stalinist voices suppressed, the Radio reflected as well as 
helped shape a democratically organized national unity across the multiplicity of 
voices now demanding to be heard. A host of new organizations erupted 
nationwide on grass-roots level such as workers' councils, various national and 
youth guards, committees etc. Political parties, churches, professional associ-
ations, silenced and banned since the communist takeover in 1948, re-emerged to 
welcome and influence the revolutionary proceedings according to their widely 
differing political visions. Organs up to then controlled by the Stalinists like the 
Radio itself or the Communist Party's daily, the 'Szabad Nép' (Free People) etc. 
aligned themselves behind the country's new leaders. Purges began in order to 
replace compromised figures holding key positions. The revolution started to 
weave its own myth. The unity and power of it originated from a variety of 
sources. It was increasingly drawing on the national historical mythology but 
also on the day-to-day expressions of international solidarity. On the negative 
side, it also gained strength from an acute sense of being threatened and from the 
painful awareness of lost lives sacrificed in the fighting. Although endangered by 
its own excesses (purges, lynch-law, anti-Semitism), the uprising was acquiring a 
certain tragic dignity. Many of those initially protesting against the Stalin-
ist/terroristic misrepresentation of the revolt were now concerned to retain and 
discursively elaborate this sense of dignity, or, with their own words, the 'purity 
of the revolution'. Naming and re-naming remained central throughout the 
twelve days of the uprising. At this stage redefinitions were vital to the moral 
dignity and political self-perception of the revolutionary participants. It was a 
kind of meta-discourse discrediting the claims made by the spokesmen of the 
defeated regime in earlier broadcastings. Re-inscribing the 'story' by challenging 
the crude or condescending cliches imputed by them had a number of motives. 
First, it may have been an instinctive gesture of self-defence. People had been 
conditioned during the Rákosi-era to fear imposed upon political labels ('kulák', 
'imperialist agent' etc.) because of their arbitrariness and fatal consequences. 
Attributing counterrevolutionary intentions to anyone implied a death sentence 
- which were actually produced on mass scale during the post-revolutionary 
terror. Additionally, people must have felt a genuine desire to restore the 
disturbed relations between what constituted their sense of truth based upon the 
experiential reality and the official representations of reality. Label-like catego-
ries, as I argued earlier in this paper, were connected with particular, in many 
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cases fabricated, narratives. The editorial of 'Szabad Nép' (October 28th) read 
out on the Radio provided the first passionate and eloquent defence of the 
insurgents and their cause: 
We disagree with those globally evaluating the events of the past few days as a 
conterrevolutionary and fasciste coup attempt. (...) The uprising started with the rallies 
of the college youth. Yet it would be a grave mistake to view them as expressions of 
merely a youth movement. The young people of Budapest articulated the sentiments 
and noble passions to be found in the hearts of the people as a whole. At last, we must 
recognize that in our country a great national democratic movement has evolved 
embracing and uniting the whole nation (...) Especially later in the afternoon, some 
dissonant voices joined the demonstration whose demands no longer related to socialist 
democracy. It must be noted that at this stage, a number of students undertook to 
convince the blinded and the extremist elements that the struggle was being carried for 
socialist democracy and not against the social order. (Fabó:89) 
By voicing the participants' viewpoints and motives, marginalized up to 
then, the author suggested a narrative of the proceedings of the first day 
dissimilar from the 'terroristic' accounts. With respect to the explosive moment 
of the revolution, the journalist emphasized the role of the First Secretary 
Gerő's speech, which, in displaying unresponsiveness towards the revolution­
ary demands, caused considerable disappointment among the public. A new 
aspect of the 'story' was thus uncovered, namely, the Party leaders' accounta­
bility in letting the demonstration grow into armed clashes: 
By then the street atmosphere had been extremely tense. At various points of the 
city shootings began. Let me add that even during the second and third days protesters 
marched in front of public buildings with slogans such as 'Independence! Freedom! We 
are no fascists!' (ibid.) 
The indiscriminate imposition of the 'fascist' label in 'terroristic' speech -
even though in some cases derived from a genuine dread - had served to create 
a sense of hideous threat. In contrast, simultaneous charges of petty burglary 
had set an equally dishonoring tone of mockery and despise for the insurgents. 
In order to purify the revolutionary actors from such accusations, the 
journalist recalled the sight of untouched goods behind broken shop-windows: 
a favored and lasting image signifying '56 as a 'moral revolution'. Certain 
words and metaphors, increasingly solemn and religion-based, such as 'purity', 
'blood', 'brotherhood', 'sanctity', 'sin', 'sacrifice', 'conversion', 'resurrection' 
etc. flooded the public rhetoric. In the discursive construction of the youth, as 
leaders of the democratic movement and fighters or even martyrs of the 
uprising, the road leading from 'purity' and 'honesty' to 'sanctity* was short. The 
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ideology of democratic renewal found a 'natural' symbol in them. As I have 
pointed out, onto this 'natural' symbolism was grafted an historical one, that 
relating to 1848 and its celebrated youth. As the writer Gyula Háy stated, this 
was the revolution of the young and those 'young in spirit' (Fabó: 57). In its 
repeated calls to end the fighting, the Government, too, appealed to the 
preciousness of young lives. Reformers emphasized the need of saving lives for 
the future to carry out the program of democratization. The nationalist 
argument was built upon the idea that Hungary as a small nation could not 
afford to waste her young in what was experienced as a 'fratricide'. Rhetoric 
notwithstanding, the confrontations lasted and many died. The tragic sense of 
lost lives became essential in the evolving myth of the revolution. And as the 
metaphor of 'family' for nation grew prevalent (even implicitly in the form of 
addressing the public as 'my Hungarian brothers'), biblical images of blood 
sacrifice - Christ and first-born sons - came to be evoked as well. The exalted 
atmosphere in which the young were glorified as heroes and saints of the 
uprising is tellingly illustrated by a piece of writing authored and read out by the 
ex-Stalinist poet Zoltán Zelk; in his tortured cry he addressed them to be granted 
absolution from his sins and a communion with them (Fabó: 131). The grief over 
the young people's death also prompted the rise of anti-communist terroristic 
voices calling for revenge. Such speeches, some of them occasioned by the 
Memorial Day funerals (commemorated in Hungary on November 1st), oddly 
mirrored - that is, echoed with reversed meanings - the Stalinist discourse with 
its name-calling and brutal language.9 The revolution created new alliances and 
dissolved old ones. A great number of communists abandoned the old faith as 
the Party had cut off its own head - ever more intensely denounced as the 'evil' 
and 'sinful' Rákosi/Gerő clique. The new leaders' legitimacy of rule depended 
on what was seen as their 'honesty' and 'true Hungarianness'. The construction 
of Imre Nagy and, to a lesser degree, of János Kádár as trustworthy leaders is of 
interest not only for the role of rhetoric in soliciting popular support but also for 
the odd convergence of ethical and ethnic purity in public speech. Nagy had 
started to build his credibility as the focus of the democratic movement already 
back in 1953. Temporarily, he was excluded from the Party as a 'right wing 
revisionist'. Kádár had been jailed for some time during the early 1950s. The 
autobiographic moment of being victimized by the Rákosi regime had a key 
function in generating trust and loyalty for both leaders. In general, persecution 
provided the moral capital for many more newly appointed directors and 
secretaries in diverse political and cultural institutions. Obviously, the recurrent 
phrases of'true Hungarian* or 'true patriot' communicated two things about the 
persons thus described: on one level it denoted moral integrity and a commit­
ment to serve national interests against the Soviet Union; on another, it coded 
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ethnicity, and in the given context Hungarianness was invested with a special 
value in itself. To illuminate the complexities of this context, involving the 
relationship between ethnicity and political ideologies in 20th century Hungarian 
history, would lead me too far from my topic. Yet it is fair to say - even without 
discussing this issue to any depth - that a disproportionate number of Jews had 
served in the highest positions of the Communist Party. Therefore they were 
distrusted by certain groups of ethnic Hungarians as the importers of Soviet 
communism since the most prominent leaders had been exiled in the Soviet Union 
during the 1930s, and, indeed, they established socialism in Hungary after the 
Stalinist model and backed by their military presence. This historical fact proved 
to be sufficient for the survival, and even the re-invigoration of anti-Semitism, an 
inherited component of ardent nationalism since the early 20th century. The 
perception of Jews as aliens and agents of an alien power had barely been affected 
by other facts; a number of them turned the opponents and/or victims of the 
Rákosi regime, including followers of Imre Nagy (Judt, 1990). As I have argued, 
the Radio provided no access to overt anti-Semitic (neither to any chauvinist) 
propaganda during the uprising. It remained contained by the double entendre of 
nationalist rhetoric. Besides, or maybe due to, his 'true Hungarianness' -
understood in this case as identifying completely with a particular historical and 
cultural tradition - , Imre Nagy was able to command a distinctive style of speech. 
First, as I argued earlier in this paper, he had the talent to address his public 
without the typical restraint and remoteness characteristic of other communist 
leaders. Second, he spoke the language of a historically grounded romantic 
nationalism, although without any recognizable anti-Semitic overtones. It was in 
his speeches that the interrelatedness of the three key issues: the self-definition of 
the revolutionary acts and actors; the ethos of the uprising (the 'moral' theme), 
and the historically located concept of national unity (the 'national' theme) can be 
identified in the most explicit form. In his oratory delivered on October 28th, 
these themes had cohered into something close to 'master script' of the revolution. 
The Prime Minister started off by setting up a three-layered temporal framework; 
the events of the 'past week' were placed in the perspective of the 'past decade'; 
further, all of this he embedded in the context of 'our one-thousand-year old 
history' viewed as abounding in tragic blows. Thus a sense of continuity with the 
past was established; a past portrayed as a site and sequence of negative historical 
experience. The uprising, suggested to be unprecedented in its severity, appeared 
as both a disruption and a tragical climax in Hungary's history. The evocation of 
the idea of the one-thousand-year old Hungary carried a great emotional weight 
for it had been deeply engrained in people's minds by the pre-communist 
hegemonic ideologies. It conveyed a 'structure of feelings' vital to a tragic-heroic 
sense of national identity. Although the phrase had been overused and abused in 
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conservative rhetoric, in the given context, it was bound to resonate with the 
actual sentiments of diverse constituencies: 
During the last week murderous events followed one another with tragic speed. It is 
the fatal consequences of the past decade's horrendous faults and sins that have 
surfaced in these misadventures which we are now witnessing and in which we are 
participating. In the course of our one-thousand-year old history our Fate has not 
spared our people from trials and tribulations. Yet a shock comparable to this one has 
ever befallen to our country... (Fabó:93) 
Followed by this introduction, his denunciation of the views that had 
qualified the uprising as a counterrevolution sounded particularly sharp and 
emphatic. While acknowledging the presence of some criminal and reactionary 
forces - note his distinction -, Nagy asserted that in the fighting a 'national 
democratic movement' had developed 'with elementary force': one encompass-
ing and uniting our whole people'. He distinctly established the Party rulers' 
moral and political responsibility not only in the growth of a democratic 
oppositional movement, but in the actual outbreak of the revolt. In appreciat-
ing the national unity produced by the revolutionary acts Nagy reinforced the 
historically based sense of collectivity to which he initially appealed. In this 
manner, he managed to discursively create the foundations of legitimacy for 
his new 'independent and socialist Government', proclaimed to serve as a 
genuine expression of the people's will', (ibid.) Along with his radical political 
moves and gestures - the declaration of Hungary's neutrality, the institution 
of the multi-party system, the dissolution of the Secret Police (ÁVH), the 
encouragement of the workers' councils' activities etc. - , Imre Nagy's com-
municational skills may have had a profound effect on the growing cult 
surrounding him. Already during his life-time, he came to be elevated on the 
pedestal of a prophet: 
He was the man who, harassed and stained, has always persisted with the Hungarian 
people's demands; even when the country's situation became truly severe (...), he 
assumed responsibility to lead the nation out of the catastrophe. (Fabó: 118) 
As is well-known, Imre Nagy eventually lost control over the course of 
events. On November 4th the Soviet authorities arrested him together with his 
Cabinet. Simultaneously, Kádár announced the establishment of the Hungar-
ian Workers' and Peasants' Government. Historians may only speculate on the 
extent to which the Utopia of an independent socialist democracy could have 
been upheld in case the revolution had survived. Yet despite its precarious 
political unity and its recognizable shift of accent from a socialistic democratic 
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towards a more conservative nationalist discourse, the revolution succeeded in 
creating an identity of its own. I have attempted to show how this identity was 
linguistically shaped by the acts of re-defining the very nature of the events 
and by producing and celebrating its heroes: its charismatic leader Imre Nagy 
and its martyrs, the youth. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper was to investigate the discursive construction of 
the Hungarian revolt of '56 through the interaction and confrontation of 
diverse political forces as displayed by broadcast Radio, during the twelve days 
of the uprising. I was primarily interested in the process in which two distinct 
types of rhetoric - termed as 'terroristic' and 'liberationist' - attempted to take 
and keep control over the definition of the situation, that is, of the revolt itself. 
The struggle was initially constrained by the institutional arrangements char-
acterizing totalitarian political systems. Although this system had had some 
cracks in it when the revolt broke out, public speech was barely open to 
contestation, not unlike the unitary belief-system which it articulated and 
attempted to shape. The discursive space of public life, the official domain, had 
been considerably detached from the non-public or non-official sphere, as well 
as from social praxis. Most of the official accounts of the proceedings of the 
revolution (including reports on people's responses to them) were voluntaristic 
and arbitrary, that is, constructed according to the dictates of pre-existing 
scripts or immediate tactical needs. Representation was typically perceived by 
the public as misrepresentation. Furthermore, this domain grew beyond its 
own 'normal' boundaries, not solely to mould but to overshadow or substitute 
for the world of everyday experience. In my analysis I have sought to point to 
the inflexibility and crudeness of the terroristic language. Those employing this 
language were not prepared to defend their validity claims when questioned by 
the opposition's own accounts of the revolt. They were no more prepared to 
integrate perspectives other than their own. That is how various speech 
elements taken over from the opposition rendered themselves so easily identi-
fiable as coopted: neither did they accord with the basic ideological assump-
tions nor with the style of rhetoric typical of the Stalinists' scripts. The revolt 
of '56 may be regarded as a complex intertwined system of discourse and 
action. Paradoxically, the struggle to dominate representation was far too 
essential to have stayed within the confines of verbal contestation. From this 
point of view, it is of symbolical relevance that the list of revolutionary 
demands contained the demand of liberating speech. In other words, a principal 
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thrust of the uprising aimed at restoring a 'normal', interactive relationship 
between public and private discursive spaces, between representational practices 
and experience. The 'liberationist' voices, by virtue of their very presence, 
challenged the legitimacy of the whole system of public political discourse as 
best exemplified by such symbolic acts as the re-naming of the Radio Station 
or by announcing on October 28th: Today the papers already write the truth.' 
(Fabó:o/7. cit.) Owing to the fact that the right of speech had not been 
pregiven, much of the debate over the meaning of the events assumed the form 
of a meta-discourse: retrospectively, 'liberationists' discredited the claims 
made by the Stalinist speakers, who had been silenced by then. I would like to 
contend that this was primarily a counter discourse in that it tended to mirror 
the terroristic language. In re-inscribing the uprising, the insurgents employed 
the same moral and quasi-religious vocabulary as the Stalinist ruling elite. In 
fact, the debate implicated a struggle to relocate the 'sacred center' of the social 
system from the Party to the Nation - represented by the Government - and 
to invest notions of 'honesty', 'sin', 'stain', 'brotherhood' or 'patriotism' with 
new oppositional meaning. The concept of patriotism leads to the uses and 
meanings of history in the revolutionary practices of signification. Most 
interesting is the mode in which the cause of self-determination was linked to 
the celebration of the national past, and on the re-living of a particular chapter 
of it, the Independence War of 1848. As Martha Lampland (1986) has 
suggested, the insurgents spoke the 19th century language of their predecessors 
and revived a whole symbolic system (names, emblems, cockades, forms of 
manifesto etc.) attached to that revolution. The everyday language sponta­
neously incorporated full verses from the romantic revolutionary poet Sándor 
Petőfi's poems as if the past would have been projected unto the present. There 
may be a number of possible explanations for this phenomenon. It may be 
viewed as a protest to the Stalinist practices which systematically de-historicized 
and emaciated the Hungarian national identity.10 On the other hand, the 
degree of embracing the tradition of 1848 also speaks to the political culture 
of the Hungarian society of the time. In the mid-1950s there existed no other 
language available than that of the past. Just as the political issues raised by 
1848 (civil rights, independence) had not been properly settled over the 
following one hundred years, their re-emergence brought with it the rhetoric 
in which they had originally been voiced. The importance of this phenomenon 
is difficult to overestimate in the light of contemporary analogous developments 
in Eastern-Europe, following the collapse of communist governments (Judt, 
1990). Because these countries have had very weak or no Liberal parliamentary 
traditions whatsoever, at present they also find themselves lacking the appro­
priate language of modern pluralist politics. As Tony Judt had observed: 
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All they could look back to - and herein lies the problem - is exactly what they're 
now getting: nationalist rhetoric, a strong emphasis on the identity of the nation and 
religion, (ibid. p. 14) 
The revolution of '56 also drew on national rhetoric embedded in the 
oppositional or dominant ideologies of different regimes over the past two 
centuries. For the 'last' available movement combining demands of democracy 
and independence, the insurgents needed to reach as far back as 1848. And this 
also explains why the French revolution, as mediated by the Hungarian 1848, 
proved such an empowering example to follow with its strong emphasis on a 
unitary language invested with high moral passion. France at the end of the 
18th century was no different from 20th century Eastern-European societies in 
one sense, namely that she, as Hunt (op. cit. p. 43) has contended, also lacked 
the 'Whig science of politics' on which to base democratic institutions and 
practices. Without pointing to this parallel in the nature of political structures 
- with the corresponding similarities in social structure such as the lack of a 
solid bourgeois class (Moore, 1966) - it would be difficult to account for the 
French Revolution's impact on a society located in radically different historical 
times. In a further research on this subject it would be interesting to explore 
the tension within the liberationist discourse, a tension arising from its 
commitment to bourgeois democratic values on the one hand, and the 
emotionally infused nationalist rhetoric burdened with conservative authori-
tarianism, on the other. That this was sensed by many witnesses of the uprising 
as a real threat to its original goals, is indicated by the fact that even a 
non-liberal writer such as László Németh voiced his anxiety, a mere three days 
before the Soviet tanks had invaded Budapest: 
The day before the revolution had broken out, I moved to the countryside with the 
resolution that I would only be concerned with working on my unpublished manu-
scripts. After the days of awful anxiety, I only had one night to struggle with my joy. 
Since then I have merely been feeling the pressure of responsibility, which must be a 
concern of every intellectual today. (...) I still had seen no more than what the radio and 
the events in the countryside had allowed me to see, but then already I clearly perceived 
the danger, the immediate threat that the nation, in her sacred impulse, responding only 
to her emotions, would commit something irredeemable. And looking ahead a little, I 
was worried that, while the figthers' attention was focused on the withdrawal of the 
Soviet troops, others expecting the return of their old glory would elbow their ways to 
the new positions, thus turning the revolution into a counterrevolution... (Fabó:249) 
I wish to express my thanks to Hugh Mehan, Ákos Róna-Tas and Martha Lampland for their 
insightful suggestions and comments on the drafts of this paper. 
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Notes 
1. Mátyás Rákosi was the leader of the Communist Party from 1941 to 1956. On returning to 
Hungary from Soviet exile, he became Secretary General of the HCP. He was State Minister 
(1945-49), Deputy Prime Minister (1952-53). In 1953 he ceded the premiership to Imre Nagy 
but remained First Secretary until July 1956 when he emigrated to the USSR. In 1962 he was 
expelled from the Hungarian Communist Party for his political crimes. (Kádár, 1985, 156) 
2. Having finished the draft of this paper, I came across with a publication containing Ferenc 
Fejtő's speech commemorating the 30th anniversary of the execution of Imre Nagy and his 
fellow-martyrs, and inaugurating their symbolic memorial in Paris, June 16, 1988. Fejtő, the 
émigré writer and President of the Hungarian League of Human Rights, also referred to the 
ancient Greek literary parable in his speech entitled: Our Créons Violated the Laws (Tóbiás, 
1989, 529). 
3. To name a few of the most significant publications: Bill Lomax: 1956 - Hungary (trans, from 
the original English language version: London, 1976); United Nations Report of the Special 
Committee on the Problem of Hungary. General Assembly, Official Records: 11th Session 
(New York, 1957); A forradalom hangja (The Voice of the Revolution). Radio Broadcastings 
of Hungary between October 23-November 9, 1956. in: Századvég Füzetek 3 (Budapest, 
1989); 1956 - A forradalom sajtója (The Press of the Revolution). Assembled and introduced 
by E. Nagy (Gyromagny, 1984); Az igazság a Nagy Imre ügyben (The Truth in the Nagy Imre 
Case). Re-issue of first edition; Bruxelles, 1959. in: Századvég Füzetek 2 (Budapest, 1989). 
4. The history of designating the '56 events in official and colloquial speech was briefly but 
perceptively remarked on by György Csepeli in his lecture 'The Twilight of State Socialism in 
Hungary' given at the University of California, San Diego, Department of Sociology, April 
1990. 
5. March 15th was the day when the War of the Independence and Freedom commenced in 1848. 
6. For a fine analysis pertaining the attribution of meaning to past actions in the 'making' of 
history, see Lampland (1986). 
7. Miklós Horthy was the Regent of Hungary (1920-44). Although he allowed a certain freedom 
to parliamentary forms, the system was essentially authoritarian (e.g. Horthy banned leftist 
parties). In 1944 he ceded power to the fascist extreme right Arrow Cross Party. 
8. For a discussion of the historical roots of such communist assumptions in Eastern Europe, see 
Judt (1990). 
9. In line with the more right wing attitudes prevailing in the countryside, the radio stations in 
the provincial towns showed more openness to anti-communist 'terroristic' propaganda than 
those in Budapest. 
10. The Rákosi regime did not entirely dispense with the Hungarian history and culture. It is more 
appropriate to say that Stalinist politics was ambivalent and abusive towards this heritage. In 
the arts, for example, indigenous folkloristic forms were used to convey 'socialist' ideological 
contents, thus ruling out modernist cultural influences. As regards history and the appreciation 
of the revolution of 1848, the latter was canonized as part of the *progressive tradition', yet 
March 15th was wiped out as a national holiday. This ambivalence may be explained with the 
rulers' apprehension about the obvious potential of March 15th to articulate national 
resistance. 
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POST MODERN TECHNIQUES IN PÉTER ESTERHÁZY'S 
HELPING VERBS OF THE HEART 
ALEXANDER KARN 
University of California, Los Angeles 
USA 
When an English translation of Péter Esterházy's Helping Verbs of the Heart 
appeared in 1990, American critics responded with mixed reviews, some with 
praise, others with disfavor. Almost always, though, the critics admitted to an 
inability to fully digest the work. What one critic called Esterházy's "unorthodox 
expedients" have bafïled and also irritated more than one reader to be sure. John 
Simon of The New Republic wrote in his review, "I don't mind admitting that I can 
follow this program only dimly." Perhaps this essay will lend readers a bit of light. 
In an appropriated excerpt at the bottom of page 104, a frustrated 
Esterházy pleads with his reader, "CANT YOU SEE I'M DIGGING A 
GRAVE?" The tone is somewhat desperate. This line is crucial to an 
understanding of the novel for two reasons. First, it is pirated from an 
undetermined source. Esterházy includes plagiarized material throughout the 
book. This tactic will be discussed in detail in subsequent sections of this essay. 
More importantly, this single line embodies the meaning of the entire book. 
Helping Verbs is exactly what Esterházy insists here. It is a grave into which 
Esterházy pitches many of the conventions and most of the notions of the 
modern novel. One might also imagine Esterházy laying at the bottom of this 
grave pulling armfuls of dirt onto himself. Indeed, Helping Verbs is also 
Esterházy's attempt to bury his own failures, both literary and emotional. 
Some might argue that Helping Verbs approaches Nihilism. Americans, in 
particular, recoil at this thought. One wonders what value this display of 
impotence might have. These fears are unwarranted. There is a rejuvenated sense 
of hope at the end of this novel. At the bottom of the last page, after the words 
"The end," the narrator, returned from oblivion, promises aloud, "SOME DAY 
I'LL WRITE ABOUT ALL OF THIS IN MORE DETAIL." Esterházy 
borrowed this line from Peter Handke, but no matter. It creates real power in its 
transplanted appearance. Esterházy buries the failure and humiliation which 
accompany him throughout the novel. A resolved, though weary, voice remains. 
It is possible that Ludwig Wittgenstein shared this same voice when he 
wrote, "He who can hope can speak, and vice versa." This quote precedes 
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Esterházy*s foreword and also appears on the back of the jacket. In his 
foreword, Esterházy insists that any book "should radiate a kind of lightness." 
Indeed, Helping Verbs does exactly that. It is a strange and powerful work. 
Esterházy incorporates a slew of radical techniques and devices which ulti-
mately reveal the limitations of his medium and of the human capacity to 
produce art which accurately reproduces the soul's inner dialogue. Still, the 
novel succeeds because it is at once a grave and a source of "lightness." The 
discussion now turns to the tools which Esterházy employs to hollow this 
strange grave. 
John Simon titled his review of Helping Verbs, "The Stunt Man." Simon 
meticulously describes experimental techniques and complains that these 
"shenanigans" illuminate nothing, and instead, make for an uneven frag-
mented failure. To Simon's credit, "failure" is the key component in Helping 
Verbs. Unfortunately, Simon seems to have missed the point. The techniques 
which Simon blames for the novel's failure are, indeed, disruptive; but these 
tricks and stunts are well controlled devices which mark the limits of the 
modern novel as an art form. The author and his text do fail intermittently, 
but Esterházy pursues these moments of impotence so that the reader might 
begin to question the capacity of his medium. Esterházy pinpoints the 
deficiencies of his medium and devises a number of tricks to accentuate them. 
It seems that the novel fails Esterházy. Simon would have one believe that the 
author is to blame. In fact, the responsibility lies with both the author and his 
medium. Esterházy makes no effort to hide this fact. Instead, he devises a 
number of tactics which exaggerate the fact. These techniques, then must be 
considered equally, if not more important than the contents of the novel. With 
this in mind, Helping Verbs becomes a model piece of post-modernism. 
Structural experimentation is the constant feature of Helping Verbs. There 
are four techniques which demand attention and analysis. The first and most 
obvious has already been mentioned. Esterházy includes at the bottom of most 
pages a running subtext which appears in all capital letters to distinguish it 
from the primary text and to remind the reader that it has been pirated from 
an outside source. Esterházy's second device appears on every page of the 
novel. A thick, black line frames the contents of every page. This frame serves 
more than cosmetic ends. Third, Esterházy leaves large portions of the novel 
blank. A generous estimation would allow that the text, if printed continuous-
ly, could fill seventy pages, as it stands, Helping Verbs is a 115-page effort. 
Finally, the identity of the narrator shifts in two instances, one intensely 
dramatic, the other less so, but still meaningful. (The sub-text is not considered 
here. The reader might decide that each of the pirated excerpts is delivered in 
Esterházy's own voice.) These radical techniques do indeed disrupt and 
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disorient the reader, but they are certainly not accidental. Nor are they 
weaknesses. They complement, perhaps supersede, the content of the book, 
and become a separate dialogue in their own right. 
The capitalized sub-text has an immediate effect on the reader. There have 
been numerous theories as to its significance. This essay offers yet another. In 
his foreword, Esterházy writes, "The text includes quotations, either literal or 
distorted, from, among others..." There is a list of forty-three authors which 
follows. The reader can assume that the majority of these quotations appear 
in the capitalized sub-text. Though, Vince Passaro of New York Newsday 
warns, "you can't be sure." What does one make of the capitalized text at the 
bottom of each frame? 
James Marcus of The Philadelphia Enquirer complains that "grief makes the 
narrator inarticulate." Esterházy, himself, complains of a "lethargic wordless-
ness" in his foreword. This foreword, though, Esterházy tells the reader, was 
written prior to the novel; not inserted after its completion. It is clear, then, 
that Esterházy must cope with this "wordlessness" as he writes this piece about 
the death of his mother. When the pain of his loss renders him speechless, he 
resorts to other author's work to express his sentiments. Where grief has muted 
Esterházy, he inserts what comes closest to his own feelings. Esterházy may 
experiment for his own amusement, but more likely, he experiments out of 
necessity. His mother's death cripples him and impedes the flow of insight. 
Consequently, he is forced to borrow the work of others in his quest for 
meaning. The reader's perception of the author and of the novel change 
drastically. The story (at least initially) is told by a self-admitted failure, a 
writer who admits freely that he is unable to approach the meaning he aspires 
to illuminate. The author is removed from his pedestal, and so is his novel. 
Esterházy inserts the pirated to passages where the conventions of the novel 
and of language fail him. 
The bold, black line which frames each page's text is another of Esterházy's 
experiments. This device, like the use of external sources, affects the reader's 
primary experience of the novel. The frame reminds the reader that the text 
does not do full justice to Esterházy's inner vision. One wonders what might 
exist outside of the page's frame. What ideas was Esterházy unable to give 
form? Again, this is a subtle admission of failure. Esterházy convinces his 
readers that the novel, as a forum for self-expression, is at best an incomplete, 
diluted version of the author's raw experience of the events s/he wishes to 
recreate. The sub-text on page eighty-four reads, "EVERYONE HERE, 
MYSELF INCLUDED, IS SO DISGUSTINGLY NORMAL." If "HERE" 
is taken to mean the confines of each frame, it becomes clear that Esterházy 
is deeply disappointed in his work. Esterházy admits that his works neither 
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depicts nor exceeds the reality of his experience. One expects art to yield more 
than life, to reveal the ultimate and infinite truths which are ordinarily 
obscured from view. Perhaps these expectations are unrealistic. With the use 
of the black frame, Esterházy hints that his novel lacks this infinite power to 
heal. Perhaps the story Esterházy hoped to write still floats outside of the black 
frame. The black frame allows Esterházy to deepen the grave he pursues in 
Helping Verbs so that he might put his failures to rest and the reader might 
bury his/her romantic ideas about the power of literature. 
The blank sequences throughout the novel serve the same purpose. Why not 
insert the pirated passages into a steady text? Why leave unfilled space? These 
blank areas, in all cases, precede the sub-text. So, one thinks of them as 
impasses or terminal points, beyond which Esterházy cannot venture. They 
mark the points at which words fail the author. Esterházy is honest enough to 
admit his failings and inventive enough to accentuate them. Esterházy makes 
the limitations of his medium all too clear. Perhaps these blank segments 
would house the magic words which will float forever outside of Esterházy's 
black frame. On page fifty-seven, the narrator whines in frustration and 
desperation, "... I have no freedom, I don't write what I want, I write what I 
can..." What a powerful moment when the author discredits himself this way 
and subverts the significance of his art. It seems that the novel, in its 
traditional form, cannot replicate Esterházy's inner dialogue. He turns, there-
fore, to unique post-modern techniques to express his grief and frustration. 
What does one make of the two instances where the narrative voice shifts 
from son to mother and then back from mother to son? One page forty-six, 
three acidic sentences appear in white print on an otherwise black page. The 
white print reads, "I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal! I 
hope you all rot. I hate you." This page, with its reversed fields, marks 
Esterházy's surrender to the "wordlessness" which plagues him. Our first 
narrator suffers a death-like silence after this stunt. Perhaps this is Esterházy 
speaking from a dark grave. Or perhaps less dramatically, it is an indication 
of the narrator's inability to shed light on the subject matter. After pages of 
frustration, the narrator simply resigns to end his agonizing fit of impotence. 
He lowers himself into this figurative grave, hoping to put his failure to rest. 
It is a sort of literary suicide; the narrator, in a sense forfeits his existence. The 
son relinquishes the reins, the pen that is, into the hands of his mother. Simon 
describes this as an interior monologue, but really, Mother assumes complete 
responsibility for the work. She is willing, though somewhat inept. Shortly, her 
narrative degenerates and dissolves. Mother is unable to create any sense of 
cohesion or direct the storyline. The text erodes into unrelated snippets of 
nostalgia and fantasy. After fifty pages of Mother's convoluted chronology, 
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the son, somewhat unwillingly, reclaims the narrative. He resumes his duties, 
but only manages to record the essential action and dialogue. There is no 
further explication. The text resembles a screenplay at this point, not a novel. 
The narrator offers no insight and his voice is completely withdrawn. Still, 
these are some of Esterházy's most successful moments. No longer does the 
reader suffer the intrusion of a failing, embittered narrator. Esterházy creates 
ingenious devices to compensate for his own limitations and the limitations of 
his medium. The two dramatic shifts in the narrative voice are perfect 
examples. 
Helping Verbs is a novel about failure, but it is far from failure itself. 
Esterházy, in a courageous self-critique, lays bare all of his artistic shortcom-
ings. Simultaneously, he exposes the weaknesses of his medium. The result is 
a powerful, brutal work which rockets the reader into contemplation and 
forces him/her to re-evaluate the meaning and capacity of art and literature. 
To achieve this effect, Esterházy invents a number of techniques and devices 
which subvert his work, but more importantly, challenge our assumptions 
about literature. For those who, like Simon, confuse these well-controlled 
experiments with meaningless acts of desperation, Esterházy promise to 
continue his struggle against silence and hopelessness should quell their 
criticism. Esterházy, back from the grave promises not to be enslaved in life 
by the spectre of death; "SOME DAY I'LL WRITE ABOUT ALL THIS IN 
MORE DETAIL." He even leaves some blank pages at the end for this 
purpose. 
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these differences are, whether real or imagined, of an historical 
context. Today, when the rights of individuals or communities, the 
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centuries-long coexistence like this and the historical tensions which 
accompany it certainly have a strange fascination that goes beyond 
the general teachings of history. 
This is why Akadémiai Kiadó has decided to publish an abridged 
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kennenlernen möchten, es richtet sich an jene, die zwar ungarischer 
Abstammung sind, aber nicht in diesem Kulturkreis aufgewachsen 
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Ungarn wissen möchten, als ein Reiseführer vermittelt. Gleichzeitig 
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